BSP

British Society for Phenomenology
Annual Conference
2020 - Online

Engaged Phenomenology

Thursday 3 - Saturday 5 Septmeber
Accessible online until Sunday 13 September

BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY

ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2020

ONLINE

Thursday 3 – Saturday 5 September

pre-event access from 30 August
post-event access open until 13 September

'Engaged Phenomenology'

co-organised with the **University of Exeter**

co-sponsors **Egenis**, and the

Wellcome Centre for Cultures and Environments of Health

publishers of *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*

CONTENTS

BSP AC2020 OVERVIEW

The British Society for Phenomenology Annual Conference is a longstanding and respected feature of the UK academic scene, providing a friendly and supportive forum for inter-disciplinary discussion. This year we are partnering with the University of Exeter (UK); and the event is co-sponsored by Egenis and the Wellcome Centre for Cultures and Environments of Health.

During the call for papers and review period, the world changed in a way none of us could have envisioned. The BSP annual conference committee continually reviewed how best to proceed with the conference amid global concerns about the Coronavirus pandemic, deciding in April that the conference should not go ahead as a face-to-face event, but rather should go online and be held on the original dates. We wanted to ensure that the work of the society and our universities continued where it could, and were inspired by the number of people submitting great quality abstracts despite the situation.

- **The conference will take place on a chat forum, video platform, and via Zoom meetings accessible only by registered participants**, beginning Thursday 3 September.

- **Keynote presentations** will be streamed live over Zoom and will include time for Q&As; the audience will be able to submit questions via Zoom chat, and these questions will be put to the Keynote by the Chair of the session. These Zoom presentations / Q&A sessions will be recorded, and be available on the video platform for those that missed them or wish to rewatch.

- **Speaker presentations** will be pre-recorded videos released according to a timetable as a dual track over the three days of the conference; Q&As will be conducted via a chat forum. Each Speaker will be allotted a 30 minute slot, 20 or so minutes for people to watch the video, with the remaining time open for the Q&A.

- **Keynote presentations will stream live and Speaker presentations will be released over three days: Thursday 3 to Saturday 5 September**.

- **After that, the conference video platform and chat forum will remain open for another eight days.** This means everyone will be able to see everything they wish to see, and rewatch as many times as they like. Participants will also be able to continue to ask questions of the Speakers via chat, and Speakers will be able to drop in to their chats to check out any new questions. The video platform and chat forum will be closed down after midnight Sunday 13 September.

If you have any questions:
https://www.britishphenomenology.org.uk/bsp-annual-conference-2020/
conference@britishphenomenology.org.uk

ACCESSIBILITY

We are committed to making the online conference as accessible as possible. If you have accessibility considerations or concerns about the video presentations, please get in touch and we will do our best to either accommodate or advise. For speakers or delegates with support workers (such as transcribers, signers, or assistants of any kind) we also offer free registration – again, just get in touch.

RESPECT

We are strongly committed to hosting an event which promotes diversity and inclusion. The conference is intended to be a space in which competing ideas and concepts can be explored freely and, fundamentally, where the rights, dignity, and value of all persons are respected.

We ask you to join us in ensuring the conference is a friendly, supportive, harassment-free environment for everyone, regardless of their gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, disability, religion, physical appearance, or other group affinity. All communication should be appropriate for an interdisciplinary academic and professional audience which includes people of many different backgrounds.

Please be kind to others.

If you experience or observe harassment, please contact our conference team by emailing: conference@britishphenomenology.org.uk . This email inbox will be monitored by the conference team throughout the event in case you need assistance.

Thank you for helping to make this a welcoming, friendly event for all.

ENGAGED PHENOMENOLOGY

'Engaged Phenomenology' seeks to complement the approaches of applied and critical phenomenology by investigating embodied lived experience through a plurality of voices, encouraging dialogue between phenomenology, as a philosophical approach, and other disciplines, in addition to practitioners and individuals outside the academy. The aim is to engage phenomenological approaches across a variety of contexts (e.g., healthcare, medicine, education, design, art, psychology, architecture, community spaces, etc.) with the hope of opening up the phenomenological approach to individuals and communities outside of traditional philosophical spaces for the encouragement of dialogue, interaction and deeper understanding of the complexities of embodied lived experience across a diversity of contexts, while also being alert to the socio-political realities and power relations which frame experience. 'Engaged phenomenology', as an approach:

- heeds the situatedness of lived experiences across diverse cultural and environmental lifeworlds
- invites us to hold this notion of plural lifeworlds together with wider phenomenological questions about lived possibility, power relations, and the condition of having and being in a lifeworld which feels open to us and to which we are open
- challenges assumptions around narrativity and privileged articulacy in phenomenological methods, embracing new ways of listening and attending to people's lived experiences in their specificity and relationality
- is mindful of how experience is lived through constellations of relations with others, rather than only seeking individualised (depoliticised) first-hand accounts
- considers the transformative potential of research participants sharing their experiences in meaningful ways, rather than merely assessing their 'utility' in academic terms.

Conference theme set by Prof Luna Dolezal, associate professor in philosophy and medical humanities, University of Exeter; and Jessie Stanier, Wellcome Centre for Cultures and Environments of Health at the University of Exeter.

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

Prof Luna Dolezal, BSP AC2020 host; associate professor in philosophy and medical humanities, University of Exeter.

Dr David Deamer, BSP Engagement and Events; writer and free scholar.

Dr Matt Barnard, BSP Technology Officer; associate lecturer in philosophy, Manchester Metropolitan University.

Hannah Berry, BSP Secretary; PhD student, University of Liverpool; and associate lecturer in philosophy, Manchester Metropolitan University.

Jessie Stanier, BSP AC2020 host; PhD student at the Wellcome Centre for Cultures and Environments of Health at the University of Exeter.

KEYNOTES

Sophie Loidolt. Professor of Philosophy and Chair of Practical Philosophy, Technische Universität Darmstadt / Technical University of Darmstadt.

Mariana Ortega. Associate Professor of Philosophy; Women's, Gender, and Sexualities; and Latina/o Studies at Penn State.

Dan Zahavi. Professor of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen; Professor of Philosophy, University of Oxford; Director of Center for Subjectivity Research (CFS).

- **Keynote presentations will be streamed live over Zoom and will include time for Q&As; the audience will be able to submit questions via Zoom chat, and these questions will be put to the Keynote by the Chair of the session. These Zoom presentations / Q&A sessions will be recorded, and be available on the video platform for those that missed them or wish to rewatch. The video platform will be closed down after midnight Sunday 13 September.**

SPEAKERS

- **We have 62 speakers giving 58 presentations selected from our original call for papers, by people who have gone on to submit videos to the conference.**
- **Speaker presentations will be pre-recorded videos released according to a timetable as a dual track over the three days of the conference; Q&As will be conducted via a chat forum. Each Speaker will be allotted a 30 minute slot, 20 or so minutes for people to watch the video, with the remaining time open for the Q&A.**
- **The conference video platform and chat forum will remain open for eight days after release. This means everyone will be able to see everything they wish to see, and rewatch as many times as they like. Participants will also be able to continue to ask questions of the Speakers via chat, and Speakers will be able to drop in to their chats to check out any new questions. The video platform and chat forum will be closed down after midnight Sunday 13 September.**

Miriam Ambrosino. 'Using Feeling: Engaging Aesthetic Experience in Phenomenological Practice'

Ashli Anda. 'Childbirth, Pain, and Subjectivity'

Pablo Andreu. 'On the Patient's Agency - a Phenomenological Approach to Medical Praxis'

Prisca Bauer. 'Engaged phenomenology: neurology beyond the brain' ["Engaging phenomenology in the neurosciences" preconstituted panel with Valeria Bizzari and Francesca Brencio]

Hannah Berry. 'We Need to Talk About Ted'

Valeria Bizzari. 'A multidisciplinary analysis of autism: predictive engagement and the living body' ["Engaging phenomenology in the neurosciences" preconstituted panel with Prisca Bauer and Francesca Brencio]

Maja Berseneva. 'The transformative power of vulnerability'

Marieke Borren. 'The Spatial Phenomenology of White Embodiment'

Anna Bortolan. 'Emotions On-Line: A Socially Robust Narrative Account'

Frances Bottenberg. 'Toward a non-privative framing of dementia experience: Lessons on play and empathy from Eugen Fink' ["Dementia and the Phenomenology of Play" preconstituted panel with Mary Fridley and Susan Massad]

Francesca Brencio. 'Shifting the paradigm. Neurosciences and the phenomenological challenge' ["Engaging phenomenology in the neurosciences" preconstituted panel with Prisca Bauer and Francesca Brencio]

Natalia Burakowska. 'An Embodied-Cognitive Approach to Dementia' (co-authored and co-presented with Danielle Petherbridge)

Matt Burch. 'Applied Phenomenology, Not Armchair Phenomenology: A New Approach to the Phenomenology of Medicine'

Olivia Cherry-Chapman. 'Hannibal as the epitome of authenticity'.

