British Society for Phenomenology
Annual Conference 2018
University of Kent
July 23 – 25
The Theory and Practice of Phenomenology

University of Kent

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Conference Programme
Day 1: Monday 23 July

10:00 – 11.00  Registration and Coffee

11.00 - 11.15  Welcome Address

11.15 – 13.15  Panel A: Transcendence, World, and Ethics
    Marcel Dubovec  ‘The Inner Structure of Heidegger’s Concept of Freedom’
    James Forrest  ‘The World from the Enactive Approach: Degrees of Transcendentalism’
    Julio Andrade  ‘Normative provisionality as a means to navigate Levinasian infinite Responsibility’

13.15 – 14:00  Lunch

14.00 – 15.30  Panel B: Phenomenology and Art
    Rhoda Ellis  ‘Being, the Gallery and Virtual Reality: An Artist’s Take on Building Immersive Artworks’
    Tingwen Li  ‘What If We Exclude Ready-mades from the Artworld? -- On a Phenomenological Response to Institutionalism’
    Bernard Micallef  ‘Drowning on Land: How Truth Sets itself to Work in Wilfred Owen’s Poetry’
    Lawrence Wang  ‘An Aesthetic Phenomenology of Boredom’
15.30 – 15.45  Break with Coffee

15.45 – 17.15  Panel D: Politics and Phenomenology
Aoife McInerney  ‘Phenomenology of Solidarity’
Jack Price  ‘Adorno and Scheler on Action and Experience’
Max Schaefer  ‘A Politics in Need: Love, Action and Justice in Michel Henry’

17.15 – 17.30  Break

17.30 – 19.00  Keynote One
Luna Dolezal  ‘Phenomenology and Intercorporeality in the Case of Commercial Surrogacy’

Respondent  David Corfield, University of Kent
Conference Programme
Day 2: Tuesday 24th July

09.00 – 09.30  Welcome and Coffee

09.30 – 11.00  Panel E: Rethinking the World and the Self
Philip Tovey  ‘Temporal range, future mandate and strategic shaping; the existential and cognitive phenomenological ethics of preventative policing’
Bhaswar Mallick  ‘Paradise on Earth: Tomb of Akbar at Sikandrabad’
Erin Plunkett  ‘Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology’

11.00 – 11.15  Break with Coffee

11.15 – 12.45  Panel F: Phenomenology, The Body, and Development
Hannah Berry  ‘The shoe never fits: a phenomenological revision of empathy’
Ilknur Ozalli  Intersubjective Commitments of Space in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment’
Cate Gibson  ‘Ambiguous Union: Sartre’s Phenomenological Account of Early Childhood’

12.45 – 13.45  Lunch
13.45 – 15.15  Panel G: Edmund Husserl
Zeigam Azizov  ‘Without Origins: Husserl’s ‘temporal objects’ in the light of nonessentialist thinking’
Tarjei Larsen  ‘Husserl's Circularity Argument for the Epoché’
Lorenzo Girardi  ‘The Constitution of the One World: Faith in Husserl’s Philosophy’

15.15 – 15.30  Break with Coffee

15.30 – 17.00  Panel H: Intentionality: History, Human, Inhuman
Tony O’Connor  ‘A Future for Phenomenology: Historicity and Social Intentionality’
Francis Halsall  ‘Inhuman Intentionality: A Geology of Cognition’
Sinead Murphy  ‘Intentionality Dimmed: The Economic Subject in the 21st Century’

17.00 – 17.15  Break

17.15 – 18.45  Keynote Two
Niall Keane  ‘Metaphysics and Nihilism’
Respondent  Todd Mei, University of Kent

Evening: Conference Meal
Conference Programme
Day 3: Wednesday 25th July

09.00 – 09.30 Welcome and Coffee

09.30 – 11.00 Panel I: Phenomenology, Medicine, and Care
James Rakoczi ‘Moving without movement: Merleau-Ponty’s “I can” in cases of global Paralysis’
Sofia Roi ‘Merleau-Ponty and 'Depersonalisation Disorder': A case of dissociation or anxiety?’
Arthur Rose ‘Reorienting Breathlessness: A Case against Symptom Discordance’

11.00 – 11.15 Break with Coffee

11.15 – 12:45 Panel J: Psychiatry and Neurophenomenology
Rafal Kur ‘Phenomenology of Pain in the Context of the Neurocognitive Theory of Consciousness’
Nicolò Valentini ‘Enacting the sense of smell: olfaction, motivation and emotions through the lens of neurophenomenology’
Rajan Nathan & Peter Wilson ‘Phenomenology and causal entities in psychiatry’

12.45 – 13.45 Lunch
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<td>Johannes Niederhauser ‘Heidegger on death in Contributions’</td>
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<td>Rona Cohen ‘“Taking Flesh” in Heidegger: On Dasein’s Bodying Forth’</td>
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<td>David Peace ‘Consenting to Progress: Hans Jonas and the Ethics of Human Experimentation’</td>
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Abstracts: Keynotes

Luna Dolezal
University of Exeter, UK
‘Phenomenology and Intercorporeality in the Case of Commercial Surrogacy’

In this paper, I will attempt to put the maternal-foetal relation through pregnancy into the centre of the ethical questions that arise in the practice of commercial gestational surrogacy. I will proceed by drawing attention to the predominant logic regarding bodies, babies, pregnancy and motherhood that underpins most bioethical discussion regarding commercial surrogacy, making salient the dominant metaphoric and patriarchal landscapes which shape how we commonly understand pregnancy, surrogacy and parenthood in the present day. Following Emily Martin, I argue that key metaphors about the body and bodily events can shape one’s experience and the logic of the practices which surround those experiences. Through describing aspects of the metaphoric landscape within which the practices of commercial surrogacy are primarily thematized, I will demonstrate that a phenomenology of pregnancy, or a theorizing of pregnancy as a complex existential intercorporeal and lived experience, is most often omitted or effaced in bioethical discussions about commercial surrogacy. As such, I will suggest that what is missing in the discourse and bioethical literature on surrogacy is an adequate theorizing of pregnancy. In order to suggest how we might introduce a theory of pregnancy, I will turn to recent phenomenological ontological accounts of pregnancy and intercorporeality, using the insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as a conceptual ground. In doing so, I will describe the phenomenology of the affective maternal-foetal relationship, engaging with Iris Marion Young’s classical discussion of pregnant embodiment alongside recent accounts of the phenomenology of pregnancy from Jane Lymer and Sara Heinämaa. Ultimately I will argue that the role of the surrogate is phenomenologically and existentially significant in foetal development and in the creation of a new human subject through communicative intercorporeal relations. Overall, my aim is to put the maternal-foetal relation and pregnancy, as a complex life-generating and kinship-generating experience with substantial social, developmental and existential significance, at the centre of conversations about commercial gestational surrogacy and to disrupt the predominant logic that surrogate
mothers are merely ‘human incubators,’ or a special type of container or vessel for the foetuses that they gestate.

**Biography**

*Luna Dolezal* is a Lecturer in Medical Humanities and Philosophy at the University of Exeter, UK. Her research is primarily in the areas of applied phenomenology, feminist philosophy, philosophy of embodiment, philosophy of medicine and medical humanities. She is the author of *The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism and the Socially Shaped Body* (Lexington Books, 2015) and the co-editor of *Body/Self/Other: The Phenomenology of Social Encounters* (SUNY Press, 2017) and *New Feminist Perspectives on Embodiment* (Palgrave, 2018).

