Keynote Abstracts

Tanja Staehler

Tanja Staehler is Professor of European Philosophy at the University of Sussex. Her current research focuses on the bodily experiences and emotions of pregnancy, birth, and being with infants, from a phenomenological perspective. Her research mediates between philosophers (phenomenologists), parents, and healthcare professionals such that the perspectives can be shared as well as differences acknowledged.


Phenomenology of Childbirth between Theory and Practice

In this presentation, I want to reflect on the experience of researching childbirth from a phenomenological perspective. In particular, methodological challenges will be considered that emerge from work at the intersection of theory and practice. My co-designed online learning module for the Royal College of Midwives entitled 'Communication in Labour' will serve as an example for the practical aspect. The module attempts to utilise the concepts of emotions, reflection, responsivity and situation which emerge from the theoretical analysis.
Lesson of Darkness: Phenomenology and Lyotard’s Aesthetics

This paper examines the relationship of Jean-François Lyotard’s aesthetics to phenomenology, especially the works of Mikel Dufrenne and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It argues that Lyotard invents what could be called a postphenomenological aesthetics, which critiques and moves beyond key aspects of phenomenology, but nevertheless continues to be governed by problems of this tradition. Lyotard cites Merleau-Ponty as opening the problem of difference in the aesthetic field, yet believes that the phenomenological approach can never adequately account for it. Lyotard critiques Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty on what he calls a ‘metaphysics of continuity’ which governs their works: the continuity is between silence and signification, or the dark ground of Being or Nature and the light of linguistic meaning. For both, the continuity is given through the mediation of expression, the immanence of the sensory in the poetic, and is grounded in a unitary ontology. Lyotard argues that these approaches cannot do justice to the radical alterity of aesthetic experience, and seeks to accentuate the differences between the sensory and language, and to locate difference in the transgressive and deconstructive effects between these two heterogenous orders. For Lyotard this is not simply an abstract theoretical matter, but one which concerns the capacity of art to be engaged in critical, political practice. After outlining Lyotard’s critiques of Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty, the paper will demonstrate how his late aesthetics, which have received little critical attention, can be seen to return to phenomenological themes but in the form of a reversal. The last section will then clarify the notion of a postphenomenological aesthetics by noting the parallel between Lyotard’s work and some recent attempts to develop a Speculative Realist aesthetics: the suggestion that Kant’s third Critique outlines an access to the real beyond conceptual categories imposed by a subject is a path which Lyotard also explored. Lyotard’s ‘lesson of darkness’ is that the secret power of art can never be brought out into the light of phenomenal appearance, or be subordinated to a stratum of meaning continuous with knowledge, but can only be registered negatively as the mark of a deconstitution. Artworks do not testify to the birth of perception, but to its resurrection.
Luis Aguiar de Sousa: The Lived Body as ‘Tacit Cogito’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

I will focus on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the cogito, in particular as it is presented in the Phenomenology of Perception. As is well known, one of the central aims of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception is to formulate a radically new conception of subjectivity, that is, to introduce the idea of embodied subjectivity. What has received less attention is the connection between this idea and his explicit theory of the cogito. Since the notion of “lived body” does not explicitly appear in the chapter on the cogito from the Phenomenology of Perception, I will make the connection between these two notions to the effect that what Merleau-Ponty calls the “tacit cogito” will be seen to be precisely the “lived body”. The lived body is the most elementary form of subjectivity, upon which all other, more complex, forms are built. As a rudimentary form of awareness, the lived body opens us to the world, it accomplishes our most rudimentary contact with being. In this connection, I will point out that that Merleau-Ponty’s lived body constitutes a new version of Sartre’s pre-reflexive cogito. For both Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, all consciousness must ipso facto be selfconsciousness. However, this does not imply that all consciousness involves explicit reflection upon oneself. On the contrary, just like Sartre’s pre-reflexive consciousness, Merleau-Ponty’s lived body is an impersonal, anonymous entity. Although the lived body possesses a certain type of reflexivity, it is not closed in on itself, rather it immediately finds itself outside in the world. Perception is the fundamental act by which the lived body is not only in contact with the world, but also and primordially with itself. The true cogito consists precisely in this selfcertainty of perception. Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not relinquish the notion of cogito, but rather radically reformulates it.

Lillian Wilde: The Minimal Self in the Face of Trauma: Practical Applications of Phenomenological Theory

I shall contribute to the discussion of post-traumatic pathologies of the self from a phenomenological perspective. Does the self remain constant in severe post-traumatic pathologies, or is it impacted? I will employ a very thin notion of minimal selfhood, in line with Dan Zahavi. I am drawing on the works of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty and shall argue that the minimal self is to be understood in a basic, pre-reflexive sense. As the subjectivity inhabiting the point of view of experience it is intrinsic to experiential life and neither arratively nor socially constructed. Many authors amend the definition of minimal selfhood, making it more complex in order to proceed with arguments that subsequently make it vulnerable to shattering (Sass & Pienkos; Ataria & Somer). When applying these modified definitions, trauma appears to pose a significant threat to the minimal self. I will argue, on the contrary, that minimal selfhood is ubiquitous to experiential life and remains constant. However, that the minimal self is not threatened does not make post-traumatic pathologies of other dimensions of selfhood less severe. Disturbances in the
sense of self, personal ownership, and experiential temporality can leave the traumatised individual devastated. A case study illustrates this. I consequently argue for a multidimensional account of selfhood that acknowledges the compatibility of different notions of the self such as narrative (Dennett) and social (Kyselo) accounts. It is the more complex notions of the self that are vulnerable to shattering. The evidence provided by trauma research thus encourages us to adopt a more complex conception of the self in order to account for its diachronicity, illuminates its fundamental fragility, and highlights the significance of the minimal self as a condition of possibility.