María Jimena Clavel Vázquez. 'Perceiving like a girl? Sensorimotor Enactivism in the face of situated embodiment'

Mary Coaten. 'Dance Movement Psychotherapy in Acute Adult Psychiatry: Psyche and Dasein'

Lewis Coyne. 'What is Phenomenological Bioethics? A Critical Appraisal of its Aims and Methods'

Caroline Greenwood Dower. 'Experiences of Anxiety: Exploring the phenomenon for therapeutic benefit' (co-authored with Benedict Smith)

Hans-Georg Eilenberger. 'A Beauvoirian Take on Empirical Phenomenology'

Rachel Elliott. 'The Futurity of the "We": A Merleau-Pontian Account of Group Temporality and Improvised Music'

Pablo Fernandez Velasco. 'Evenki wandering and situationist wandering'

Michael Fitzgerald. 'Phenomenological interpretations of patient engagement in research' (co-authored with Esther Shoemaker, Lisa Boucher, and Claire Kendall)

Lorenzo Girardi. 'Experience and Solidarity'

Mary Fridley. 'Creating a New Performance of Dementia' (co-authored and co-presented with Susan Massad) ["Dementia and the Phenomenology of Play" preconstituted panel with Frances Bottenberg]

Jan Halák. 'Phenomenological physiotherapy: extending Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of bodily intentionality' (co-authored and co-presented with Petr Kříž)

Veronica Heney. 'A phenomenological consideration of the meaning and function of repetition in self-harm' (co-authored and co-presented with Jessica Stanier)

Joseph Houlders. 'Revelation and Pathologisation of Ambiguity in OCD'

Gemmo Iocco. 'A Bioethical Reading of Scheler Personalism'

Tarun Kattumana. 'The Crisis of Vaccine Hesitancy'

Kata Dóra Kiss. 'The Importance of Intersubjectivity in the Process of Psychotherapy'

D. R. Koukal. 'Teaching Phenomenology as a Heuristic Tool in Architectural Design'

Petr Kříž. 'Phenomenological physiotherapy: extending Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of bodily intentionality' (co-authored and co-presented with Jan Halák)

Joel Krueger. 'Taking Watsuji online: aidagara and expression in the techno-social niche' ["Engaging with Online Spaces" preconstituted panel with Lucy Osler]

Ondra Kvapil. 'Thought-provoking Death'

Corinne Lajoie. 'Space, Access, Belonging: Insights from Phenomenology and Disability Studies'

Adriano Lotito. 'Tran Duc Thao between Phenomenology and Marxism'

Bence Peter Marosan. 'Engaged Eco-phenomenology. An Eco-socialist stance based upon a phenomenological account of narrative identity'

Susan Massad. 'Creating a New Performance of Dementia' (co-authored and co-presented with Mary Fridley) ["Dementia and the Phenomenology of Play" preconstituted panel with Frances Bottenberg]

Sam McAuliffe. 'The Improvisational Encounter: What is Common to Music and Hermeneutic-Phenomenology'

Filipa Melo Lopes. '"Half Victim, Half Accomplice": Cat Person and Narcissism'

Ellen Moysan. 'Phenomenological Description of the Notion of Inner Song: Doing Phenomenology to Understand Music Practice'

Jamie Murphy. 'The Angry is Always Right'

Lucy Osler. 'Blending spaces: techno-social niches and emotion regulation in the age of the Internet' ["Engaging with Online Spaces" preconstituted panel with Joel Krueger]

Maria-Nefeli Panetsos. 'Dancing Phenomenology: A New Source of Non-Verbal Knowledge'

Fabio Tommy Pellizzer. 'The Sounds of the Manifold. Towards a Phenomenology of Noise' ["Phenomenologies of Noise - Three Studies" preconstituted panel with Giuseppe Torre and Basil Vassilicos]

Danielle Petherbridge. 'An Embodied-Cognitive Approach to Dementia' (co-authored and co-presented with Natalia Burakowska)

Vít Pokorný. 'Embodiment of rhythm and rhythms of embodiment: exploring rhythmic multiplicity'

Irina Poleshchuk. 'Ethical dimension of chronic pain: temporal dephases, guilt, and despair'

Belinda Marshall. 'Being-in-the-Virtual-World'

Nicole Miglio. 'Painful experience and constitution of the intersubjective self: a critical-phenomenological analysis' (co-authored and co-presented with Jessica Stanier)

Rosa Ritunnano. 'Self, World and Meaning: Understanding Existential Changes in Early Psychosis'

Erika Ruonakoski. 'Violated and Suppressed Intentionality'

Joe Smeeton. 'In search of meanings within child protection social work in the UK'

Sadaf Soloukey. 'Phenomenological Embodiment in Patients with Spinal Cord Injury Receiving Neural Implants'

Lucienne Spencer. 'The phenomenological impact of hermeneutical injustice'

Jessica Stanier. 'A phenomenological consideration of the meaning and function of repetition in self-harm' (co-authored and co-presented with Veronica Heney); *and* 'Painful experience and constitution of the intersubjective self: a critical-phenomenological analysis' (co-authored and co-presented with Nicole Miglio)

Margaret Steele. 'Weight-Based Shame as an Affective Determinant of Health'

Hamid Taieb. 'Walther on the Reality of Communities'

Juan Toro. 'The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why disability does not entail pathological embodiment' (co-authored with Julian Kiverstein and Erik Rietveld)

Giuseppe Torre. 'Noise, Phenomena and the Digital Psychosis' ["Phenomenologies of Noise - Three Studies" preconstituted panel with Fabio Tommy Pellizzer and Basil Vassilicos]

Basil Vassilicos. 'Noise as positive phenomenon: assessing the constraints of a "no-noise" principle in phenomenology' ["Phenomenologies of Noise - Three Studies" preconstituted panel with Fabio Tommy Pellizzer and Giuseppe Torre]

Sabina Wantoch. 'Navigating "mad" experience: An application of Multiple Realities to anomalous experience'

CO-AUTHORS NOT PRESENTING AT CONFERENCE

Lisa Boucher. 'Phenomenological interpretations of patient engagement in research' [co-authored with Esther Shoemaker, Claire Kendall and Michael Fitzgerald: presented by Michael Fitzgerald]

Claire Kendall. 'Phenomenological interpretations of patient engagement in research' [co-authored with Esther Shoemaker, Lisa Boucher and Michael Fitzgerald: presented by Michael Fitzgerald]

Julian Kiverstein. 'The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why disability does not entail pathological embodiment' [co-authored with Juan Toro and Erik Rietveld; presented by Juan Toro]

Erik Rietveld. 'The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why disability does not entail pathological embodiment' [co-authored with Juan Toro and Julian Kiverstein; presented by Juan Toro]

Esther Shoemaker. 'Phenomenological interpretations of patient engagement in research' [co-authored with Claire Kendall, Lisa Boucher and Michael Fitzgerald: presented by Michael Fitzgerald]

Benedict Smith. 'Experiences of Anxiety: Exploring the phenomenon for therapeutic benefit' [co-authored with Caroline Greenwood Dower; presented by Caroline Greenwood Dower]

CHAIRS

- **Keynote presentations will be chaired by the following members of the BSP Executive Committee and representatives from the conference host, University of Exeter.**

Prof Luna Dolezal, BSP AC2020 host; associate professor in philosophy and medical humanities, University of Exeter. Chair for Dan Zahavi.

Dr Darian Meacham, Editor-in-chief of the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology; assistant professor of philosophy at Maastricht University, principle investigator for Ethics and Responsible Innovation at the BISS Institute, and deputy director for responsible research and innovation at BrisSynBio. Chair for Sophie Loidolt.

Dr Keith Crome, Director of Impact for the British Society for Phenomenology; principle lecturer in Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University. Chair for Mariana Ortega.