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*Niall Keane*

University of Limerick, Ireland

‘Metaphysics and Nihilism’

This talk will examine the interconnected issues of metaphysics and nihilism in the works of Martin Heidegger and Ernst Jünger. Exploring the issues of metaphysics and nihilism through the lens of their respective analyses of being and nothing, it will assess Heidegger’s interpretation of Jünger’s position as modern and metaphysical in that it remains trapped within the Gestalt of the human being as the subject that sets in place and produces the world and by doing so secures further production possibilities for itself. However, in Heidegger’s dialogue with Jünger one can detect deep structural affinities, especially in Jünger’s description of nihilism and his attempt to reconceive the ontological question. It is the aim of this talk to explore the points of convergence and divergence and to argue for the necessity of reading Heidegger with Jünger and with metaphysics as opposed to understanding Heidegger’s thought as anti-metaphysical through and through. This talk will address whether Heidegger’s re-conception of being and nothing as one and the same, albeit not identical, is not itself a real expression of metaphysical orientation, that is, whether the cunning of metaphysics is not already operative in Heidegger’s attempts to sketch the contours of another way of thinking about the human being’s relation to the question of being. Taking Heidegger at his word, when he claims that there is no such thing as a last word, especially when it comes to the question of being, it is my contention that his thought is metaphysical to the core and that this becomes clear in his response to Jünger and in what
he took from Jünger. If it is true, as Heidegger claimed, that metaphysics is nihilism proper, then surely his goal must be to confront metaphysics from within metaphysics and not to overcome it. In the end, the paper will argue that there is a problematic tension in Heidegger’s interpretation of the history of metaphysics and nihilism, such that Heidegger vacillates between not wanting to belong to the metaphysical tradition and recognizing that all thought must necessarily belong to this tradition.

**Biography**

*Niall Keane is Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Philosophy at Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick, Ireland. He has published widely in the areas of phenomenology and hermeneutics and is the co-author of The Gadamer Dictionary (Continuum 2012) and co-editor of The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics (Wiley-Blackwell 2016). In addition to his publications on Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Michel Henry, and in the field of ancient philosophy, he is Treasurer of the Irish Phenomenological Circle, and cofounder and coordinator of the Irish Centre for Transnational Studies. His current research project focuses on the transformed nature of the self in Heidegger’s thought.*
Abstracts: Panels

Andrade, Julio
University of Stellenbosch, South Africa
‘Normative provisionality as a means to navigate Levinasian infinite responsibility’
The core of Emmanuel Levinas’s (1969) argument in Totality and Infinity is that because the other cannot be faithfully represented without reducing his/her alterity, I cannot discharge my responsibilities to him/her. As such, my responsibility to the other is infinite. Infinite responsibility is at the centre of Levinasian ethics, however, it is also the most problematic. If I am infinitely responsible for the other, what of my, and all the other others, needs and desires? Levinas responds by positing a third party to the face-to-face encounter with the other. Levinas argues that justice (or the political) is “an incessant correction of the asymmetry of proximity” (1998; 158 emphasis added), i.e. justice or politics must constantly efface the alterity of the other in order to render the other representable, and thus comparable with the third.

However, what such a politics entails in practice is not something that Levinas develops in any depth. He remarks that “[m]y task does not consist in constructing ethics; I only try to find its meaning” (1985; 90). However, his follow-up to this remark hints at an endorsement of just such an enterprise: “one can without doubt construct an ethics in function of what I have just said, but this is not my own theme” (ibid).

It is by expanding on the above ‘incessant correction’ of justice that I hope to offer a way to ‘operationalise’ Levinasian ethics. In order to achieve this, I enlist Woermann and Cilliers’ (2012) ‘provisional imperative’. Pared to its essence, the provisional imperative reads as follows: “When acting, always remain cognisant of other ways of acting” (ibid; 451).I reinscribe this into Levinasian terms – ‘when representing the other, always be cognisant of other ways of representing the other.’ Then, by understanding responsibility as an ability to respond to the demands of the other, a response-ability, I argue that the other as infinity (Levinas takes the idea of infinity as the model for the other), should be understood as the other representing itself in an infinite number of ways, rather than a representation of itself as infinity.

The provisional imperative, I conclude, drives this incessant, and infinite revision of the representation of the other, and concomitantly my
responsibility to the other. The provisional imperative operationalises Levinasian ethics such that infinite responsibility to the other is not rendered quixotic even as it is confirmed as the limit of our responsibility.

Azizov, Zeigam
Independent
‘Without Origins: Husserl’s ‘temporal objects’ in the light of nonessentialist thinking’
I will talk about Husserl’s initial search for the ‘essence’ in his earlier work and his realising the persistence of culture as a non-determinate entity towards the latest period of his philosophical activities. In his lecture given at the Vienna Kulturbund in May 1935 Husserl spoke of “the crisis as a pathological sickness of which the dominant characteristic is a fall into passivity (Passivitat)”. In both cases Husserl wanted to find an answer to the question of the lost contact of people with the sense of their activities, of their mode of knowledge.
By taking Husserl’s initial understanding of ‘a temporal object’ and his later critique of ‘passivity’ I would like to reactivate this question for the world of full of objects like ours. ‘Passivity’ of subjects inhabiting the “Lebenswelt” is connected to the world consisting of fuzzy objects. This is the reason why even without having no proper education of numbers and words anyone who is attracted to new media can learn how to become a hacker. It may be explained as in a sensual human activity-knowledge translated from the brain and extended to other senses. The recognition of ‘a natural attitude’ in a particular reality takes place in this manner on the grounds of intersubjectivity. Objective idealities transcend to subjects and potentially perceivable as without origins.
I claim that ‘re-activating’ of the lost contact is possible through the understanding of objects of the world as they are non-essential. Any object has a quality of the quasi-object and therefore in the state of fuzziness. In order to problematize this inquiry further and to provide a novel understanding of Husserl’ work I will reflect on the theory of ‘fuzzy logic’ by the Azeri-American computer scientist Lotfi Zadeh and its development for my own understanding of non-essential existence of objects.
Berry, Hannah
‘The shoe never fits: a phenomenological revision of empathy’
The contemporary lay use of the term empathy appears to be synonymous with ‘sympathy’, ‘fellow-feeling’ or the ability to “put yourself in another person’s shoes”. For a philosophy which draws on human experience, how much does phenomenology tell us about empathy? How much do we know about the self, the other and the relationship between them? How does empathy differ from Einfühlung?
This paper explores the historical landscape of empathy: its etymology, position in the philosophical field as well as which areas redeveloped, renamed or rejected theories of empathy. Empathy has become a focus point in recent evolving research such as: artificial intelligence, psychology, sociology, criminology, communication studies, and neurobiology and disability studies.
Contemporary phenomenology offers a different perspective on what empathy is and is for than traditional theories in the field. I compare aspects of Zahavi’s theory of empathy and Husserl’s to suggest which is most effective in the application and development of understanding human nature. I then propose a theory of epistemic or aesthetic empathy that is built on an interpretation of Husserl, which in turn allows us to rediscover certain aspects of transcendental phenomenology (as Husserl’s philosophy is a precursor to preconception and landscaping of empathy). My theory projects elements of traditional and contemporary phenomenology to better understand how, why and what it is when we do empathy.