Edmund O'Toole: *Phenomenology and Psychiatry*

By the 1990's biological psychiatry became the dominant approach in dealing with mental disorders. This resurgence began decades earlier in America, where the ‘biological turn’ was an attempt to reform psychiatry along empirical lines and reaffirm the authority and status of psychiatry. Bolstered by developments in pharmacology, the belief was that a revolutionary reorganization of the classification of mental disorders would lead to greater research and validity for the bio-categorical approach. This approach was generally regarded as providing a basis for greater reliability and validity in diagnosing disorders.

Subsequently much of the philosophical considerations in dealing with psychiatry were aimed at providing a scientific description of mental disorder and attempts to define scientific legitimacy. These relied on giving biologically based descriptions and explanations using evolutionary theory and the notion of biological dysfunction. However, critics pointed to the neglect of the phenomenological and intentional experience in psychopathology, many believed that the phenomenological experience should be the first and the most important point of reference, as meaningful expression, in the diagnosis of a condition or disorder. Mental states are phenomenological and intentional in nature but the casual explanation offered by the biological approach leads to the view of the subjective experience of mental disorder as symptomatic rather than meaningful. Biological accounts of functionality did not give the phenomenological experience as meaningful but rather a superficial byproduct of causal relations or underlying dysfunction.

This paper addresses this neglect of phenomenology in psychiatry and how it has impinged on the psychiatric process, from classification of mental disorders to diagnosis and treatment. I will reflect upon the importance of phenomenology for psychiatry socio-historically and why it is hermeneutically significant for multiple levels of consideration. As such, by focusing on phenomenology, this paper highlights the need to reconsider psychiatry as an interpretive science.
Panel B: Sartre

Mary Edwards: *The Phenomenological Foundations of Sartre’s ‘Human-World Realism’*

Drawing upon the work of John Duncan (2005), Thomas R. Flynn (2014), and upon Frederick A. Olafson’s (1967) classic text, *Principles and Persons: An Ethical Interpretation of Existentialism*, this paper argues that the development of Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology is guided by his commitment to providing a robust foundation for philosophical realism. Its aim is to illuminate how, rather than merely enriching our knowledge of experience itself, Sartre’s mature phenomenology seeks to transcend experience toward the concrete realm of worldly being by affirming that human experience provides the basis for a ‘realistic materialism’.

This paper proceeds by first discussing how, despite his initial, enthusiastic engagement with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, Sartre departs from Husserl in his efforts to turn his phenomenology outward – towards deepening our understanding of others and things in the world – rather than inward – toward the self – which is how he interprets Husserl’s work. Then, it traces the development of Sartre’s phenomenological thought from *Being and Nothingness* through to the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and argues that Sartre progressed from using the tools of ‘pure’ phenomenology as a means of examining consciousness, to developing a realist phenomenology that is committed to describing human experience as concrete experience of an embodied self, the world, and others. Finally, this paper highlights some idealist tendencies that persist in Sartre’s thought and poses the question of whether his mature phenomenology can support a defence of ‘realism-proper’. It concludes by gesturing towards an answer in the negative, but which defends Sartre’s choice not to isolate metaphysics from politics in his later work.

Matthew Barnard: *Two Concepts of Anxiety: Heidegger and Sartre on Freedom*

In this paper, I wish to argue that the difference between Heidegger and Sartre’s interpretation of the concept of anxiety lead to two different concepts of existential freedom. These differences have their basis in their distinct understanding of the nature of existence and the self, leading Sartre into an absolute negative conception freedom and Heidegger into a limited and difficult to obtain positive conception of freedom.

For Sartre, in *L’Être et le néant*, anxiety reveals the nothingness that stands between me and what I can do. Nothing, not even my own being, is an obstacle to freedom. Indeed, every time I adequately perceive my own being, I negate it, and am condemned to be able to overcome it. Anxiety is an experience of our capacity: the fact of negative freedom.

For Heidegger, in *Sein und Zeit*, anxiety reveals nothingness as the consequence, not manifestation, of freedom. Rather than an absence of an obstacle in front of us, anxiety reveals the wake of lost opportunities behind us, things we could have and should have done. Anxiety therefore reveals the charge from our authentic self: “Guilty!”. For Heidegger, anxiety expresses our existential responsibility, not to overcome our self, but to make “the choice to choose oneself”.

For Sartre, anxiety reveals the potency of the will to negate the self. For Heidegger, it calls us back to our self. This disagreement provides a case study in the different phenomenological priorities of two highly influential thinkers. In explaining why they are able to disagree so fundamentally about the same
phenomenon, I wish to lend weight to Heidegger's claim that phenomenology is not a set of theoretical discoveries, but a practice.