TIMETABLE
OVERVIEW

Days	Activity
Sunday 30 August – Wednesday 2 September	**Build-up** Videos from the Conference team released prior to conference
Thursday 3 September – Saturday 5 September	**Conference – 'Live'** Keynotes live on Zoom, Speaker presentations released to timetable
Sunday 6 September – Sunday 13 September	**Catch-up** Speaker videos, Keynote recordings & videos from conference team

TIMETABLE
BUILD UP – SATURDAY 29 AUGUST to WEDNESDAY 2 SEPTEMBER

Time (UK BST)	Title
Sunday 30.08 noon	**A conversation with Jessie Stanier and Hannah Berry from the BSP2020AC Conference Committee** Jessie and Hannah have a casual conversation on all things phenomenology related.
Monday 31.08 noon	**A conversation with Professor Luna Dolezal, University of Exeter, as host for BSP2020AC** Jessie Stanier & Hannah Berry have a conversation with the host of this years' BSP conference Prof Luna Dolezal and discuss yoga, art installations, this years' BSP theme and all things phenomenology.
Tuesday 01.09 noon	**A conversation with Professor Sophie Loidolt, a keynote speaker at this years' annual conference** Jessie Stanier & Hannah Berry discuss reading groups, armchair philosophy, music, film and all things phenomenology with one of the keynote speakers at this years' BSP annual conference, Prof. Sophie Loidolt.
Wednesday 02.09 noon	**New Collaboration Opportunities for BSP Members: Impact at the British Society for Phenomenology** The BSP launches our new Impact initiative, with opportunities for future collaboration between academics and practitioners from the event. Dr Keith Crome, BSP Impact Director, speaks to our BSP Podcast Editor, Dr Matt Barnard.

TIMETABLE
CONFERENCE DAY 1 – THURSDAY 3 SEPTEMBER

Time (UK BST)	Session	Panels A	Panels B
09:30-10:00	Welcome	**Luna Dolezal**	
10:00-11.30	Keynote	**Dan Zahavi: 'Pure and Applied Phenomenology'** Chaired by Luna Dolezal	
11.30-11:45	Break		
11:45-13:15	Panel 1	**Exploring narrative activity** [3]	**Theoretical approaches reimagined** [3]
13:15-14:15	Lunch		
14:15-16:15	Panel 2	**Spatialities and socialities** [4]	**Therapeutic analyses and approaches** [4]
16:15-16:30	Break		
16:30-18:30	Panel 3	**Theories of social reality** [4]	**Engaging phenomenology in the neurosciences** [3]

Panel 1A: Exploring narrative activity	
'Engaged Eco-phenomenology. An Eco-socialist stance based upon a phenomenological account of narrative identity'	Bence Peter Marosan
'"Half Victim, Half Accomplice": Cat Person and Narcissism'	Filipa Melo Lopes
'Emotions On-Line: A Socially Robust Narrative Account'	Anna Bortolan

Panel 1B: Theoretical approaches reimagined	
'Using Feeling: Engaging Aesthetic Experience in Phenomenological Practice'	Miriam Ambrosino
'Applied Phenomenology, Not Armchair Phenomenology: A New Approach to the Phenomenology of Medicine'	Matt Burch
'A Beauvoirian Take on Empirical Phenomenology'	Hans-Georg Eilenberger

Panel 2A: Spatialities and socialities	
'Evenki wandering and situationist wandering'	Pablo Fernandez Velasco
'The Spatial Phenomenology of White Embodiment'	Marieke Borren
'Teaching Phenomenology as a Heuristic Tool in Architectural Design'	D. R. Koukal
'Space, Access, Belonging: Insights from Phenomenology and Disability Studies'	Corinne Lajoie

Panel 2B: Therapeutic analyses and approaches	
'Phenomenological physiotherapy: extending Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of bodily intentionality'	Jan Halák & Petr Kříž
'Experiences of Anxiety: Exploring the phenomenon for therapeutic benefit' (co-author Benedict Smith)	Caroline Greenwood Dower
'The Importance of Intersubjectivity in the Process of Psychotherapy'	Kata Dóra Kiss
'An Embodied-Cognitive Approach to Dementia'	Natalia Burakowska & Danielle Petherbridge

Panel 3A: Theories of social reality	
'Tran Duc Thao between Phenomenology and Marxism'	Adriano Lotito
'Walther on the Reality of Communities'	Hamid Taieb
'Being-in-the-Virtual-World'	Belinda Marshall
'Experience and Solidarity'	Lorenzo Girardi

Panel 3B: Engaging phenomenology in the neurosciences – *precostituted panel*	
'Engaged phenomenology: neurology beyond the brain'	Prisca Bauer
'A multidisciplinary analysis of autism: predictive engagement and the living body'	Valeria Bizzari
'Shifting the paradigm. Neurosciences and the phenomenological challenge'	Francesca Brencio

TIMETABLE
CONFERENCE DAY 2 – FRIDAY 4 SEPTEMBER

Time (UK BST)	Session	Panels A	Panels B
09:00-10:30	Panel 4	**Patient engagement and agency** [3]	**Dimensions of painful experience** [3]
10:30-10:45	Break		
10:45-12:15	Panel 5	**Complexities of personal meaning** [2]	**Examining bioethics through phenomenology** [3]
12:15-13:15	Lunch		
13:15-14:45	Keynote	**Sophie Loidolt: 'Order, Experience, and Critique: The Phenomenological Method in Political and Legal Theory'** Chair Darian Meacham	
14:45-15:00	Break		
15:00-16:30	Panel 6	**Injustice as lived-through** [3]	**Pathology and Anomaly** [3]
16:30-16:45	Break		
16:45-18:15	Panel 7	**Enactivism & embodiment** [2]	**Temporality & Vulnerability** [3]

Panel 4A: Patient engagement and agency	
'On the Patient's Agency - a Phenomenological Approach to Medical Praxis'	Pablo Andreu
'Phenomenological interpretations of patient engagement in research' (co-authors Esther Shoemaker, Lisa Boucher, & Claire Kendall)	Michael Fitzgerald
'Phenomenological Embodiment in Patients with Spinal Cord Injury Receiving Neural Implants'	Sadaf Soloukey

Panel 4B: Dimensions of painful experience	
'Painful experience and constitution of the intersubjective self: a critical-phenomenological analysis'	Nicole Miglio & Jessica Stanier
'Childbirth, Pain, and Subjectivity'	Ashli Anda
'Ethical dimension of chronic pain: temporal dephases, guilt, and despair'	Irina Poleshchuk

Panel 5A: Complexities of personal meaning	
'A phenomenological consideration of the meaning and function of repetition in self-harm'	Veronica Heney & Jessica Stanier
'In search of meanings within child protection social work in the UK'	Joe Smeeton

Panel 5B: Examining bioethics through phenomenology	
'What is Phenomenological Bioethics? A Critical Appraisal of its Aims and Methods'	Lewis Coyne
'A Bioethical Reading of Scheler Personalism'	Gemmo Iocco
'The Crisis of Vaccine Hesitancy'	Tarun Kattumana

Panel 6A: Injustice as lived-through	
'Violated and Suppressed Intentionality'	Erika Ruonakoski
'The phenomenological impact of hermeneutical injustice'	Lucienne Spencer
'Weight-Based Shame as an Affective Determinant of Health'	Margaret Steele

Panel 6B: Pathology and Anomaly	
'Revelation and Pathologisation of Ambiguity in OCD'	Joseph Houlders
'Self, World and Meaning: Understanding Existential Changes in Early Psychosis'	Rosa Ritunnano
'Navigating "mad" experience: An application of Multiple Realities to anomalous experience'	Sabina Wantoch

Panel 7A: Enactivism and embodiment	
'Perceiving like a girl? Sensorimotor Enactivism in the face of situated embodiment'	María Jimena Clavel Vázquez
'The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why disability does not entail pathological embodiment' (co-authors Julian Kiverstein Erik Rietveld)	Juan Toro

Panel 7B: Temporality & Vulnerability	
'Thought-provoking Death'	Ondra Kvapil
'The Futurity of the "We": A Merleau-Pontian Account of Group Temporality and Improvised Music'	Rachel Elliott
'The transformative power of vulnerability'	Maja Berseneva