Cohen, Rona
Tel-Aviv University
“‘Taking Flesh’ in Heidegger: On Dasein’s Bodying Forth’
In discussing the phenomenology of the body in the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger draws a distinction between the spatiality of Dasein and its body. According to Heidegger, Dasein is not spatial because it is embodied. Rather, “its bodiliness is possible only because Dasein is spatial”. Here, Heidegger puts into service the distinction between spatiality and embodiment to draw a distinction between the ontological and the ontic: the spatiality of Dasein is prior to Dasein’s embodiment, which is to say, Dasein is ontologically spatial and ontically embodied. In another of the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger addresses the phenomenology of the body by invoking Husserl’s distinction between Korper [“the corporeal thing”] and Leib [“the body”].
However, Heidegger gives this distinction a spatial interpretation. He claims that the corporeal thing stops with the skin, nevertheless noting that, “phenomenologically, Dasein always exceeds the corporeal limit [...] when pointing with my finger toward the crossbar of the window over there, I [as body] do not end at my fingertips”. According to Heidegger, the bodily phenomenological limit extends beyond the corporeal spatial limit. Owing to this, he explains, the two “limits” do not coincide. How, then, is this argument compatible with Heidegger’s former claim that Dasein’s spatiality is its mode of being and the body is “ontic”? In this lecture, I present this dilemma in Heidegger’s text vis-à-vis Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between body and flesh in The Visible and Invisible. I suggest that Heidegger’s (little-known) notion of bodying forth [Leiben] introduced in this seminar could supply a solution to this dilemma.

Dubovec, Marcel
‘The Inner Structure of Heidegger’s Concept of Freedom’
The purpose of this paper is to present Heidegger’s concept of freedom between 1927 and 1930. It puts emphasis on the difference between the fundamental-ontological and the transcendental concept of freedom. The elaboration of this difference is founded on the transformation of the ontological difference in its three forms: the difference of the being of beings (existential approach), the difference of the being and beings (transcendental/metontological) and the cosmological difference as a difference between the thing and the world (phenomenological metaphysics). The central manifestation of the difference is the possibility of a deeper understanding of freedom beyond its existential structures (Being and time) that focus on authenticity. The transcendental concept of freedom is the essence of the ground in the context of transcendence and the world and as such it is also the ground for existentially conceived freedom. In order to show this hierarchy in particular, Heidegger’s debate on Kant’s concept of freedom as spontaneity will be explained. Spontaneity is a specific form of causality and as such it is also grounded in transcendental freedom. The limits of a hierarchical way of thinking illustrate themselves in the significance of freedom for the essence of truth. This refers to the inner transformation of Heidegger’s philosophy into the thinking of being from itself. In this context, the importance of a possibility to evolve the concept of freedom in its metontological turn is emphasised. On this metontological way of Heidegger’s thinking, Hungarian philosopher
László Tengelyi follows with his concept of phenomenological metaphysics that is placed beyond the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics. Tengelyi’s concept of freedom as a partial causality is of particular significance to this subject.

Ellis, Rhoda
‘Being, the Gallery and Virtual Reality: An Artist’s Take on Building Immersive Artworks’

Dreyfus was right when he told computer scientists they were wrong during the first wave of virtual reality (VR). While technology companies continue to turn to cold, hard, objective, neuroscience to ‘trick’ the body into a sense of immersion, the recent resurgence of VR has also seen a wider acknowledgment of the body and the increased prevalence of phenomenology in discussions about VR. We may no longer be dreaming that extropian dream in quite the same way anymore, but we’re making artworks in and for virtual reality with a-whole-new approach.

Through practice-led research into the making, and recreating, of sculptural artworks, I have found it more meaningful to draw on the aesthetic tradition and art theory – from Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Benjamin, up to contemporary thinkers like Noë and Paterson. As a sculptor I work in 3D space, rather than as a 2D image maker, and have found aesthetics that relies too heavily on the visual has left me questioning. Here I focus on two of my artworks that were made with movement, touch and atmosphere very much in mind. Both were designed to be experienced in an art gallery setting, within all the traditions that entails, by interacting via the HTC Vive headset and moving within the artwork at life-scale. The mixed reality piece Being-in-the-Gallery explored embodiment of the immersive experience and the aura of the virtual art object – with the viewer-participant invited to touch an original sculpture while seeing it veiled in a virtual copy. In Virtual Halls I was commissioned to remake an artwork by the late video artist David Hall in VR, leading to questions of authenticity in the methodology, preservation and experience. The line of my argument shows the passage of my engagement with a number of philosophers and how they continue to influence my practise.
Enactivism and embodied cognition movements at large are gaining influence in diverse fields ranging from cognitive science to philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, and anthropology (Hutto 2017, p.378). As Francisco Varela’s dream of extending and expanding Merleau-Ponty’s work intertwining empirical research with phenomenological investigations comes further to fruition, it’s pertinent to pause and ask the question: what do different branches of enactivism have to say about the status of the world we inhabit? This paper proposes a conceptual taxonomy of varieties of enactivism with respect to their metaphysical claims of mind-(in)dependence of the physical world. This taxonomy would be orthogonal yet compatible with others such as Ward, Silverman, and David’s differentiation of autopoietic, sensorimotor, and radical enactivisms (2017, p.369).

Consider that one finds explicitly transcendental and anti-foundationalist perspectives on the existence of world in texts like The Embodied Mind (Varela et al, 1991), echoing what some have called the correlationist metaphysics of the later Husserl (Beck 1928; Zahavi 2017, p.114). In these cases, what’s being enacted is the real world itself. An alternative possible reading of some texts, e.g. Mind in Life, suggest that what’s enacted is a ‘selection’ or ‘interpretation’ of an environing world to create a phenomenal world (Thompson 2007). Other branches, for instance O’Regan’s work, lend themselves to objective realist interpretations, where sensorimotor activity is taken to offer objective determinations of enacted phenomenal qualia (O’Regan 2012, p.180). Still others more or less explicitly bracket metaphysical commitments altogether (cf. Gallagher). I propose to call these four kinds of enactivism, respectively; (1) correlationist, (2) phenomenal, (3) objective, and (4) bracketed. Using this heuristic outline I will further raise the question of how naturalism and transcendentalism, or realism and anti-realism, are taken to combine coherently in versions 1-3.

In this talk, I propose a phenomenological account of early childhood drawn from the works of Jean-Paul Sartre. I argue with Sartre that the infant and
primary caregiver (here, the mother) exist in an ambiguous union, and support this account with reference to developmental psychology. It is in his later biographies and autobiography that Sartre explores the phenomenology of childhood. He does not consider the adult and child to be ontologically different; rather, he is led to revise his existing phenomenology of the human subject (being-for-itself), in particular the relation of the for-itself to Others. The infant is a pre-reflectively self-aware subject from birth but lacks reflective self-awareness. Without reflective self-awareness, the infant has no personal, social or historical self. According to Sartre in The Family Idiot, the infant gains a sense of its own body through internalising the mother’s loving touch. Through the relationship with its mother, the infant learns that there is an objective world and that the mother is Other, which gradually leads to the development of a personal sense of Self. I infer from this that the mother and child initially exist in an ambiguous union, where the boundaries between Self and Other are indeterminate. This is not the ontological union of the ‘We’—Sartre rejects the idea of a joint subject in Being and Nothingness. But, like Merleau-Ponty, Sartre claims that there is an original reciprocity between mother and child, where intention is grasped before articulation. The child’s first experience of being-for-others becomes incorporated into its experience of being-for-itself. Thus, not only does Sartre’s phenomenological description enrich our philosophy of childhood, but also it illuminates our understanding of relations with other people.