Panel C: Art and Aesthetics

Max Schaefer: The Clandestine Community of Life: Michel Henry and the Cultural World

This paper will determine how communication transpires between living beings and the cultural world. We argue that Michel Henry’s study of the essence of language reveals a ‘clandestine communication’ to be at the heart of the cultural world, and that this clandestine communication reveals that community is not based on a reciprocity between human beings of a shared nature or worldly condition ("family, solidarity, charity"), but on a non-reciprocity (asymmetrical relation) between the flesh (immanent self-affection) of the living being and its immanent generation in the transcendental self-affection of life. This will be to demonstrate how the non-reciprocity between life and the living being reveals that the reciprocity proper to community cannot be based on the perception of others within the ecstatic appearing (transcendence) of the world, but on the suffering and mobilisation (acting) of the needs and desires of the immanent pathos of life. We will do this by showing that Henry’s account of the genesis of the living being in the transcendental affectivity of life means that the human word is not merely a word of the world (sign, signification), but is at heart a word of life (a fleshly feeling-itself-living). In so doing, we will demonstrate that the possibility and meaning of human communication is not the human word understood as a sign directed toward an external referent, but human language as informed by and speaking to the immanent need of life for its self-growth. By showing how, for Henry, artworks at heart are given as affective tonalities that intensify and arouse feelings of effort within the lived body, we will demonstrate how cultural communities form and can be known “incognito” among those who carry out the needs of life.

O. Bader, A. Peri-Bader: The Presence of Others and the Constitution of Extraordinary Architectural Space

Living with others is a key factor shaping our urban life. Their bodily presence scaffolds our social world and is involved in the way the built environment appears to us. In this article we highlight the influence of the embodied presence of other human beings on the constitution of a special type of urban architecture – the extraordinary architectural space such as museums, theaters, public libraries and central stations. Our analysis, which lies at the intersection between architecture, phenomenology and cognitive science, suggests that being in the direct presence of others constitutes this extraordinary architectural space in the sense that it transforms the built setting into a negotiated place and reveals for the subject some of its extraordinary properties. The architectural examples we discuss show that these intersubjective advantages are often embedded in and encouraged by the design of such built objects.
Anna Yampolskaya: *Aesthetic experience as transformative: Henry and Maldiney on Kandinsky*

I compare how two leading French phenomenologists of the last century – Michel Henry and Henri Maldiney – interpret Kandinsky’s heritage. Henry’s phenomenology is based on a distinction between two main modes of manifestation – the ordinary one, that is, the manifestation of the world and the “manifestation of life”; for him Kandinsky’s work provides a paradigmatic example of the second, more original, mode of manifestation, which is free from all forms of self-alienation. This is why Kandinsky’s paintings do not show us anything, but rather provoke in us certain impressions, certain feelings; they should be experienced, lived through. Henry claims that this living-through of the work of art is transformative; it is a kind of ascetic practice or mystical experience that goes beyond the distinction of the subject and the object. Maldiney also recognises in Kandinsky’s work an attempt to provide an access to an a-cosmic and a-historic experience of one’s inner self; yet for Maldiney this is not a positive characteristic. For Maldiney, the key distinction is not between modes of phenomenalisation, but between two dimensions of meaning (sens): the ordinary one, that he calls “gnostic” (*gnosique*), and “pathic”. This pathic dimension of meaning can be reached only in a personal contact with the living-world in its nascent state. According to Maldiney, there is no radical self-transformation which is not a transformation of one’s being-in-the-world and one’s meaning of the world (and vice versa). My access to myself cannot bypass my relation to the world, and so Kandinsky’s paintings cannot induce a true transformation of self. The disagreement of Henry and Maldiney on Kandinsky doesn’t unfold on the level of the phenomenological description of the concrete aesthetic experience, but rather on the level of metaphysics.

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Panel D: Images and the Imagination

James William Hoctor: *The Prejudices of the Phenomenology of Doubles*

The overall aim of this project is to describe intersubjectivity in twins, however, before this it is necessary to carry out a pre-phenomenological investigation, the aim of which is to make our prejudices about twinship explicit, which in turn, will open the phenomenon to a phenomenological analysis.

Prejudices should not be understood in their everyday sense. Rather, in phenomenology “prejudice” is a technical term. Prejudices condition how something appears as meaningful for us—they colour and shape our perceptions. Therefore, we should not understand this technical term in either a negative or positive sense. To make the prejudices that colour our experience of twins apparent, I turn to the social imaginary, which, according to Charles Taylor, is the background understanding that gives shared meaning to our common social world.

The paper explores visual and literary representations of twins, which demonstrate three values we unequivocally associate with them – sameness, togetherness and closeness. Alone, these values do not represent the prejudices of twinship, rather, these become apparent once we locate twins in relation to these values, namely, at their extremes. In fact, twins are characterised as the extremes of these values, so much so, that very often, we depict them as physically and cognitively conjoined, and twinship as monstrously singular. Consequently, one underpinning prejudice becomes apparent. Precisely, a twin is merely half an individual that only functions correctly as part of a supra-individual unit. I then turn my
attention to theoretical accounts of twinship to ascertain if this prejudice correlates. I argue, while researchers mainly focus on issues with personality and identity formation, the underpinning prejudice is approximately the same. That is, twinship is the consequence of two failed selves which end up forming a single entity or we-self. In other words, the self – other distinction allegedly is lost in twinship.