TIMETABLE
CONFERENCE DAY 3 – SATURDAY 5 SEPTEMBER

Time (UK BST)	Session	Panels A	Panels B
09:00-10:30	Panel 8	**Phenomenologies of Noise - Three studies** [3]	**Aggression and authenticity** [3]
10:30-10:45	Break		
10:45-12:15	Panel 9	**Music, improvisation, and rhythm** [3]	**Dance, movement, & feeling** [2]
12:15-13:15	Lunch		
13:15-14:15	Panel 10	**Dementia and the Phenomenology of Play** [2]	**Engaging with Online Spaces** [2]
14:15-14:30	Break		
14:30-16:00	Keynote	**Mariana Ortega: 'To Have a Mouth – Perception, *Autoarte*, and Resistance'** Chair Keith Crome	
16:00-16:15	Closing remarks	**Luna Dolezal**	

Panel 8A: Phenomenologies of Noise - Three studies – *preconstituted panel*	
'The Sounds of the Manifold. Towards a Phenomenology of Noise'	Fabio Tommy Pellizzer
'Noise, Phenomena and the Digital Psychosis'	Giuseppe Torre
'Noise as positive phenomenon: assessing the constraints of a "no-noise" principle in phenomenology'	Basil Vassilicos

Panel 8B: Aggression and authenticity	
'We Need to Talk About Ted'	Hannah Berry
'Hannibal as the epitome of authenticity'	Olivia Cherry-Chapman
'The Angry is Always Right'	Jamie Murphy

Panel 9A: Music, improvisation, and rhythm	
'Phenomenological Description of the Notion of Inner Song: Doing Phenomenology to Understand Music Practice'	Ellen Moysan
'The Improvisational Encounter: What is Common to Music and Hermeneutic-Phenomenology'	Sam McAuliffe
'Embodiment of rhythm and rhythms of embodiment: exploring rhythmic multiplicity'	Vít Pokorný

Panel 9B: Dance, movement, and feeling	
'Dance Movement Psychotherapy in Acute Adult Psychiatry: Psyche and Dasein'	Mary Coaten
'Dancing Phenomenology: A New Source of Non-Verbal Knowledge'	Maria-Nefeli Panetsos

Panel 10A: Dementia and the Phenomenology of Play – *preconstituted panel*	
'Toward a non-privative framing of dementia experience: Lessons on play and empathy from Eugen Fink'	Frances Bottenberg
'Creating a New Performance of Dementia'	Mary Fridley & Susan Massad

Panel 10B: Engaging with Online Spaces – *preconstituted panel*	
'Taking Watsuji online: aidagara and expression in the techno-social niche'	Joel Krueger
'Blending spaces: techno-social niches and emotion regulation in the age of the Internet'	Lucy Osler

TIMETABLE
CATCH UP WEEK – SUNDAY 6 to SUNDAY 13 SEPTEMBER

Time (UK BST)	Title
Sunday 06.09 noon	**Catch-Up week begins** Registration re-opens for new attendees (closes midnight Thursday 10 Sept)
Monday 07.09 noon	Keynote Sessions Recordings I **Mariana Ortega. 'To Have a Mouth – Perception, *Autoarte*, and Resistance'** Recording of the live Keynote Zoom and Q&A session released
Tuesday 08.09 noon	Keynote Sessions Recordings II **Sophie Loidolt. 'Order, Experience, and Critique: The Phenomenological Method in Political and Legal Theory'** Recording of the live Keynote Zoom and Q&A session released
Wednesday 09.09 noon	Keynote Sessions Recordings III **Dan Zahavi. 'Pure and Applied Phenomenology'** Recording of the live Keynote Zoom and Q&A session released
Thursday 10.09 noon	**Special Announcement** The BSP makes a special announcement about a future activity
Friday 11.09 noon	**BSP2020AC Reflection with Jessie Stanier and Hannah Berry from the Conference Team** Jessie and Hannah reflect on the conference, discuss their favourite presentations, recommend to each other papers each of them may have missed
Saturday 12.09 noon	-
Sunday 13.09 midnight	**Conference closes** Conference platform taken down and conference team sleeps for a week!

KEYNOTE ABSTRACTS

Sophie Loidolt.
Professor of philosophy and chair of practical philosophy, Technische Universität Darmstadt / Technical University of Darmstadt.

'Order, Experience, and Critique: The Phenomenological Method in Political and Legal Theory'

The talk investigates phenomenology's possibilities to describe, reflect and critically analyse political and legal orders. It presents a "toolbox" of methodological reflections, tools and topics, by relating to the classics of the tradition and to the emerging movement of "critical phenomenology," as well as by touching upon current issues such as experiences of rightlessness, experiences in the digital lifeworld, and experiences of the public sphere. It is argued that phenomenology provides us with a dynamic methodological framework that emphasizes correlational, co-constitutional, and interrelational structures and thus pays attention to modes of givenness, the making and unmaking of "world," and, thereby, the inter/subjective, affective, and bodily constitution of meaning. In the case of political and legal orders, questions of power, exclusion, and normativity are central issues. By looking at "best practice" models such as Hannah Arendt's analyses, I will elaborate on an analytical tool and flexible framework I call "spaces of meaning," which phenomenologists can use and modify as they go along. In the current debates on political and legal issues, I see the main task of phenomenology in reclaiming experience as world-building and world-opening, also in a normative sense, and in demonstrating how structures and orders are lived while they condition and form spaces of meaning. If we want to understand, criticize, act, or change something, this subjective and intersubjective perspective will remain indispensable.

Sophie Loidolt is professor of philosophy at the Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany. She is a member of the "Young Academy" of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and "Recurrent Visiting Professor" at CFS Copenhagen. During her time and education at University of Vienna (PhD, habilitation, assistant professor), she was a visiting researcher at the Husserl-Archives of KU Leuven and at The New School for Social Research in New York. Her work centers on issues in the fields of phenomenology, political and legal philosophy, and ethics, as well as transcendental philosophy and philosophy of mind. Her books include *Anspruch und Rechtfertigung. Eine Theorie des rechtlichen Denkens im Anschluss an die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls* (Springer 2009), *Einführung in die Rechtsphänomenologie* (Mohr Siebeck 2010), and *Phenomenology of Plurality. Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity* (Routledge 2017).

KEYNOTE ABSTRACTS

Mariana Ortega.
Associate Professor of Philosophy; Women's, Gender, and Sexualities; and Latina/o Studies at Penn State

'To Have a Mouth - Perception, *Autoarte*, and Resistance'

Guided by critical phenomenological analyses by Alia Al Saji and Helen Ngo on the operations of racializing perception and Chicana theorist Gloria Anzaldúa's phenomenological description of artistic practices in the liminal space of the borderlands (border arte, *autohistoria*), this presentation has the twofold aim of (a) highlighting the connection between affect and perception, specifically in the context of racializing vision, and (b) introducing the notion of *autoarte* as an aesthesis of the limen and practice of self-making that allows for the possibility of a resistant response to internalized negative racializing perception. *Autoarte* is shown to be a sensuous artistic practice filled with possibilities of resistance for those who are "othered" within socio-political contexts and epistemic-perceptual regimes that construct hierarchical categories of being. Within a context of perverse anti-Black violence, flagrant racism against peoples of color, and a prevailing reign of objectifying racializing perception, *autoarte* stands as a self-constituting practice in which one can become, feel, and be otherwise than what the colonialist, modernist racializing gaze prescribes. It constitutes an aesthetic response to the call for non-cognitive interventions within a historico-racial-schema and embodied habitual sedimentation which rests on the crucial connection between affect and racializing perception. Such a response is part of an aesthesis of the mouth—a multisensory approach to artmaking and art appreciation that does not center vision.

Mariana Ortega is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy; Women's, Gender, and Sexualities; and Latina/o Studies at Penn State. Her main areas of research and interest are Women of Color Feminisms, in particular Latina Feminisms, Phenomenology (Heidegger), Critical Philosophy of Race, and Aesthetics. Her research focuses on questions of self, identity, as well as visual representations of race, gender, and sexuality. She is author of *In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self* (SUNY, 2016) in which she presents a theory of multiplicitous selfhood informed by Latina feminist and Heideggerian phenomenologies. She is co-editor with Andrea Pitts and José Medina of *Theories of the Flesh, Latinx and Latin American Feminisms, Transformation and Resistance* (Oxford University Press, 2020); she is also co-editor with Linda Martín-Alcoff of *Constructing the Nation: A Race and Nationalism Reader* (SUNY, 2009). Her current research is at the nexus of aesthetics, photographic theory, race, and the epistemology of ignorance. She is the founder and director of the Latina/x Feminisms Roundtable (formerly the Roundtable on Latina feminism), a forum dedicated to discussions of Latina/x and Latin American feminisms.

KEYNOTE ABSTRACTS

Dan Zahavi.
Professor of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen; Professor of Philosophy, University of Oxford; Director of Center for Subjectivity Research (CFS).