Girardi, Lorenzo
Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick
‘The Constitution of the One World: Faith in Husserl’s Philosophy’
Edmund Husserl’s philosophy is characterized by an eminently rationalist outlook. It contains some of the key features of the Enlightenment-project: a focus on the spirit of reason, a rational teleology, and universalism. It is perhaps the most critical version imaginable of this project, allowing for no justification that cannot be found in intuitive experience. This paper will point out a tension between this methodological limitation of Husserl’s phenomenology and the scope of his philosophy as a whole. It will do so by looking into the way Husserl conceives of the possibility of the constitution of one world for all of humankind. While Husserl can experientially justify the process of universalization based on the horizontal nature of experience, he cannot justify the outcome of this
process. That is, he cannot provide experiential justification for the idea that this process of universalization necessarily culminates in the same world for everyone who engages in this process. The possibility of a single rational world for all is more of a deeply entrenched assumption than a possibility that is properly justified.

After showing that recourse to experience is insufficient to justify the possibility of such a world, it will be shown that in the end Husserl backs up this speculative possibility through an act of faith. Showing the role of faith in Husserl’s account of the constitution of the one world puts the explicit references to faith in the Crisis in a new light. They might be more than rhetorical devices, revealing something about the nature of the crisis and Husserl’s solution to it, as well as providing a useful heuristic to distinguish Husserl’s thought from that of later phenomenologists. In doing so, the deep practical or even existential concern that forms the backbone of Husserl’s thinking, but that is not always acknowledged, is highlighted.

Halsall, Francis
National College of Art and Design, Dublin
‘Inhuman Intentionality: A Geology of Cognition’

In The Inhuman Lyotard asks: “Can thought go on without a body?” In this paper I offer the speculative answer of no; but that body doesn’t have to be human but instead instances of material complexity.

Lyotard claims that “Thought is inseperable from a phenomenological body” and “As a material ensemble, the human body hinders the separability of this intelligence, hinders its exile and therefore survival. But at the same time the body, our phenomenological, mortal, perceiving body is the only available analogon for thinking a certain complexity of thought.” (1991: 22)

To rephrase Lyotard’s question, my starting question in this paper is: What if Intentionality is not specific to Human thought? From this follow the further questions: what if other entities exhibit an intentional relationship to the world; what would it mean to say that intentionality is not even specific to biological life but, instead, emerges from instances of material complexity?

This requires considering that intentionality is not a feature specific to humans but instead emerges from processes of complex material organisation. Or, in other words, that intentionality is not a feature unique to consciousness but rather one that consciousness shares with other complex systems.
In advancing this claim I introduce three accounts of material complexity that point toward an account of intentionality in material complexity. These are Jeremy England’s theorisation of self-organisation in matter arising from the 2nd law of thermodynamics; A.G. Cairns-Smith’s attempt in Evolving the Mind (1996) to reconcile “molecular mechanics and conscious experience” and Max Tegmark’s claim that “consciousness can be understood as a state of matter.” Having introduced these positions I will essay the prospect that complex systems display the same aboutness and directedness that human consciousness also displays. That is that we might consider not only a phenomenology of intentionality, but also a biology and a geology of intentionality too. Or, conversely, that not only human, but also biological and material systems might also have a phenomenology.

This paper is part of the joint panel: Intentionality: History, Human, Inhuman, presented by Sinead Murphy, Francis Halsall and Tony O’Connor
The papers on this panel propose, respectively: that intentionality is an irreducibly historical/cultural achievement that is central to human experience; that intentionality is a feature, not only of human but of inhuman modes of being, with implications for claims about the historical/cultural character of intentionality; that intentionality is diminishing as a feature of human experience, with implications for claims about the historical/cultural character of intentionality as well as the status of current interest in widening the attribution of intentionality to comprehend non-human beings.

Kur, Rafal
Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
‘Phenomenology of Pain in the Context of the Neurocognitive Theory of Consciousness’
Concepts of consciousness are struggling with the matter of subjective sensations. More precisely, with the subjective qualities associated with sensations. In most topics related to the functions of the mind, these have been reduced to specific functions of the brain. It is not possible to reduce states of consciousness to mere brain functions. For this reason, the quality of sensations is best viewed from the point of view of subjective cognitive mechanisms. And subjective experiences exist as they can be felt, though we still do not understand why this happens. We owe the way we
experience the quality of sensations to complex cognitive mechanisms. Evidence of this can be seen in patients with damage to somatosensory areas and pathways that leads to loss of sensations. Apart from some selected theories on sensations, I will also present a few experiments on individuals suffering from paralysis of phantom limbs. These experiments show that the sensation of pain appears to be associated the way stimuli reaching the brain are interpreted (Ramachandran, 1999). Experiments have confirmed that there are brain mechanisms responsible for interpreting experiences of pain. Undoubtedly, the nature of sensations and consciousness can be tested by the analysis of pain-related phenomena. However, how do we study pain sensations? It seems that the most useful tool is phenomenology, which already has an extensive theoretical (philosophical) apparatus for the analysis (deep introspection) of qualitative (subjective) data. I will present examples on how this type of first-person perspective (introspection) can also serve and enrich the medical third-person perspective. Nonetheless, in a broader context, I would like to show how this type of qualitative data can be used to better understand and interpret brain states (conscious sensations).

**Larsen, Tarjei**  
**University of Stavanger, Norway**  
**‘Husserl’s Circularity Argument for the Epoché’**

According to Husserl, epistemology is possible only as phenomenology. In my paper, I assess one of his arguments for a crucial part of the considerations he offers in support of this claim. Husserl takes the central problem of epistemology to be “the problem of transcendence”, or the problem of the possibility of transcendent cognition – very roughly, justified judgements about objects that do not form part of the judging subject’s consciousness. And he argues that any form of cognition by means of which this problem – and, by extension, any other genuine epistemological problem – can be solved must satisfy a number of methodological requirements, which, he maintains, only phenomenological cognition satisfies. Chief among these is that any attempt to solve the problem of transcendence must involve the performance of an “epistemological epoché”, by which Husserl means a general refraining from making cognitive use of transcendent cognition. He offers different arguments for this requirement, the arguably most important of which is that attempting to
solve the problem of the possibility of transcendent cognition by means of transcendent cognition would be viciously circular. Despite its significance for Husserlian metaepistemology, this argument has not really been assessed by commentators, who, to the extent that they have considered it, have tended merely to reiterate it. Seeking to remedy this, I claim that there is strong reason to believe that the argument fails. Acknowledging that employing transcendent cognition to solve the problem of transcendence would be circular, I argue that it’s far from clear that it would be viciously so, if account is taken of the fact that, as Husserl insists, the problem at issue is how transcendent cognition is possible, not whether it is possible. I end by briefly considering the consequences that the failure of the circularity argument would hold for Husserl’s conception of epistemology.

Li, Tingwen  
Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge  
‘What If We Exclude Readymades from the Artworld?’

Readymades had formed a significant challenge to the tradition of art. While analytic aestheticians have been devoted to solving the problem of readymades, phenomenological aesthetics had paid little attention to this issue before the 1990s. John Barnett Brough, an American Husserlian philosopher, is among the earliest phenomenologists who were to combat the question of readymades. In his early discussion, unlike most of the phenomenological aestheticians who attend to art through aesthetic experience, Brough’s concern is more with the “classificatory” sense of art by interpreting Dickie’s and Danto’s institutional formulations from the perspective of late Husserl’s “Cultural World,” claiming that “a work of art is an artifact created against the horizon of the artworld and presented to an artworld public for its contemplation.” However, in the work published three years later, Brough seemed to change his idea of the analytic approaches by pointing out what they have to sacrifice for accommodating readymades in the artworld: Dickie would have to make a difficult choice between the artfactuality of artworks and “unaided” readymades, whereas Danto would pay the full cost of losing the whole classic world of art, which is also argued by James Foster who contrasts Gadamer to Danto in terms of their justifications for modern works of art. As a result, Brough is about to save the artworld by abandoning the readymades, albeit there is also expense of excluding them: not only of becoming philosophically
disreputable, but also of thrusting a potential risk onto the artworld that has already been. For one, it refers to how we tolerate, involve, or assimilate a subverted event that has already been admitted by a tradition. For another, it is related to the flaws of Husserl’s views of historical sedimentation upon which Brough builds his phenomenology of artworld.