Mark Thomas Young: The Phenomenology of Maintenance: Technologies in Process

Philosophers of technology have long disregarded maintenance as a derivative form of technological activity. This presentation seeks to challenge this contention by exploring the role that maintenance plays in a phenomenological account of technological practice. The first section of this presentation aims to explore the way technologies often appear as autonomous technical solutions whose efficiency derives largely from their physical design. A good example is the personal calculator, which is commonly understood to perform calculations for the user. Yet while this way of understanding certain technologies may seem natural and intuitive, my goal will be to demonstrate how it is often derivative of a more fundamental level of technical experience in which the efficiency of technologies depends on human activity in the form of decentralised and continuous practices of maintenance. The same technology however, is often experienced by people in different ways and the essential role that practices of maintenance play in the function of various technologies is not equally visible to all. The second section of this presentation therefore explores how the human practices upon which our technologies depend, have a tendency to withdraw from view. By drawing on perspectives from standpoint epistemology, I will argue that our experience of technology is often influenced by our socio-economic location. In particular, it will be shown how general differences between perceptions of the nature of infrastructure technologies in the global north and south align closely with the different modes of technical experience outlined above.

Panel E: Lifeworld

Sonja Feger: On Lifeworld’s Threshold. Hans Blumenberg on the Transition to Theory

The aim of my presentation is to shed some light on the relation between two distinct yet related modes of consciousness. According to Husserl’s Crisis, what precedes any phenomenological, and hence, any theoretical attitude, is what he calls ‘the lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt); lifeworld is the condition of possibility of theoretical understanding. Yet how phenomenology proceeds from practice to theory, from lifeworld to phenomenology, merits philosophical attention. In my presentation, I wish to examine this transition with the help of Hans Blumenberg’s reading of Husserl: both Husserl and Blumenberg consider the lifeworld as the “universe of self-evidence” (Selbstverständlichkeit—literally “that which is understood all by itself”), whereas theory, in contrast, relates to what has become problematic and questionable, calling for being transformed into evidence. In terms of (self-)evidence, lifeworld and theory seem to be strongly opposed to one another. Going one step further, I wish to show that the opposition between lifeworld and theory is only fruitful for an initial account and calls for a more detailed description. For theory not only begins with the vanishing of lifeworld’s self-evidence. Blumenberg’s account of “pensiveness” (Nachdenklichkeit) rather describes a mode of consciousness within the lifeworld that is proto- or quasi-theoretical. In
pensiveness, lifeworldly events have already lost their status of self-evidence and begun to loosen their unquestionability. What pensiveness thus grants us, is an experience of meaning in its own right. However, this mode of consciousness is not identical with the theoretical attitude; pensiveness is rather adequately described as a transitory state between the practical understanding of the lifeworld and a theoretical, reflective engagement with the world.

Lorenzo Girardi: *When was the Lifeworld? Heretical Reflections on Husserl’s ‘Crisis’*

This paper will look at the way two different interpretations of the concept of the lifeworld lead to different political outlooks. In Edmund Husserl’s later work the lifeworld plays a central role as the world of pre-given meaning that is lost from view due to the prevalence of the natural-scientific interpretation of the world. This has led to a foundational crisis in the sciences, but also to a large-scale cultural crisis. In this context, the lifeworld is essentially a pre-scientific world. This raises the question of what a pre-scientific lifeworld would look like.

Jan Patočka largely follows Husserl’s analyses of the lifeworld and the related crises. Yet, in his later Heretical Essays, he provides the interesting suggestion that the lifeworld should not so much be seen as the pre-scientific world, but as the pre-historical world. History here is characterized by the discovery of the problematical character of the world, that is, precisely by the dissolution of the pre-given meaning on which we could rely.

While following Husserl’s criticism of the natural-scientific interpretation of the world as derivative, Patočka thus also denounces the idea that ‘underneath’ such an artificial world we could discover a world of more original meaning that we could turn to in order to resolve the cultural crisis. Even as prehistorical such a non-problematical world seems to have been more of an ideal type than something that could actually have ever existed.

This means that whereas Husserl could have what Patočka would call a non-problematical world as his goal, for Patočka this is just another ideal construct obscuring the lifeworld and its inherently problematic nature. Their different interpretations of the lifeworld consequently lead to two different political praxes: the construction of an ideal in Husserl’s case and resistance to any such ideal in Patočka’s.

Lee Michael Badger: *The Life of Theory: Phenomenology as a Living Practice*

This paper will address a problem in the life of method for phenomenology as it appears in Husserl and Fink. It will raise the question: “How can we phenomenologists live phenomenologically?” The following discussion on the life of phenomenology will have three parts: (1) First, we shall examine the phenomenological reduction whereby the phenomenologist “puts himself out of action”, dislocates from the world and refrains from living in it. However, the phenomenologizing “onlooker” must also remain located in mundane life and continue to live in the world it constitutes. Fink conceives this paradox of mundane participation in terms of a split in transcendence which cleaves constitution into two disparate regions: the phenomenologizing “I” is constituted alongside but differentiated from the world. This divided constitution means the transcendental ego has an indeterminable origin and location with respect to the life-world, and so forms an impossible “gap in the cosmos”. (2) Next, we reconsider the
phenomenologizing paradox as something inescapably bound to life and living, i.e. where the theory and practice of phenomenology lives-on regardless of its dislocation from the life-world. Consequently, we look at the event of the phenomenologizing “I” in Husserl’s idea phenomenology and ask: “What is the living status or original life of absolute consciousness?” But here we find a more radical dislocation of the ego, not just from the time of world, but as already separated from the original phenomenon of temporalizing life: the transcendental ego is positioned to present life as something alien and new, and as mere evidence for world-constitution. (3) Finally, we look to the life of this dislocation and its determination as a living aporia in life of experience. We close with a call to reformulate the intentional life of theory and practice in phenomenology in terms of a radical correlation of living and unliving phenomena.