'Pure and Applied Phenomenology'

At its core, phenomenology is a philosophical endeavour. Given its distinctly philosophical nature, one might reasonably wonder whether it can offer anything of value to positive science. Can it at all inform empirical work? There can, however, be no doubt about the answer to these questions. For more than a century, phenomenology has provided crucial inputs to a variety of disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities, including psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Within the last few decades, phenomenology has also been an important source of inspiration, not only for theoretical debates within qualitative research but also for ongoing research within the cognitive sciences. But what is the best way to practice, use and apply phenomenology in a non-philosophical context? How deeply rooted in phenomenological philosophy must the empirical research be in order to qualify as phenomenological? How many of the core commitments of phenomenology must it accept? In my talk, I will discuss and assess some different answers to these questions.

Dan Zahavi is Professor of Philosophy at University of Copenhagen and University of Oxford, and director of the Center for Subjectivity Research in Copenhagen. In addition to a number of scholarly works on the phenomenology of Husserl, Zahavi has mainly written on the nature of selfhood, self-consciousness, intersubjectivity, and social cognition. His most important publications include *Self-awareness and Alterity* (1999), *Husserl's Phenomenology* (2003), *Subjectivity and Selfhood* (2005), *The Phenomenological Mind* (together with Shaun Gallagher) (2008/2012), *Self and Other* (2014), *Husserl's Legacy* (2017), and *Phenomenology: The Basics* (2019). Zahavi also serves as the co-editor in chief of the journal *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.

SPEAKER ABSTRACTS

Miriam Ambrosino.
New York University

'Using Feeling: Engaging Aesthetic Experience in Phenomenological Practice'

In her essay, "The Difference of Feminist Phenomenology: The Case of Shame," Bonnie Mann (2018) contends that feminist sholarship in all areas of philosophy is up against "an affective problem, not a cognitive one." Mann calls attention to the "problem of reverence" that prevents philosophy—especially feminist phenomenology—from considering new methods of theorizing and interpreting. Following Mann's claims and Alia Al-Saji's (2014) work on affective hesitation, I investigate how contemporary thinkers can attend to and thus reconfigure their affective commitments of reverence towards the white male canon in phenomenology. I argue that part of this project involves using one's affects as a mode of critique. For phenomenology to open up to cross-disciplinary dialogue, it must recognize that critique is sufficient at the level of self reflection and transformation of habitual modes of feeling and perceiving.

I read Aimé Césaire epic poem, Notebook of a Return to the Native Land, as a case study that demonstrates my methodology of using affect in critical phenomenological practice. I explicate how the rhetoric of disgust in this poem can catalyze a critical and ethically responsive phenomenological reduction for myself, a white reader. I claim that this experience of disgust in reading resonates with Merleau-Ponty's (1945) account of wonder, vis-à-vis Eugen Fink, as "perhaps the best formulation of the reduction," a reflection that "reveals the world as strange and paradoxical." Guiding this methodology is Louise Rosenblatt's (1969) transactional theory of literary criticism, inspired by John Dewey's pragmatism. Through my case study I clarify how this theory provides a framework for engaging phenomenology with lived aesthetic experience to facilitate transformative affective work on one's affective commitments.

I am a masters student at NYU Gallatin School of Individualized Study. My individualized course of study examines affects-broadly including sentiments, feelings, sensations- as they are theorized across disciplines such as in philosophy and literature. I build from my undergraduate degree in philosophy at Fordham University in which I began studying philosophy of emotions and contemporary French philosophy. Though my central discipline is in philosophy, I develop my research on affect studies and critical phenomenology through my graduate coursework in literary criticism and critical race and gender theory.

Ashli Anda.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

'Childbirth, Pain, and Subjectivity'

Empirical research shows that many women "forget" the pain of childbirth.* It turns out that the memory of pain actually refers back to the positivity or negativity of a woman's labor experience. I argue that by studying the pain of laboring and childbirth, we can gain important insight into our own mortality and an unconventional understanding of life and death. My labor and delivery was that event which revealed my limits. It felt like witnessing the end of myself. In the moment, I was just the activity of laboring (and I thought I would die doing that

activity). This act, even with a supportive partner, is a solitary act and in this act, we can lose our sense of self. The unconventional understanding of life and death is tracked well by Arendt in The Human Condition.

Arendt says, "Indeed, the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of blotting out all other experiences, namely, the experience of great bodily pain, is at the same time the most private and least communicable of all. Not only is it perhaps the only experience which we are unable to transform into a shape fit for public appearance, it actually deprives us of our feeling for reality to such an extent that we can forget it more quickly and easily than anything else. There seems to be no bridge from the most radical subjectivity, in which I am no longer "recognizable," to the outer world of life. Pain, in other words, truly a borderline experience between life […] and death…" (Arendt, *The Human Condition* pp. 50-51)

I am interested in how we can use Arendtian language and frameworks to understand moments when we are not recognizable to ourselves (or others). That is, how can we talk about being on the bridge between life and death in the activity of laboring?

* https://psychcentral.com/lib/childbirth-experience-determines-memory-of-pain/

Ashli Anda is a fourth-year graduate student in philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She received her master's degree from Boston College where she studied Hegel and Kant. Her main research areas are legal and political philosophy and ethics. Anda's dissertation offers a tripartite Kantian theory of punishment (i.e., a theory of punishment where retributive, deterrence, and restoration-based aims are mutually supportive). The theory aims to address heinous crimes and proportional punishment. Some violations are so damaging that there is no punishment that (1) is severe enough to match the heinousness and (2) allows victims and wrongdoers to move on as equals.

Pablo Andreu.
University of Zaragoza (Spain)

'On the Patient's Agency - a Phenomenological Approach to Medical Praxis'

George Canguilhem has affirmed that pathology, far from being a state of abnormality, should be considered as another way of life (Canguilhem, 1978, p. 45). According to Canguilhem, being healthy is not the same as being "normal", what he considers to be an inapplicable concept to biology, but normative, this is, making of a way of life a norm. If accepted, such consideration not only affects what we take to be "pathological", it also questions what the nature of medical practice is, and what this praxis should be to start. Specifically, if illness is not something that bursts into existence and interrupts it, but rather a new mode of existence properly speaking, then what role, if any, does a patient play in the understanding we have of their illness, and what importance should be attributed to this role during the medical treatment. To this aim, an approach to pathology and medical praxis from a phenomenological point of view seems promising. Martin Heidegger's notion of care (Sorge) and Paul Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity could explain the existential shift on a patient's existence. But tracing illness as a continuity rather than an interruption could be problematic, questioning our very understanding of recovery. In other words, to what extent would a phenomenological approach to medical practice entail a methodological and epistemological differentiation between medically treating a patient and healing a person, and, more importantly, would this demarcation be constructive for the patient's wellbeing to begin with? The task, hence, is double: on the one hand, to state the benefits phenomenology can bring to medicine; on the other, its plausibility.

The following article aims to do so by following the personal account of a cancer fighter, evaluating it through the lens of Heidegger's notion of care and Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity.

Pablo Andreu is a PhD Student at the University of Zaragoza, Spain. Mainly focused on phenomenology, and specifically the phenomenology of death, Pablo Andreu has also approach analytic philosophy through the Master's program offered by the University of Barcelona.

Prisca Bauer.
Department of Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy University Medical Center Freiburg Faculty of Medicine University of Freiburg Freiburg, Germany

'Engaged phenomenology: neurology beyond the brain'

The burden of neurological conditions is enormous and steadily increasing. When including stroke, neurological conditions are the main cause of disability-adjusted life-years. Modern medicine is based on a strict division between body and mind. As a consequence, neurological conditions are reduced to conditions of the brain, yet they have a profound impact on the experience of people affected by them. Phenomenological accounts are not routinely considered in the diagnostic or therapeutic processes in neurology. I will show the potential of using a systematic phenomenological approach to improve care in people with neurological conditions by taking epilepsy as an example. The main symptom of epilepsy, a condition affecting 1% of the population, is unpredictable seizures, which severely impact people's lives. Our hypothesis is that through systematic interviews, people with epilepsy can learn to recognise subjective seizure "warning signs". The recognition of these may help people to increase their safety around seizures, and to regain a sense of control over their unpredictability. I will present preliminary data from phenomenological interviews with people with epilepsy, and explorative analyses of the neural correlates of these subjective seizure "warning signs". The combination of phenomenological and neural data has the potential to help to improve data-based seizure prediction algorhythms. This study is the first clinical implementation of the neurophenomenological paradigm first proposed by Francisco Varela. It shows how phenomenological and biological data can be used complementarily, and have the potential to greatly advance our understanding and management of neurological conditions, bridging the gap between the brain and experience.