Mallick, Bhaswar
University of Cincinnati
‘Paradise on Earth: Tomb of Akbar at Sikandrabad’
Globalization’s dissolution of boundaries parallels a resurgent identity politics, exacerbated by religious invocations. Evidently, the Islamic heritage of India is being repositioned as foreign and incongruent to the nation-state’s cultural legacy. A prime case in point is the recent exclusion of the Taj Mahal from the state government’s tourism booklet—this iconic heritage having been labelled as the architectural flagbearer of Islamic rule in India. But this exclusion is also symptomatic of the primacy of classifications: architecture’s ‘scientific method’ – a work identified by its style and age, its origin and author, and an objectified list of its features.

This paper presents an alternative, rooted in the discourses of phenomenology, that can illuminate the nature of situated human interactions more holistically, and hermeneutics, that can reveal the continuing relationships between works of the distant past with the always new present. To account for the booklet’s missed opportunity, this paper will dwell not on the Taj Mahal, but on the tomb of the most powerful Mughal Emperor Akbar, at Sikandrabad. Ignored and attracting far fewer tourists, this monument recedes into relative obscurity, although located within the same city.

This paper argues that the tomb remains relevant to modern India because it incites questions of life and death, of living and dying; it claims legitimacy as a work of art – a meaningful and on-going, ever-present human experience. The work works best by transforming a sense of being with the deceased in a place after death, to become a respite in mortal life for soulful contemplation; realised for heightened sensitivity, activated by bodily engagement, and explored within spatial sequences, all encompassed as a holistic architectural experience. In introspection, it provides insight into what Islam, and the human experience in general, are for you and me today, beyond yet through constructions of a defined past.
McInerney, Aoife
University of Limerick
‘Phenomenology of Solidarity’
The term plurality is somewhat in vogue of late; yet, arguably its implications were not taken seriously until Hannah Arendt. Arendt displays a genuine engagement with what plurality actually means and what it has to offer. The consequences of this, on the one hand, call for a theoretical reframing of the conditions of political action and interaction. On the other, they force us to rethink the nature of pluralistic co-existence. While plurality may present challenges, such as how does one truly participate at the political level and how does the notion of solidarity fare against the reality of difference and uniqueness contained in everyday communal life and practice, a phenomenological investigation of plurality provides a compelling approach to today’s most vexing social-political problems. In order to extract the full potential from Arendt’s notion of plurality, this paper will begin at the conceptual level and systematically iron out the theoretical implications of plurality and the methodological challenges it presents. Subsequently, it will further explore what plurality has to offer in the political domain and how it is actualized, that is to say, how a theory of solidarity becomes practice. Finally, in terms of my own contribution, this paper will analyze these pluralistic implications in light of forming solidaristic relations which the notion of plurality could be seen to undermine. The notion of plurality that Arendt tries to capture is one which, in spite of a seeming conceptual contradiction, -- different but equal, separate but unified -- remains faithful to the phenomenon of political life with others, that is to say, the lived experience of intersubjectivity. Ultimately, Arendt’s contributions culminate in an innovative ethics of participative plurality which has far-reaching implications for current social policy, such as fostering solidaristic understanding and cooperation, and managing international mobility.

Mehmel, Constantin
University of Essex
‘Towards a Phenomenology of Disorientation’
Experiences of disorientation are both diverse and common: moving countries, losing a significant other, falling severely ill or not fitting in. Most fear feeling disorientated and navigate through life accordingly. In such experiences, we appear to lose our bearings in and with the world, which has tended towards an interpretation of disorientation in purely negative
terms as a ‘loss of orientation’. Yet, what kind of experience do we actually designate with ‘disorientation’? The phenomenon of disorientation has rarely been explicitly addressed in philosophy and remains, in many respects, poorly understood. This paper seeks to further enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of disorientation. (i) I begin by outlining the predominantly negative image of disorientation as ‘loss of orientation’. This will help me motivate the question of if, and to what extent, we are still orientated at times of disorientation, despite the tendency to treat the phenomenon as an either/or condition. In contrast, I will suggest that we no longer go on in one sense, yet we have a different kind of orientation. (ii) Then, as one way of motivating this view, I turn to the phenomenologically rich case study of interpersonal grief. The loss of one’s loved one is not just a loss of orientation towards one’s partner, insofar as the absence of one’s partner is still orientating me, although in a different way. Understanding the ways in which the experience of grief changes the bereaved agent’s orientation thus demonstrates that we are still orientated within the loss of orientation. (iii) On this basis, I propose that the phenomenon of disorientation is not adequately captured if it is analysed solely as a loss of orientation but instead requires an account of the complex interplay between orientation and loss of orientation that characterises experiences like grief.

Micallef, Bernard
University of Malta
‘Drowning on Land: How Truth Sets itself to Work in Wilfred Owen’s Poetry’
In this paper I will be focusing on Wilfred Owen’s epistolary and poetic figure of drowning on land to illustrate Heidegger’s notion of poiesis as a peculiar historical truth set to work “according to the manner” in which a work of art unfolds (“The Origin of the Work of Art” 69). As opposed to being technologically enframed or lost in practical application, in art an object unfolds progressively and meaningfully, since poiesis entails an ongoing conflict (between World and Earth) that clears an ontological field whose originating potential is more significant than the particular appearance of the things it brings forth (“The Origin of the Work of Art” 51, 54). Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of dehiscence, the opening or rift in the flesh of being that allows for an emergent growth or an extended shape of things is
a related phenomenological concept that will be cited in support of Heidegger’s view of poetic art as an originary clearing in being. Owen’s recurring theme of an engulfing earth against which man strives to rise as a distinct being is exemplified by, for instance, his letter to his mother of 16 January 1917, wherein he famously wrote about his unit’s advance on to an embattled zone not like “mud, not sloppy mud, but an octopus of sucking clay” (Cooke 62-3). The octopus blends with the seabed which would then seem to rise and engulf its prey. This blending ascribes to the embattled zone the deadly intent of absorbing a human world into its amorphous substance whose elemental force is vividly conveyed in poems such as “The Sentry,” “Asleep,” “Dulce et Decorum Est,” and “Exposure.” How does such a battlefield allow for the meaningful unfolding of or clearing for a human world?

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**Murphy, Sinead**

**Newcastle University**

‘Intentionality Dimmed: The Economic Subject in the 21st Century’

According to Paolo Virno (‘The Ambivalence of Disenchantment’, 1996), intentionality is one of ‘the salient traits with which the metaphysical tradition invested the dignity of the subject.’ Also according to Virno, intentionality is, in our society, ‘atrophied.’ This paper seeks to illuminate Virno’s claim – that intentionality is now and increasingly dimmed as a feature of human experience – with insights gained from The Invisible Committee’s account (Now, 2017) of the mode of subjectivity that accompanies capitalism’s trajectory from industrialized production to monetized competition. This mode of subjectivity is economic ‘all the way down’, and approaches a wholesale cyphering of the generic categories and behaviours that serve global corporate interests; the hopes and fears of the economic subject are increasingly not about anything, but are free-floating and opportunistic, ‘capable of complete detachment from the tenuous life-worlds’ (Virno, ‘The Ambivalence of Disenchantment’).