Panel F: Nature

Pasi Heikkurinen: Ecophenomenosophy: A Response to the Anthropocene

According to Earth sciences, the planet has entered a new geological epoch. This epoch, referred to as the Anthropocene, is characterised by a significant human impact on nature and its processes. While humans have not equally contributed to the destruction of the non-human world, the dominance of this species calls for questioning the contemporary human condition. What is (now) wrong with ‘us’? The ongoing widespread damage caused to the natural world, including the humankind, dates back (at least) to Industrial Revolution. The 19th century transition to new manufacturing processes and its existential relevance is well captured in Heidegger’s critique of technology. Heidegger notes that, in its essence, modern technology is a mode of revealing (Gestell) that takes humans further away from being itself. Albeit successful in challenging the technological frame of the modern human, classic phenomenology, however, does not provide tangible alternatives to think about being in also ecological terms. This paper argues that in order to respond to the undesired anthropogenic changes in the Earth’s biosphere – e.g. rising greenhouse gas levels, ocean acidification, deforestation and biodiversity deterioration – phenomenology needs to go ‘green’. In the Anthropocene, investigations on the human condition cannot be separated from (the question of) nature and its non-human processes. Dasein is not only connected to nature but also embedded in it, as well as unfolding from it. In this paper, I will conjoin elements of (mainly late) Heidegger’s phenomenology with some key tenets of ecophilosophical thinking to reconsider the human place vis-à-vis the rest of nature. As a response to the problems of the Anthropocene, I will outline an ‘ecophenomenosophy’ that rejects human–nature dualism, challenges the idea of progress, and calls for a non-anthropocentric approach to phenomena in the age of humans.

Maria Jimena Clavel Vazquez: Naturalizing Heidegger (Against his Will)

The question regarding the pertinence of using Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein as a guide for empirical research arises from contemporary attempts to bring Heideggerian phenomenology and cognitive science together. I will focus on one of the main figures behind these attempts, Hubert Dreyfus. I will start by
showing that Dreyfus argues in favour of the idea that Heideggerian phenomenology can be naturalized and made continuous with scientific research on the basis of two implicit premises: (a) the interpretation of the analytic of Dasein as a regional ontology; and (b) an account of the relation between phenomenology and science as a relation that holds between two disciplines of the same kind, but that stand at different levels. The aim of this paper is to show that it is not possible to defend these premises on Heideggerian grounds. I will do so by analysing Heidegger’s considerations regarding anthropology, psychology, and biology, and their difference with the analytic of Dasein. I will argue that the main difference can be found in Heidegger’s definition of phenomenological concepts (i.e. formal indications). Finally, I will argue that, although Dreyfus fails to take into account the nature of phenomenological concepts as a relevant methodological matter, his project of naturalization raises a valid concern regarding the possibility of taking Heidegger’s ontology back to a relation with the ontic sciences.

Panel G: Phenomenology in Practice


This paper will review the potential reason for discrepancies in sentencing outcomes in magistrate’s courts in England. Other disciplines such as criminology, psychology and sociology, have tried to explain why sentencing disparities occur, but have resulted in superficial analysis which has failed to penetrate to the core of this particular issue. Through phenomenological inquiry, this paper will investigate how individuals involved in the criminal justice system could potentially be consciously and unconsciously influenced by innately determined types. Conscious and unconscious reliance on subjectively determined types could allow assumptions to inform decision making, particularly when they are used indiscriminately and un-reflexively. This paper will demonstrate how innately determined types could operate in practice in magistrate’s courts, and assess whether it is possible to interrupt these processes.


Phenomenology is often taken as a philosophy involving knowledge or representation of experience: a reflective, descriptive, scientific logos about structures of phenomena. But what if phenomenological discourse, just as such, could also be applied to life as a kind of ethics? What if phenomenology can be a hortatory discourse inviting us into a certain way of life?

For the reflective meaning of phenomenology presupposes a more concrete meaning signifying a form of lived experience itself: a phenomenon with a certain logos or form to it, within it, and as it, which can go on to be represented as knowledge. Here phenomenology is fundamentally and firstly a way of life:
life is phenomenological when it goes in a certain way that flows from, stays with, and lives into the natural grain of spontaneous, immediate, embodied experience.

If life can be phenomenological, however, life can also not be. Life with the grain of experience can be dangerous and difficult, so human life rebels against it with a gamut of theoretical and practical fantasies that are all versions of “metaphysics.” Life with metaphysics is self-contradictory, is inauthentic, and vitiates experience, but it promises us simulacra of safety in purporting to distance us from the threats and challenges we fear in the plane of experience.

Hence phenomenology needs to be seen not only as descriptive but also as evocative of a way of being human. Through meditating on Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy as “therapy” and Merleau-Ponty’s idea that phenomenology means “putting essences back into existence,” I hope to show how phenomenology can be much more than knowledge. Engaging Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty helps us see phenomenology as a therapeutic, evocative discourse, an art of living, an ethics, meant to reconnect us with phenomenological life—meant to invite us into phenomenology as a way of life.