This paper is part of a preconstituted panel with Valeria Bizzari and Francesca Brencio: "Engaging phenomenology in the neurosciences". See preconstituted panels overview.

Prisca Bauer is a physician (M.D) and scientist (PhD) at the Department of Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy of the University Medical Center Freiburg. Her main research interests are in neurological conditions, especially epilepsy, and in combining phenomenological and biological approaches.

Hannah Berry.
University of Liverpool

'We Need to Talk About Ted'

There is an increasing fascination with serial killers, morbid crime and the general macabre within popular culture and contemporary society. It has often been argued that our enjoyment of sad films; the act of slowing down when driving to view a crash site; looking at a dead animal in the park; listening to interviews with serial killers, and even; eating meat are "survivalist" tendencies, as well as a means of reinforcing pro-social values (Burkeman, 2012). We indulge these curiosities and watch highly rated television programs such as *Making a Murderer*, *Unabomber*, *Mindhunter*, *Criminal Minds*, *The Fall*, *True Detective*, etc. These fictional and non-fictional narratives examine the intricate details of the crime, the history, the criminal investigation and the prosecution of serial killers and are often supplemented with a clinical psychologist's reflection of why the perpetrator acted in this way. Bonn claims that there appears to be an innate human tendency to identify or empathise with all things – whether good or bad –including serial killers (2014), and this may be why we are fascinated with them.

I will present a corpus analysis and critical discourse analysis of interviews with two serial killers: Ted Bundy (an American serial killer who kidnapped, raped and murdered women during the 1970s) and Ted Kaczynski (also known as the Unabomber: an American domestic terrorist and anarchist who killed 3 people in the late 1970s and 80s). I will analyse the linguistics devices the criminals used when: referring to the victims; the use of agency in descriptions of the crimes, and; present a phenomenological description that aids my linguistic analysis in order to track the awareness of the embodied other and the level of consciousness of the others' subjectivity throughout the interviews. I will include a social commentary on how the criminals were presented to the public and how the language used to describe them shaped the popular conception of "serial killer".

Hannah has recently completed her Ph.D. on a linguistic and phenomenological analysis of empathy. She has had a lectureship at Liverpool Hope University in Sociolinguistics and has taught at various institutions such as the University of Liverpool and Manchester Metropolitan University. She is now working in the adult education sector.

Valeria Bizzari.
Clinic University of Heidelberg, Department of Psychiatry

'A multidisciplinary analysis of autism: predictive engagement and the living body'

The aim of this paper is to offer a multidisciplinary account of autism, linking the role of the body and intercorporeality with recent findings in philosophy of neuroscience under the predictive brain hypothesis.

Firstly, I will show some coherences between the predictive engagement hypothesis and the phenomenological approach (with a particular emphasis on the notions of motor intentionality and habit body). Within the three approaches to predictive model (predictive coding, predictive processing and predictive engagement), in fact, for predictive engagement, active inference is more action than inference; it's an enactive adjustment, a loop that also navigates through the body and environment and forms a whole (Gallagher and Allan 2016: 9). This seems to be coherent with the phenomenological account, according to which cognition is dynamically incorporated and located in the environment. In fact, the living body

seems to entertain a dialogical and enactive relationship with the surrounding context, as well as with neural circuits actively responding to external stimuli.

Accordingly, in the second part I will analyze the HIPPEA (High, Inflexible Precision of Predictions Errors in Autism) theory on autism and I will show how, phenomenologically speaking, this theory argues for an impairment of the habit body.

In this view, autism itself seems to be a complex disorder which needs an interdisciplinary analysis that considers it:

- A neurobiological disturbance (the mechanisms which seem to be responsible for HIPPEA are a deficient neural mechanism for precision and a deficient meta-learning system);
- An intercorporeal deficit;
- A lack of motor ability and an impairment of the attitude of being engaged with the world.

Predictive engagement approach can integrate phenomenology in a mutually informed manner, enabling a description of the subject not as an "I think" but as an "I move".

This paper is part of a preconstituted panel with Prisca Bauer and Francesca Brencio: "Engaging phenomenology in the neurosciences". See preconstituted panels overview.

Valeria Bizzari is a Thyssen postdoctoral researcher at the Clinic University of Heidelberg, section Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychotherapy. Her research involves intersubjective disorders, with a special focus on autism spectrum disorder and Asperger's syndrome.

Maja Berseneva.
Freie Universitaet Berlin

'The transformative power of vulnerability'

Being vulnerable is a *conditio humana*. This condition represents characteristics, key events and situations which compose the essentials of human existence. One definition of vulnerability is the general human capacity to being exposed. As such, it can make a subject a victim (when violence is inflicted), but it also represents the capability to being open to the world with its unpredictable events, and to others. Furthermore, vulnerability structures the subject's experience of the world and makes transformation possible. The concepts of 'limit situations' (Jaspers) and 'transformative events' (Heidegger), are helpful for the understanding of how we experience ourselves as vulnerable. Encountering a transformative event as the current pandemic crisis, we are forced to realize that our safety and the foundations of our being can be instantly undone. Limit situations touch us in our core values, reminding us of the fragility of everyday life, relationships, and health.

While it is possible to respond to vulnerability that shows in a limit situation through avoidance, denial, and rationalization, Jaspers advises to not hastily try to make it vanish. On the contrary, the demand and challenge lie in endurance of the unknown, of the ambiguity that this situation brings. I will argue with Butler's critical claim that vulnerability can (and must!) be turned into strength, into a resource, since the experience of vulnerability and dependence can move us beyond and against the vocation of the paranoid victim. Acknowledging that I am vulnerable and enduring it brings a choice for encountering the other without violence: it means having space for showing consideration and attention for the other. The chance of self-improvement lies in vulnerability as permitted openness, and in waiver of protection. In compelling me to deal with my fears and vulnerabilities as part of who I am, lay the transforming power of vulnerability.

Maja Berseneva is a translator and language teacher, currently living and working in Athens, Greece. Currently graduate student of Philosophy at Freie Universitaet Berlin. Writing Master Thesis on the Vulnerable self and the 'ethics of the welcome' in Levinas' work. Research interests: Philosophy of Mind, Affectivity, Self-experience, Empathy, Personhood, No-self doctrines, phenomenology, alterity, ethics of embodiment, Vulnerability and the human condition, intentionality, philosophy of medicine and mental health, nature of grief. politics in the feminine, philosophy of sexual difference, embodied female subjectivity, violence, feminist life.

Marieke Borren.
Open University Netherlands, Faculty of Humanities

'The Spatial Phenomenology of White Embodiment'

> Within critical race theory, phenomenological scholarship is unique in focusing on the racialized body. Based on the work of Fanon and Merleau-Ponty (even if the latter does not address racial difference), phenomenologists have recently developed rich explorations of racial embodiment, predominantly in a visual register (Alcoff, Al-Saji, Gordon, Weiss, Yancy, among others). However, 'white' and 'black' embodiment are not just involved in perceptual (notably: visual) habits, but also, so I will argue in this paper, in ways of inhabiting and taking up space and habits of moving. What 'I can' do, and where, is to a large extent dependent upon my racial situation.
>
> This presentation seeks to expand the phenomenology of racial embodiment, more particularly whiteness, by attending not just to the (in)visibility but also to the spatiality and motility of racialized – in particular: white – embodiment. To this end, I will I confront the conceptual resources for understanding spatiality and motility in relation to embodiment, present in the work of Merleau-Ponty (while challenging its false racial neutrality), Fanon's phenomenological account of black racialization, and Shannon Sullivan's (feminist) pragmatist account of the 'ontological expansiveness' of whiteness. Being a key feature of what the latter calls 'the unconscious habits of racial privilege', white expansiveness entails the taken-for-granted freedom to inhabit space and move around as one sees fit.
>
> Finally, I will argue that the normative implications of the phenomenology of white expansiveness are undecided. It might be strategically employed for undercutting itself. However, any effort to fight white privilege may end up reconfirming rather than undermining white expansiveness. I will illustrate this undecidability with the case study of Carola Rackete, the self-proclaimed white and privileged German captain of the Sea-Watch 3, who rescued 42 African migrants on the Mediterranean and brought them into port in Lampedusa in July 2019.