For The Invisible Committee, the urgent task for the economic subject is to exit the economic mode, and allow to crystallize around itself something akin to a way of life. This paper concludes by considering what role there might be for philosophy in this task, pointing to a transition in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer: from the ‘critical’ philosophy of question-and-answer described in Truth and Method (1960), in which Gadamer posits the encounter with art as central and intentionality as a given trait of human
experience; to the philosophy of trust, or belief, of later lectures and interviews, in which it is engagement with the medical sciences that is made central, and the waning of intentionality is admitted as a feature of contemporary life. We may not, after all, be ‘always affected, in hope and fear, by what is nearest to us’ (Truth and Method, 1960).

This paper is part of the joint panel: Intentionality: History, Human, Inhuman, presented by Sinead Murphy, Francis Halsall and Tony O’Connor
The papers on this panel propose, respectively: that intentionality is an irreducibly historical/cultural achievement that is central to human experience; that intentionality is a feature, not only of human but of inhuman modes of being, with implications for claims about the historical/cultural character of intentionality; that intentionality is diminishing as a feature of human experience, with implications for claims about the historical/cultural character of intentionality as well as the status of current interest in widening the attribution of intentionality to comprehend non-human beings.

Nathan, Rajan and Peter Wilson
CWP NHS Foundation Trust & Universities of Liverpool and Chester
‘Phenomenology and causal entities in psychiatry’
Psychiatric training emphasises the need to make sense of the patient’s experience at the symptom and diagnostic level of abstraction. In so far as attention is given to obtaining a representation of mental phenomena, this is a means to satisfy rules that define symptoms and diagnoses. In view of the questionable historical and empirical provenance of these rules, it is not surprising that underlying causal entities have proved elusive.
The authors will draw on their clinical practice and the relevant academic literature to make the case for phenomenological analysis, not only to elucidate psychiatric experiences (in line with the tradition of Jaspers), but also as a process to generate data to explain these disturbances (i.e. extending beyond the limits of Jaspers’ notion of ‘static’ understanding).
In this paper, the authors will demonstrate that neurobiological and phenomenological disciplines can complement each other in explaining troubling psychic events. However, using solely the language of brain structure, chemistry and circuits does not allow description of either what is troubling or psychic. Therefore, a neurobiological account in itself will never be sufficient for understanding.
Additionally, the authors will make the case for identifying causal entities through phenomenological inquiry. The advantage of phenomenology over the traditional symptom enquiry approach will be illustrated by case examples of different types of psychopathology. The authors propose a two-step process comprising (i) phenomenological inquiry to produce a representation of the patient’s experiences without interference from preconceptions, and (ii) an analysis of this representation to identify an explanatory entity using principles emerging from the empirical literature in relation to mental mechanisms. Unlike the common use of existing psychological models in clinical practice, in the second step the psychiatrist must refrain from applying mechanisms that are generally associated with certain experiences and confine his/herself to the data elicited in that case.

Niederhauser, Johannes
University of Warwick, Philosophy Department
‘Heidegger on death in Contributions’

It is well known that Heidegger devotes a substantial amount of time on the analysis of death in Being and Time. Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility and as such death is what gives rise to Dasein’s factical possibilities. But it has so far often been neglected that death continues to be important in Contributions to Philosophy. In Contributions Heidegger calls death “the highest testimony to being” and in this talk I would like to explore this notion further by comparing it to Heidegger’s initial analysis of death in Being and Time. In a nutshell, I shall argue that death is one of the central human features that Heidegger attributes to being (“beyng”), as he begins to think in terms of the event of appropriation. I shall argue that death itself becomes a moment or an interest of being and it is now upon being itself to run forth toward death and thereby come into its own. That is to say, that death is now an aspect of the history of being. This is why Heidegger, for example in Why Poets?, says that death touches mortals. In this talk I shall present which aspects of Dasein’s ownmost possibility Heidegger transfers over to being itself. This should add to a clearer understanding what Heidegger means by a thinking out of the event of appropriation and how this later approach differs from the hermeneutical phenomenology of Being and Time.
O’Connor, Tony  
‘A Future for Phenomenology: Historicity and Social Intentionality’
The paper supports a core claim of phenomenology that intentional properties are central to human experience and our place in the world. This permits a strong defence of the philosophical value of phenomenology against its post-structuralist, post-modernist and autonomist critics such as Foucault, Lyotard, and Virno, etc. The defence highlights some beliefs and concepts shared by both sides, especially historicity and social intentionality. It argues that to maintain philosophical relevance into the future, phenomenology must sacrifice the foundationalist presumption inherited from ancient Greek philosophy, namely the supposed invariant principle that reality necessarily involves an unchanging structure which can be known as such. Thus, the argument of the paper has a twofold thrust: the foundationalist Greek thesis is not a necessary truth; it is not conceptually necessary that reality should possess an unchanging character. It will be argued that reliance on the concepts of historicity and social intentionality allows the development of a coherent philosophical discourse, which may validly rely on personal and social intentional/historical beliefs and practices as shared by phenomenology and its critics. The argument will be supported by citing Husserl on the historical apriori and the life-world, Gadamer’s concept of historically effective consciousness, Merleau-Ponty’s account of operative intentionality, and Foucault’s use of the notions of episteme, the historical apriori, and biopower.

This paper is part of the joint panel: Intentionality: History, Human, Inhuman, presented by Sinead Murphy, Francis Halsall and Tony O’Connor
The papers on this panel propose, respectively: that intentionality is an irreducibly historical/cultural achievement that is central to human experience; that intentionality is a feature, not only of human but of inhuman modes of being, with implications for claims about the historical/cultural character of intentionality; that intentionality is diminishing as a feature of human experience, with implications for claims about the historical/cultural character of intentionality as well as the status of current interest in widening the attribution of intentionality to comprehend non-human beings.
Ozali, Ilknur

‘Intersubjective Commitments of Space in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment’

This paper deals with the relationship between ethics and space in Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodiment. Thinkers working on the theme of ethics in his phenomenology, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to space. This paper suggests some ways in which lived space is important for an adequate account of an ethics of intersubjectivity. Beginning with the living body-world movement, and pointing how our sense of space emerges from it, I argue that the sense of space develops in a social setting that is inherently related to others, and thus, always involves intersubjective significations. To secure this point and approach the connection between body and space, I will first start by giving an examination on Merleau-Ponty’s non-dualistic account of the lived body as presented in the Phenomenology of Perception (1945). As is well known, he promotes the importance of embodied perception with special focus on how one experiences the world through one’s body and how one lives one’s body in the world. Hence, he is not concerned with traditional approaches of space as an already established geometrical system which places the subject as a passive receptor of spatial information. Instead, the sense of space is rooted in the body’s active engagement with the world. In this connection, I will point out that spatial experience is constituted in perceiver’s dynamic crossing to the world. This theoretical result demonstrates a deeper rapport between body and space which in turn presents a new framework for one’s openness to her situation in the world and how it relates to its ethical implications. I consequently show that in the crossing of the body and world, there exists an interdependence between self and other, and thus this interdependence shows the inseparability of the ethicality and spatiality.
‘Consenting to Progress: Hans Jonas and the Ethics of Human Experimentation’