Mike Martin: The Application of Phenomenology to Explore Pre-Service Teachers Experience of Placement in School

This paper reports on the practical application of phenomenology in exploring the experience of pre-service teachers during their school placement as part of their course of teacher education. Whilst there has been much written about teacher education as a whole, there is relatively little research focused specifically on the experience of pre-service teachers as they work through their time in school. For this study, individual interviews were carried out with eleven participants on three separate occasions as part of doctoral work into the development of their subject knowledge. The paper will begin with an overview of the context of school experience where individuals enter new environments, developing relationships with staff and pupils, get to grips with unfamiliar systems and routines as well as acquiring new knowledge about their subject(s). The paper will then critique some of the existing ways of looking at placement such as community of practice, activity theory and social constructivism that all frame the experience within relatively pre-determined structures. This paper then highlights the value of phenomenology in bringing new insights about what takes place, and the experience of the individuals. It will also discuss the importance of making appropriate choices, based on value judgments about which phenomenological traditions and perspectives might prove fruitful. One of the most significant challenges for the study was in making choices about the processes of data explication given the various traditions within phenomenology and the significant figures such as Husserl and Heidegger who have come to represent seemingly different approaches. For researchers new to phenomenology it is necessary to develop a full understanding of this and the paper will highlight some of the challenges met. Finally the findings of the research study will be presented and ideas for further study discussed.
Panel H: Phenomenology

Anna Jani: Ontology and Religious Questioning in Ricoeur’s Phenomenology

My approach to Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenology of religion consists in the primordial hypothesis that the basic question of the phenomenology can be formulated by virtue of the reality of the experienced thing. Ricoeur emphasized both in the introduction to his translation of Husserl’s Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy and in the 1970s that the Husserlian idealist phenomenology is the first step to the experimental phenomenology, i.e. the transcendental phenomenology has a direct connection with the phenomenology of the reality (see: P. Ricoeur, A Key to Edmund Husserl’s Ideas I., Fordram University Press 1996; P. Ricoeur, Husserl. An Analysis of his Phenomenology, Northwestern University Press 2006). In this regard there is a parallelity in the phenomenological methodology by the question on the reality, which leads Ricoeur directly to the phenomenological acting of Christianity.

My aim is to show in my paper the way Ricoeur connected the phenomenological and hermeneutical problematics of Being to the fundamental ethical dimension of the phenomenological ontology, i.e., the way the fundamental ontology of the phenomenology essentially belongs to the individual religious questioning. The originality of the contribution based on the linkage of the two independent question of the phenomenology: the question on the reality of experienced thing, on the one hand, and the phenomenological approach to the religiosity, which is appearing in the ethical acting, on the other hand. The choice of this topic is based on my previous investigations and published results about the realist phenomenology and my contributions to the problem of phenomenology and religious experience.

Marek Pokropski: Practicing Phenomenology in Cognitive Sciences: Toward Theoretical Integration with Mechanism

Phenomenology entered the field of cognitive sciences in the early 90s of the 20th century (Varela 1993). Since then, several proposals for introducing phenomenology to the cognitive sciences have been produced e.g. front-loaded phenomenology (Gallagher 2003), formalization of phenomenological description (Marbach 2010), neurophenomenology (Lutz & Thompson 2003). In my paper, I would like to propose another approach, namely non-reductive theoretical integration with mechanistic explanations.

Mechanistic explanations are applied widely in life sciences especially in biology (e.g. Craver & Derden 2013). However, in recent years there have been attempts at introducing mechanistic thought to cognitive sciences (e.g. Bechtel 2008, Craver 2007) including an attempt to mechanistically explain consciousness (e.g. Oizumi et al. 2014). I will argue that this attempt is doomed to failure due to its phenomenological naivety. However, it can be improved by incorporating a phenomenological approach.

In my paper, firstly, I will discuss the background of practicing phenomenology in the cognitive sciences. Secondly, I will characterize mechanistic explanations and show why the mechanistic naturalization of consciousness will fail if it refuses to incorporate phenomenology. Then, in order to prove that phenomenology can be integrated with mechanistic explanations, I will argue for a new reading of Husserlian phenomenology, namely that it can be read as a kind of functionalism. The main
objective of Husserlian phenomenology was to give adequate descriptions of the functions of consciousness. Furthermore, phenomenologically described functions of consciousness are congruent to some extent with a mechanistic approach - they are autonomous, multi-level, and decomposable. Finally, I will argue that phenomenological practice can be inspiring and deliver explananda to researchers working on mechanistic explanation of consciousness.

Jack Lovell Price: Max Scheler, Critic of Phenomenology

A careful reading and interpretation of Max Scheler’s work highlights a thinker concerned with the diversity and multiplicity of human life. As a vehement critic of reductionism, determinism and the focus of phenomenology on the individual subject, Scheler offers trenchant insights and arguments which retain their power today.

This paper begins by outlining Scheler’s conception of the human being, highlighting its distinction from a classical Husserlian model. For Scheler, it is wrong to conceive of the mind as reason alone. Instead, he offers a broadly tripartite division of mind into the drives and instincts common to the lowest forms of life, habitual and adaptive intelligent behaviours developed by higher animals, and finally self-reflective, rational spirit as the specifically human achievement. Perceptions, and especially intentions, operate on a pre-rational level. Pure experience, free of intentionality and interpretation, is therefore impossible: meanings are hardwired into any conscious experience and any attempt to bracket them away will fail.

Sympathy likewise works at a pre-rational level; it is, for Scheler, the means through which we come to know ourselves. We recognise the other as an individual, and it is through our interaction with them (in particular, through love) that we come to be an individual ourselves. ‘Our’ world is therefore not our own. It is given form and substance by our social–cultural environment and the interactions we have with others. The problem of other minds, which so plagued Husserl, is thereby dissolved. We have, for Scheler, simply got it the wrong way around.