Marieke Borren currently works as an assistant professor in philosophy at Open University Netherlands. From 2015-2017, she held a postdoctoral fellowship at the department of philosophy of the University of Pretoria, South Africa. Specializing in Hannah Arendt's political phenomenology, her research expertise lies at the intersection of continental political philosophy, philosophical anthropology and phenomenology. She is particularly interested in feminist and postcolonial perspectives. She has widely published on Arendt's work, in particular about dis-placement and having a place in the world ('the right to have rights'), focusing on the predicament of refugees and undocumented migrants.

Anna Bortolan.
Swansea University

'Emotions On-Line: A Socially Robust Narrative Account'

> This paper explores from a phenomenological perspective some of the characteristics of emotions experienced in the context of digital and social media use.
>
> A growing body of research has been exploring the particular nature and role of emotions in the internet age. A key question which has emerged here concerns whether emotions on-line and off-line are fundamentally different. In this regard, attention has been drawn, for example, to the "disembodied" nature of emotions undergone via digital and social media use as opposed to the centrality of the body to in-person affective interactions (cf. Benski and Fisher 2014).
>
> On-line activities seemingly allow only for more rarefied, less rich forms of embodiment; however, at the same time, they appear to involve emotions which can be particularly intense, persistent, and contagious. Expanding on philosophical research on the ontology and phenomenology of affectivity, in this paper I suggest that such an apparent contrast can be made sense of through the adoption of a narrative account of emotions.
>
> Drawing on Peter Goldie's theory (2000), I start by suggesting that emotions "on-line" are best conceived as consisting of multiple mental states and actions which unfold over time in characteristic ways. I then move to argue that the distinct features of emotions on-line – namely their intensity, persistence, and contagiousness – depend to a significant extent on the particular role played by others in generating, upholding, and shaping their narrative structure. More specifically, I highlight how others provide the "scaffolding" (Colombetti and Krueger 2015) for the development of individual emotions through their actual and expected responses, the provision of a virtual collective memory of previous experiences and interactions, and by offering a repertoire of affective scripts on which affective responses can be modelled.

I am a Lecturer in Philosophy at Swansea University, which I joined in January 2020. Prior to this, I was a Lecturer and a Teaching Fellow at the University of Aberdeen, and a Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Fellow at University College Dublin. I hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy conferred by Durham University in 2016. My research interests lie primarily at the intersection of phenomenology, philosophy of emotion, and philosophy of psychiatry. More specifically, some of the main questions I have been exploring in my work concern the relationship between emotions, narratives, and self-understanding; the role of affective experience in psychopathology; and the nature of self-esteem.

Frances Bottenberg.
University of North Carolina Greensboro

'Toward a non-privative framing of dementia experience: Lessons on empathy and play from Edith Stein and Eugen Fink'

> In part due to the dominance of the biomedical model, living with dementia is conceived to be an experience of increasing privation, with reference to neuronal atrophy, memory loss, and functional declines. As a result, dementia experience is usually linked with increasing subjective absences – absent memories, absent abilities, and absent subjectivity. This has given rise to a tragedy discourse surrounding dementia – a stigmatizing discourse that further isolates people living with the illness. In this paper, I argue that it is both phenomenologically possible and morally urgent to frame living with dementia in other than strictly privative

terms. To do so, I draw on Eugen Fink's conception of play as revealing the world-open and relational character of human existence, noting promising applications in the areas of dementia play therapy in particular. Fink's account provides tools for re-imagining the potential of one's own and other peoples' lifeworlds and experiences, which is particularly relevant to people without dementia wishing to connect more deeply with those living with dementia, overcoming the pernicious effects of widespread epistemic arrogance when it comes to judging what dementia-related impairments must be like. Unlike conceptions of dementia experience that are simplistically framed by forgetfulness and memory loss, the account I am developing does more than highlight disruption and omission. Rather, it develops a perspective on dementia experience as active, even resilient, and as an achievement dependent upon embedded and embodied interpersonal agency.

This paper is part of a preconstituted panel with a second paper from co-authors and co-presenters Mary Fridley and Susan Massad: "Dementia and the Phenomenology of Play". See preconstituted panels overview.

Frances Bottenberg (Ph.D., Stony Brook University) is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of North Carolina Greensboro. Her scholarship focuses on the critical examination of dominant assumptions concerning the nature of mind, its relationship to physically situated beings and systems, and its bearing on moral categories such as personhood and sentience. Publications include "Epistemic arrogance, moral wrong, and dementia," "Emotion as the animation of value," and "Searching for alterity: What can we learn from interviewing humanoid robots?" She is the co-editor of *Living with Dementia: Ethical and Neuroscientific Issues in International Perspective* (Springer Nature, 2020).

Lisa Boucher.
University of Ottawa

'Phenomenological interpretations of patient engagement in research'

This paper draws on Husserl's notions of epoché and phenomenological reduction to interpret patient engagement in research. The epoché suspends or bracket naturalistic assumptions about the existence of the world, so as to allow phenomenological inquiry to focus on meaning or significance. Phenomenological reduction to the life-world, in turn, functions to restore the significance of the concrete world of basic life, i.e., to allow the phenomenologist access to the structures of meaning that are the basis for all inquiry (Luft 2004). In particular, it suspends the assumptions of the positive sciences. Patient engagement in research is an approach that includes patients and caregivers as partners on the research team. Arguably, this approach has become the standard for a wide variety, if not all, types of health research, driven in part by funding agency imperatives. Studies of this approach have argued that the significance of and motivation for engaging patients can be understood in terms of three sets of values: "moral or normative (e.g., empowerment and rights), instrumental or substantive (e.g., improving research quality), and process (e.g., having to do with research conduct)" (Kendall et al. 2018). However, further investigation is needed into the impact of patient engagement in research, and in particular how it affects health researchers' own understanding of their research activities, exploration of which has so far been limited (Staley 2015; 2017). This paper proposes a phenomenological approach, in which patient engagement is seen as a transformation of research. We suggest that patient engagement in research can function as an epoché or even a type of reduction, by challenging researchers' assumptions about the process of research. As with the life-world reduction, this can be seen as a way of resituating health research in the life-world, so as to expand and deepen its meaning and significance.

Lisa Boucher, PhD candidate in Epidemiology and Public Health, University of Ottawa, has expertise in participatory research approaches and both quantitative and qualitative methods. Her projects focus on highly marginalized populations, especially people who use illicit drugs.

Francesca Brencio.
University of Seville

'Shifting the paradigm. Neurosciences and the phenomenological challenge'

> In the history of neurosciences, phenomenology arrived pretty late as a method able to enhance the understanding of neurological conditions. While psychiatry and psychology recognised the contribution of the phenomenological method at the beginning of XX century, other branches of neurosciences (neurology, neuropsychology, etc.) are still not including this approach, affirming that the investigation of the brain's neuronal states can be understood only through third-person perspectives and that the subject's experience is not necessary in order to understand clinical conditions and psychopathological phenomena, since memory, behaviour, perception and consciousness can be explained through a purely biological approach. This paper aims to propose a paradigm shift and to challenge neurosciences to bridge the gap between brain and experience. This contribution is articulated in two parts: in the first one, I will briefly rebuild the origin of this methodological gap in order to show how the implications of this approach affect contemporary understanding and treatment of neurological conditions and neurodiversity. Techniques like functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and Electroencephalogram (EEG) measure brain activity in response to sensorimotor, cognitive, affective or social stimuli or tasks, and many have tried to find brain correlates of neuropsychological conditions. However, recent findings show that causes or risks of mental disorders may operate at many levels, including genetic and neural elements of course, but also individual, family and social environments, that can be grouped under the item "experience". In the second part, I will propose how to bridge the gap with an interpretative hypothesis aimed to show how the brain is part of a more complex system of elements in which human being is situated, involved and embedded. The 4E approach, as the most recent result of phenomenological adjustment to neurosciences, and the systemic approach stress the need of understanding the mental life of people and their life circumstances in a non-reductionist view. We will see how there is a bidirectional way to understand the link between brain and experience: mental disorders cannot be reduced only to brain dysfunctions and brain disorders cannot be caused by abnormal mental experience.