Under what conditions are we justified to cause pain to others? From Jeremy Bentham to Karl Brandt, the principle of medical utility – based upon the doctrine of the greater good – has justified experimentation with human subjects as sacrifices on the altar of scientific knowledge. To harm the incurable, the isolated poor, or the racially different in the pursuit of medical knowledge to benefit those that come after their sacrifice is a common theme in the history of medical ethics from the Panopticon, through Nuremberg to Tuskegee. In the wake of the Nazi Doctor’s Trial at Nuremberg and the attempts to prevent the unethical exploitation of patients and minorities during the Cold War, medical utility lost its ethical primacy to the principle of informed consent. The ethical problematic at the heart of human experimentation is to formulate an effective policy for research that protects and safeguards the individual rights of the subject yet also allows for explorative progress in medical knowledge. However, is a categorical system of ethics, based upon rights and consent, possible in relation to the consequentialist appeals and demands of progress? This question is explicitly tackled by Hans Jonas in his 1969 article, ‘Philosophical reflections on experimenting with human subjects’. I explore the success and failure of Jonas’ attempts to align the categorical rights of human subjects with the consequentialist demands of medical progress. I will place his philosophical reflection on human experimentation within the wider context of his phenomenology of biology and the encounter philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Buber. I will conclude that while the principle of informed consent has won the day, as the moral absolute that should guide the conduct of doctors, we are once more experiencing a rise in the consequentialist ethics of medical utility. In the rise of medical utility, the demand to look carefully at the metaphysical deficiencies at the heart of Jonas’ categorical ethics of informed consent provides fertile ground to tackle contemporary bioethical decision-making that drives the demands for experimentation with human subjects in the name of medical progress.
Plunkett, Erin  
University of Chichester  
‘Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology’  
The return to the ‘object’ or ‘thing’ in contemporary Continental Philosophy is in part a reaction to the past sins of what Husserl calls Cartesian philosophy—a philosophy in which truth hinges on subjective consciousness and in which the res cogitans and res extensa are thought as radically separate. The environmentally disastrous consequences of such a position are hard to deny and are diagnosed by Husserl himself in his Crisis. Yet, today Phenomenology is often lumped together with this tradition (in part because of Husserl’s own emphasis on consciousness) and, so, implicated in these consequences.

Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka, one of Husserl’s last students, was already thinking through the problem of subjectivism in phenomenology in the 1930s, and in 1971 wrote the essay ‘Husserl’s Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Philosophy’, in which he argues that phenomena are not the mere ‘correlate of subjective processes’, nor the ‘accomplishment of subjective constitution’; rather, phenomena as such are primary. As for the subject, it is itself a phenomenon allowed by things, rather than the basis for the appearance of things. It is ‘not we but phenomenal being itself that indicates for us what possibilities there are for our own being’.

This conception, I argue, is an advance on Husserl on the one hand and contemporary philosophies of the object on the other. It avoids the consequences of Cartesianism while providing a more coherent account of subjectivity (as a no-thing) and retaining the idea of Being over against beings or things. With these considerations in the background, I present Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology as a viable and relevant philosophical methodology.

Price, Jack  
Cardiff University / University of Exeter  
‘Adorno and Scheler on Action and Experience’  
T.W Adorno’s work includes sustained critical engagement with phenomenology. While sympathetic to the attempt to engage with the ‘heterogenous’ and with the world of objects, Adorno argues that traditional phenomenology ultimately fails: Husserl relies too much on constitutive subjectivity and is unable to break from idealism. Perhaps as a result, Adorno tends to pass over much of the work of Max Scheler. Despite this,
this paper argues that Scheler’s materialist phenomenology could engage with Adorno’s critical theory to mutual benefit. Adorno’s work speaks to phenomenological attempts to understand experience. Emphasising the limitations of concepts, the primacy of the object and the value of embodied affective experience, Adorno builds a broad social critique emphasising mediation and the need for moving beyond traditional conceptual thought. But Adorno’s methodological negativity means that his account of the role of embodied subjectivity tends to be laconic, working more as a counterblast to transcendental idealism than as an articulated alternative. Scheler’s model of the human being is drawn from a twofold distinction between ‘life’ and ‘spirit’, in which ‘life’ represents pre-rational and instinctual drives and behaviours and ‘spirit’ the rational and self-reflective element. The human being is thus not a singular entity ruled by reason, but a creature of conflicting drives, passions, and interests of which reason is a late and by no means omnipotent part. This model of the human being, however, is situated at times quite abstractly. Scheler lacks the critical resources needed to thoroughly interrogate the role of subjectivity under contemporary social conditions. Dialogue between the two could therefore be very productive. While tensions undeniably exist, Max Scheler’s work, when brought together with Adorno’s critique of constitutive subjectivity and contemporary society, could present a plausible and phenomenologically-minded account of human action and experience under the current social order.

Rakoczi, James  
King's College London  
‘Moving without movement: Merleau-Ponty’s “I can” in cases of global paralysis’  
In this paper, I aim to demonstrate how memoirs written by people who live with, or have experienced, global paralysis can illuminate and complicate Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s claim in Phenomenology of Perception that embodied movement is a necessary condition for a transcendental self. I argue that the kinds of movement these texts articulate shares an affinity with the kind of movement instantiated by Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc: a ceaseless and adaptive movement, or a “therapeutic” movement, which constantly “recovers” from an incapacity to move. In short, Merleau-Ponty’s “I can” emerges ceaselessly from an “I cannot”. I shall make particular
reference to two texts. First, I shall consider how any philosophy attempting to centre the importance of bodies-in-movement might align with the claims made in Kate Allatt’s memoir Running Free (2011), a text in which Allatt attributes an interior ‘running psyche’ as imperative to her miraculous recovery from locked-in syndrome. Second, I will read Jean-Dominique Bauby’s locked-in syndrome memoir The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly (Le scaphandre et le papillon, 1997) through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s account of anosognosia, arguing that the text conceals its laborious method of production in the very process of describing that method. I will conclude by reflecting on the influence Merleau-Ponty has had on embodied therapies and textual accounts of lived illness experience, and indicate how understanding the ways in which embodied movement, textuality and therapeutics overlap has significance for our understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s claims.

Roi, Sofia
University of British Columbia
‘Merleau-Ponty and 'Depersonalisation Disorder': A case of dissociation or anxiety?’
Depersonalization-derealization disorder (DP-DR), in main psychological discourse, is clinically described as a phenomenon in which one is dominated by feelings of unreality and dissociation from the self, body or surroundings. However, much of the etiology remains a mystery in psychological discourse. Psychologists have a difficult time explaining what causes the condition and why the condition manifests the way it does. The paper will first argue that this is because the clinical descriptions rest on a Cartesian presumption of how the individual is organized; that consciousness is separate from the body, and the person from the world. In addition to these underlying dualist conceptions, it also assumes an object-subject ontology. The person as subject, is in a divorced relation to the self, body, and the world; all of which are treated as objects-- for we cannot dissociated from ‘our self’, unless our self is somehow an object as well. However, even though this framework appears to explain some aspects of depersonalization such as the ‘alienation from the self and body’, it becomes difficult when it is tasked with explaining accounts concerning ‘alienation from the world’. Here, I make the claim that the Cartesian implications in psychology cannot adequately capture any of the aforementioned aspects. Instead, I argue that by employing Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology and a juxtaposition around his notion of the lived-body, it becomes clear why the dissociative designation is both inaccurate and improperly rooted. I offer the alternative account that the condition is more appropriately framed as a product of anxiety. Furthermore, the mystery of its etiology also become resolved under this light. My paper concludes with how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of this condition might also gesture towards a sense of hope and agency to those suffering chronically.