Evaluating Scheler’s arguments, I conclude that it is important not only to see Scheler as a contributor to the grand phenomenological tradition, but to appreciate his role as an original and insightful critic of that tradition, with much to contribute to current problems.

Panel I: Technology

Rachel Coventry: Are the sunglasses a metaphor? Some Heideggerian Considerations of the Essence of Sunglasses

In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger moves from the example of van Gogh’s painting of the peasant’s shoes to Meyer’s poem Roman Fountain. We are told that the painting is not merely a faithful representation of something present at hand but rather it reproduces the shoes in their essence. Next, Heidegger considers Meyer’s poem. He points out that although the poem is a fairly straightforward poetic description, it is not “a reproduction of the general essence of the Roman fountain.” It would seem that, in the poem, truth is set to work symbolically or metaphorically. However, for Heidegger, great poetry cannot be considered metaphoric because it transcends the sensuous/nonsensuous dichotomy at the heart of Western metaphysics. Instead, we must say that the fountain in the poem ‘things’ or opens up the fourfold in a way that is different to the peasants shoes. Heidegger claims that in the technological age
truth withdraws or things stop ‘thinging.’ Despite this, a good deal of contemporary poetry is preoccupied with things as metaphors, perhaps demonstrating Heidegger’s thesis that in the technological age the possibility of great art is threatened. This paper will show how Heidegger’s account can bring us towards a new understanding of contemporary poetry. This is worked out in terms of a pair of sunglasses as an example of a ‘thingless’ consumer object. If Heidegger’s account of technology warrants serious consideration, the question becomes do such objects have essences and if not how are contemporary poets to respond to them? The paper will consider the poem *american sunglasses* by Sam Riviere. It can be argued that sunglasses are enframed in the poem as there are no other options are open to the poet. In other words, what is the role of the poet in a time where essences withdraw?

Zeigam Azizov: *A Temporal Order of Things: Husserl’s ‘temporal objects’ and the (Industrial) Temporalisation of Consciousness*

I will look at the concept of ‘a temporal object’ coined by Edmund Husserl and to address its complex development in the philosophy of technology by the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler as the question of the ‘temporalisation of consciousness’. Husserl coined the term ‘a temporal object’ in order to show that ‘the object of inquiry’ (the intention of the consciousness directed towards objects of the world) is a temporal state of the investigation itself. This temporal state creates the condition for the existence of a temporal object, which gives the ‘striking evidence’ (‘schlagender Evidenz’). A temporal object means that the object is not only in time, but it is constituted through time and its flux coincides with the flux of consciousness. A temporal object plays the role in the constitution of the subject since it is an object towards which the consciousness is directed. The temporal object is the part of the content that it translates (this content is the world). The consciousness is also a part of the content, but there is a difference: the temporal object perceived as a result of the intention may be developed by the consciousness differently: the consciousness may accept this object but also may reject it. In both cases the ‘consciousness’ performs the evidence, whereas the temporal object makes evidence available. The consciousness is the intention of the subject; the temporal object is the intentionality of the world. This idea is developed by Stiegler, who applies the notion of temporal objects to his critique of the technical “industrial temporalisation of the consciousness under the pressure of hyperindustrialisation”. I would like to show how in this process a problem of a fatal separation between the object and the subject is created and continues to influence contemporary thought in relation to technics and memory.

Jonathan Tuckett: *The Cartesian Meditation of Pneuma: the Dasein of a Video Game Character*

“A few seconds ago there was nothing. But now, here I am! There’s only one logical conclusion. I am God and this is my universe.”

The opening line to *Pneuma: Breath of Life* sets the scene for a video game that attempts something very odd for a video game to make the theme of its main story: Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum*—“I think, therefore I am”. Yet, this is exactly what this puzzle game seems to do; going so far, as the opening line indicates, as to critique Descartes’ formulation to suggest that the Cogito would think itself to be God. To a seasoned
philosopher this “conclusion” may seem questionable, indeed some of the meditations that Pneuma proceeds to make from its position of deity would strike us as absurd and philosophically unsophisticated. But, as this paper means to show, this would be the very point of the game’s philosophical exploration: to show the absurdity of the Cartesian Meditation itself. Once this point is recognised, Pneuma reveals itself not to be an exploration of the Cogito, but an exploration of the being of Dasein. As such, contained in the seemingly absurd meditations of Pneuma are novel reflections on Heidegger’s notions of being-toward-death, authenticity and the they-self.

Panel J: Ethics and Politics

Niall Keane: Affective Demonstration and Speaking Communally: The Practice of Rhetoric

Heidegger’s interest in the themes of theory and practice have been well documented, especially his early lectures on Aristotle’s Ethics and his prioritization of praxis over theoria. However, a less explored way into the distinction between theory and practice is to be found in Heidegger’s SS1924 analysis of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (GA 18), which analyses rhetoric in terms of a practical dynamics rather than a techne. Rhetoric, for Heidegger, is a capacity to concretise practically the diverse ways of speaking together. Rhetoric identifies the most practically appropriate means of disclosing what speaks for itself, making something evident in its substantive character.

In Heidegger’s SS1924 lecture course, he argues that the primacy of the practical attitude is represented in the proper use of pisteis, the means of persuasion, which in the parallel theoretical field of dialectic are termed syllogisms. Pistis is not simply about belief, but is a form of affective, embodied, and shared demonstration. In the end, the analogous nature of these two fields of logos, rhetoric and dialectic, practice and theory, hinges on their overlapping and yet distinct approaches to the question of demonstrable truth and how it is disclosed in a twofold manner, either by logical proof or affective demonstration. Logos is thus the fundamental determination of the communal and expressive life of the human being, and finds in rhetoric a degree of demonstrative force which discloses the modal character of truth, which is always tied to context, listener, and affect.