Rose, Arthur
Durham University
‘Reorienting Breathlessness: A Case against Symptom Discordance’
In Phenomenology of Illness, Havi Carel identifies a ‘Janus-faced duality’ to breathlessness: ‘it is so real and overwhelming to the person experiencing it and yet so invisible to those around her’ (Carel 2016: 109). The discrepancy between external appearance and internal reality replicates a further discrepancy, known as symptom discordance, between the person’s perception of breathlessness (‘subjective experience’) and the oxygen saturation of their blood (‘objective measurement’). Not only is the breathless person challenged by another’s failure to recognize their experience, their own interoceptive ability may not match what they feel to what medicalised testing shows. Carel usefully relates this mismatch to Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between the objective and the lived body. The affordances of the objective body come to define new limits on the bodily habits that determine the lived body’s engagement with the world. To emphasize the reshaping of world that faces the person with breathlessness, Carel uses geographical metaphors or articulations that demonstrate both forms of discordance. But, Carel does not devote much attention to extremes of symptom discordance: either where a person has objectively low levels of oxygen saturation but does not complain of breathlessness or, conversely, where a person does complain of breathlessness but has no measurable oxygen deficiency.
This paper seeks to draw on Carel’s account of breathlessness to consider how it responds to the problems symptom discordance presents for ‘external’ verification, by either casual or medical perception. By shifting the terms of the account, from concordance-discordance to orientation-disorientation, it reframes a continued reliance on the subjective-objective distinction as a matter of cognitive direction. Drawing on Sara Ahmed’s
engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s account of orientation, it argues that the experience of breathlessness can be usefully thought of as a series of orientations: to the world, the sensations of breathlessness and their scientific measurement.

Schaefer, Max  
University of Limerick  
‘A Politics in Need: Love, Action and Justice in Michel Henry’  
This project addresses French phenomenologist Michel Henry’s account of the transcendental genesis of the political world. To develop Henry’s finding that the political world arises from the non-political needs of the life (affective identity) of the living subject, I stake out the position that non-political affects such as love provide a utopian attitude, which are necessary to allow individuals to critically engage their current political system. In contrast to the dominant tradition (Arendt, Badiou, etc.), this will show that love and the subject’s affective life are integral to the life of the political world.

I begin by showing how Henry comes to view an immanent affectivity as the reality or phenomenological material of the living subject. In so doing, I demonstrate that Henry’s transcendental account of how the subject passively receives itself from an immanent embodied process of self-grounding affectivity involves a critique of the private/public distinction, which orients much of Western thought in its approach to the political realm. This critique reveals that the public affairs of the political realm (ecstatic appearing of the world) have their basis in the private needs of individuals (immanent, invisible appearing of life).

This critique demonstrates that individuals are not first with one another through the ecstatic appearing of the world or reason, but on the level of their affective lives, insofar as they respond to the needs of each other as sons and daughters of life. Since the essential formal structure of the life of the living subject stands as a self-givenness, Henry regards the latter as an act of love. As a development of this, I maintain that it is only by acting from a loving attention to the needs of the other that the subject can see the invisible affective presence of the other. It follows that it is only through love that individuals can understand the true value of others and their living labor, and that a political system grounded in social justice can be formed. As a result, I argue that political systems — democracy in particular — cannot be sustained by autonomous rational deliberation concerning public
affairs, but must be oriented by the non-political affects of life. This analysis of Henry’s study of the political world reveals that political action needs to sustain the tension between the political (objective representation) and the non-political (non-objective acts of love).

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Tovey, Philip  
Canterbury Christ Church University  
‘Temporal range, future mandate and strategic shaping; the existential and cognitive phenomenological ethics of preventative policing’

Since the inception of modern policing, its founding strategic instruction was to ‘prevent crime’. Historically, policing strategy approached prevention through a geospatial predisposition in order to deter criminality. However recent years have seen a shift away from this area-based effect to an individual-centric model of tactical prioritisation, of which one's vulnerability to a given threat forms a transcendentally subjective centre of gravity. This paper will propose two fundamental challenges for UK policing operating a threat-based, preventative and individual-centric strategy; (1) prevention requires accurate prediction of and morally justifiable ingress into the subjective future and (2) there is no conceptual definition of what constitutes legitimate future reach in order to prevent crime. By firstly grounding strategy in an existential framing of 'the threat of meaninglessness', a cognitive phenomenological analysis of 'future-states' is conducted to expose issues of future mandate, temporal range and strategic shaping; providing a contemporary insight into, and an empirical reading of some of phenomenologies most challenging concepts such as time and more specifically, future-consciousness. Through the examination of some of policing's more divisive operational developments, such as para-militarization, early infant intervention programmes and advanced predictive analytics, the issue of futures and their disputably distinctive qualitative character, surfaces underlying strategic fallibilities in preventative, individual-centric approaches to policing within a paradigm of vulnerability.
Valentini, Nicolò  
Università degli studi di Trento  
‘Enacting the sense of smell: olfaction, motivation and emotions through the lens of neurophenomenology’

The close intimacy between olfaction and emotion has been widely assessed by several cultures in different historical periods. Recent scientific studies ascertained the validity of this widespread belief by showing that odours are frequently associated with affective responses at distinct psychological levels. My aim is to explore a particular aspect of the interrelation between olfaction and affectivity: its motivational components. In my analysis, I will draw on the insights offered by the enactive approach. The main advantages gained by adopting this model are: 1) the broad notion of affectivity, conceived as the basic capacity to be influenced and moved by what is salient for us; 2) the conceptualization of affective states as selforganized patterns of the entire organism, whose components (cognitive, motivational, expressive, etc.) are related with one another by complex circular cycles of causality; 3) the integration of phenomenological analyses with neurophysiological studies. The investigation will focus on two case studies which exemplify the utmost importance of action tendencies in affective experiences elicited by olfactory perceptions. On the one hand, I will examine how the sense of smell mediates the activity of eating by influencing the states of hunger and satiety. On the other hand, I will analyse the experience of olfactory disgust by focusing on the withdrawal tendency generated by foul odours. In both cases, I will highlight how the action tendencies actively contribute both to appraise the eliciting situations and to set in motion the affective states under scrutiny. Methodologically, a thorough phenomenological examination of lived experiences will be incorporated with detailed analyses of empirical studies which pinpoint their neurophysiological correlates. Finally, I will discuss how crucial the integration of phenomenology and neuroscience is to elucidate the relationship between affective olfactory experiences and the living body which enacts them.

Wang, Lawrence  
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg  
‘An Aesthetic Phenomenology of Boredom’

Works of art which bore us signify that something is awry; either we are failing to be immersed because of the fault of the work, or else the fault of
the ourselves. In this paper, I suggest that this doxa of aesthetic attention falls short of the distinction of aesthetic experience—instead, boredom and distraction are crucial to the aesthetic gaze. The work of art must be conceived as an object which not only distracts us out of our usual worldly engagement, but incorporates distraction into its enunciation as an aesthetic object. The idea that art can always re-encountered depends on a distraction greater than that of ‘parts’ of the artwork from one another, or the work as a whole. Rather, our failure to synthesize complete meaning from the ‘hermeneutic circle’—neither the parts nor the whole—depends on the boundary between artwork and world. Because works of art do not themselves need from the viewer, do not carry a function, our distraction emerges as a call to action; we are nonetheless drawn back into the artwork precisely because it shows us something beyond the task—beauty. In the work of art lies this boundary between the knowledge of human action and the inarticulability of beautiful creation; symmetrically, the creation of beautiful things follows only from distractions out of the ‘actionable’ purpose of doing.

Wilson, Peter and Rajan Nathan
See Nathan, Rajan and Peter Wilson
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