This paper will locate in Heidegger’s analysis of rhetoric an alternative way into the theory and practice distinction, by drawing attention to two types of thinking and speaking, theoretical and practical, and in conclusion the paper will address Heidegger’s attack on metaphysical modality in the name of a deeper and more essential blocked possibility. Heidegger’s reading of the rhetoric, the practical exercise of speaking and hearing together, is an early example of this. His interpretations of the affects of rhetoric are precisely an early attempt to draw our attention to blocked possibilities rooted in the practical attitude.

Elisa Cacopardi: Human Dignity as a Normative Phenomenon. Herbert Spiegelberg’s Perspective

This talk explores the practical application of the phenomenological method, taking account of Herbert Spiegelberg’s phenomenological investigation into typical social entities, such as claims, duties and values,
which are – according to Spiegelberg – ‘praktia’. Spiegelberg’s analysis of the ontological status of such entities focuses in particular on the phenomenon of human dignity, which discloses an essential relation among three normative dimensions, i.e. practical, axiological and deontic ones. The talk consists in two parts. In the first part, it deals with Spiegelberg’s (1933, 1934) phenomenological approach and his foundation of a new science, i.e. praktology [Praktologie]. Spiegelberg’s phenomenological approach consists of both the pure Wesensschau and ‘linguistic phenomenology’, which he inherits from his most influential teacher Alexander Pfänder. According to both Spiegelberg and Pfänder, linguistic phenomenology analyses ordinary language, it grasps potential polysemy of the terms and clarifies those. By both linguistic phenomenology and eidetic intuition, Spiegelberg analyses typical entities, i.e. claims, duties and values. The outcome of such an investigation is the discovery of the phenomenon of human dignity. The phenomenon of human dignity is the object of the second part of the talk. Spiegelberg’s linguistic phenomenology and eidetic intuition ‘work together’ in order to disclose the vagueness of the term ‘human dignity’ and to enlighten essential features of such a phenomenon. According to Spiegelberg (1986), the term ‘human dignity’ has a double meaning: ‘a human intrinsic worth’ and ‘to be worthy of regard’. The phenomenon of dignity grounds on essential relations among claims, duties and values. The talk attempts to shed light on the three-layered construction of the phenomenon of human dignity, bearing in mind Spiegelberg’s investigation: such layers belong respectively to the practical, axiological and deontic sphere and contribute to constitute a genuine normative phenomenon, since each of them counts as a non-independent part of such phenomenon itself.

Aoife McInerney: Practical Thinking

One understanding of the division between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ implies a gap between the spheres of thinking and acting that needs bridging. At the core of the matter lies a standoff between the contingency of acting and the enduring nature of thinking. However, this dichotomy conceals the interdependent nature of theory and practice in which thinking itself is an activity and manifests itself in the world through the inter-action of human beings.

No philosopher dissolves this gap between theory and practice as convincingly as Hannah Arendt in her reflections on both the vita activa and ‘the life of the mind’. By way of phenomenological method, Arendt reveals how engaged action opens a space for appearances and encounters, making the political domain her main phenomenological concern. However, this is not a critique of theory for the sake of it. Arendt also champions a way of thinking, specifically practical thinking, which is intricately connected to the political. Such thinking informs and culminates in worldly action and is concerned with phenomenality. The real issue, then, is not the division between theory and practice, but rather their more nuanced collocation.

After examining such a collocation, this paper will analyze how Arendt’s practical thinking is concretized in the idea of solidarity. Solidarity deals with the abstract values of human rights, while also entailing an essentially performative element. Arendt shows how essential it is to the integrity of this principle for there to be a political interaction. This paper aims to capture Arendt’s phenomenological insights into the interdependent nature of thinking and acting. I contend that an Arendtian account of solidarity allows us to move concretely beyond the seeming opposition between theory and practice, by
showing how she argues that there is something wrong with the very framework of ‘applying theory in practice’.

Jakub Kowalewski: Levinas and the Deformalisation of Time

In a 1988 interview Levinas describes deformalisation of the notion of time as the essential theme of his research. Commentators have usually interpreted this central Levinasian idea as a provision of a concrete experience in which the formal structure of time is realised. Although correct, this accepted definition is too general. As I will demonstrate in my paper, for Levinas, different concrete experiences not only realise time differently, but, more importantly, are able to impact on the formal structure of time-consciousness itself. In order to defend this thesis, I will argue that Levinas understands the form of time-consciousness as governed by a three-aspect internal tendency or ‘conatus’: a striving for the present; a horizontal synchronisation of the past, present, and future experiences; and a self-projection into the infinite future. I will then examine the deformalisation of time in the phenomena of responsibility, fecundity, and death, in order to show the three distinct ways in which these phenomena modify, or put into question, the conatus characteristic of the form of time-consciousness. I will claim that a) responsibility for another human being interrupts the striving for the present, b) fecundity, and the time of the child it promises, refuses horizontal synchronisation, and c) death renders impossible the futural self-projection. I will conclude by suggesting that it is responsibility which occupies a privileged position with regards to the other concrete experiences which allow for the deformalisation of the notion of time.