> *This paper is part of a preconstituted panel with Prisca Bauer and Valeria Bizzari: "Engaging phenomenology in the neurosciences". See preconstituted panels overview.*

Francesca Brencio is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Seville, Convener and Instructor at the *Pheno-Lab*, a theoretical laboratory on Philosophy and Mental Health at the Department of Psychosomatic Medicine at the University Hospital in Freiburg and Member of *The Phenomenology and Mental Health Network*, The Collaborating Centre for Values-Based Practice in Health and Social Care, Catherine's College, University of Oxford (UK). Her field of research is mainly related to Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Philosophy of Psychiatry and Philosophy of religion.

Natalia Burakowska.
University College Dublin

'An Embodied-Cognitive Approach to Dementia'

Dementia is a complex disease that is most often framed in terms of diminished cognitive capacity or neurodegeneration, together with assumptions about the loss of personhood, memory and communication skills. As a consequence, forms of dementia assessment and care are often based on a cognitive account of personhood and framed in terms of cognitive and linguistic capacities. One of the central arguments of this paper is that such accounts of personhood are one-sided and neglect the important embodied dimensions of persons both as subjects in the world and in their interactions with others. More significantly, drawing specifically on phenomenology, the research constructs an embodied-cognitive account of dementia that offers new insights not only into the lived experience of persons with dementia but also alternative forms of care. The paper begins by examining the appropriateness of an account of empathy in encounter with persons with dementia before investigating the importance of dynamic engagement that can give rise to embodied and relational capabilities and forms of communication. This has significant ramifications for forms of interaction and care, as well as existing policies, medical attitudes and diagnosis of dementia. Our aim in this paper is to: (a) offer an embodied-cognitive approach to dementia drawing on a phenomenology; (b) provide an account of the lived experience of persons with dementia that in turn informs policy and care; (c) explore alternative forms of expressivity and personhood informed by a phenomenological approach. This research offers an important phenomenological alternative to current research on dementia with implications for the understanding of dementia, as well as diagnosis and methods of care.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Danielle Petherbridge.

Natalia Burakowska is a PhD student in Philosophy at University College Dublin. She works in the areas of phenomenology, philosophy of mind and applied philosophy. Her doctoral work is focused on a phenomenological approach to dementia that conceptualizes it as both a cognitive and bodily condition, taking account of the lived experience of dementia, vulnerability and forms of ethical responsiveness and care.

Matt Burch.
University of Essex

'Applied Phenomenology, Not Armchair Phenomenology: A New Approach to the Phenomenology of Medicine'

With its rise in popularity, work in the phenomenology of medicine has also attracted its fair share of criticisms. Chief among these criticisms is the charge, notably articulated by Sholl (2015), that since the phenomenology of medicine does nothing but describe the experience of illness, it offers nothing we cannot obtain more easily from psychology and its various subfields. Svenaeus (2019) has pushed back against this charge, insisting on the phenomenology of medicine's distinctly philosophical contribution. Although I agree with Svenaeus, I argue that once we acknowledge the phenomenology of medicine's philosophical aspirations, it faces a difficult set of objections regarding a) its definitions of health and illness and b) its reliance on an unclarified notion of 'normalcy'. To answer those objections, the

phenomenology of medicine needs to rethink its self-conception: rather than regarding itself as a branch of pure phenomenology that need not trouble itself with empirical research, it should see itself as a project in applied phenomenology that depends crucially on the empirical evidence bases of other disciplines. By climbing out of its armchair and embracing this new self-conception as applied phenomenology, the phenomenology of medicine could answer its toughest critics, while preserving its most significant achievements.

Matt Burch is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Essex. He works on issues at the intersection of phenomenology, moral psychology, and the social sciences. He is a co-editor of *Normativity, Meaning, and the Promise of Phenomenology* (2019) and *Transcending Reason: Heidegger on Rationality* (forthcoming). His work has appeared in multiple journals, including Inquiry, *The European Journal of Philosophy*, *The Journal of Applied Philosophy*, and *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.

Olivia Cherry-Chapman.
Leeds Trinity University

'Hannibal as the epitome of authenticity'.

> The concept of Dasein is something that, as human beings, should be extremely familiar. And yet, when discussed through the written word, it remains elusive, difficult to translate and time and again language seems to simply fail under the weight of what is being described. But film can show what words cannot in a way that allows the concept to be grasped with ease. The best piece of film to demonstrate the concept of Dasein, in its fullest, would be the TV series, *Hannibal*. Here we are confronted with an individual who forces his own authenticity against the "they" (das Man), who refuse to allow his wants, desires and appetites to be quashed simply because the society he happens to live in deems those things to be abhorrent. And what's more, he does it all with decadence and fine taste. We may judge Hannibal to be reprehensible, violent and cruel. But, judging him as Dasein, understanding his experience from within and taking apart his relationship with the world in order to comprehend his experiential structures, it is difficult if not impossible to understand him as a pure demonstration of Dasein in its authenticity. Hannibal's experiential structures may be disturbed, he may have trouble forming compassionate relationships with others, and he may be incredibly difficult to relate to at times. But, he is also entirely unbothered by the "they", is able to confront his own mortality with absolute confidence and clarity, and he is always, absolutely and unashamedly himself. He would absolutely consider himself to be seizing 'a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the "they"' (Heidegger, 1967: 266).

Olivia Cherry-Chapman is a pre-doctorate student about to take on her PhD at Leeds Trinity University, investigating the Hellenistic pagan origins of Greek metaphysics with the aim of writing a complete metaphysical theory for British Pictic paganism. Her research interests and goals have always been re-aligning philosophical thought with occultist or otherwise bizarre practices and theories. Her previous works that she is happiest with have been a philosophical analysis of the Tarot deck and an excavation of the philosophical theories that supported alchemical thinking. Though she is as yet publically unpublished, the paper presented at this conference will be submitted for publication in the near future.

María Jimena Clavel Vázquez.
University of Stirling, University of St Andrews

'Perceiving like a girl? Sensorimotor Enactivism in the face of situated embodiment'

In what sense is perceptual experience situated? Embodied theories of perception might be good candidates to answer this question. However, most of these views have omitted the situated aspect of embodiment, i.e. the way perceptual experience is shaped by a body that is the concrete locusof our social, historical, economic and cultural situation. In this paper, I focus on sensorimotor enactivism (SMEn). I aim to show that this view can remedy this omission by paying closer attention to the idea that perceptual experience consists in situated embodied skills.

I begin by outlining the relevant aspects of SMEn, a theory that claims that perceptual experience is enacted by the interactions of an embodied agent with her environment (see Hurley 1998, O'Regan & Noë 2001, Noë 2004, O'Regan 2011). In section II, I argue that, although for SMEn perceptual experience is shaped by the body of the perceiver, the view fails to do justice to the situated aspect of embodiment. This aspect is reflected in perceptual experience's lack of social and cultural neutrality. In section III, I articulate the lack of neutrality of the body by drawing on Iris Marion Young's view of the gendered situated body (Young 1980). She claims that our social, cultural, economic, and political situation is embodied in that it is manifested in the way we relate to and inhabit our space, i.e. in our movements and comportment. In section IV, I argue that, if we accept with SMEn that perceptual experience is constituted by practical knowledge and consists in the execution of embodied skills, we should accept that these skills are also a manifestation of our situation. If perception is "something we do" (O'Regan and Noe 2001, p. 970), as the motto of SMEn goes, it is something we do as situated agents.

I am a PhD candidate at the St Andrews/Stirling Philosophy Graduate Programme. I work on Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Phenomenology, and Philosophy of Mind. I am particularly interested in embodied approaches to cognition and the way these can be informed by phenomenology. For my doctoral research, I have focused on the sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience and the notion of embodiment within this approach. I have also developed an embodied approach to imagination.

Mary Coaten.
Durham University

'Dance Movement Psychotherapy in Acute Adult Psychiatry: Psyche and Dasein'

My paper explores doctoral research on the therapeutic mechanisms of Dance Movement Psychotherapy (DMP) in an in-patient setting for acute adult psychiatry through the qualitative dynamics of movement and the symbolic and metaphoric processes present. Previous research has focussed on the efficacy of DMP in relation to psychosis spectrum disorders, but little on the mechanisms, especially the role of the moving body within phenomenological approaches.

I drew on the phenomenological tradition through Heidegger and Jung, utilising similarities between the two to develop ideas about body movement, space and time.

For Brooke (1988), Jung and Heidegger understood the body as the incarnation of psychological life and not as the meaning-less body of anatomy; they saw psyche and dasein as spatial, viewing distance and closeness as lived realities, and not merely in absolute time which they both argued is a limited abstraction from lived reality.

"Jung's method is primarily hermeneutic-phenomenological; the psyche is not "mind" or an inner realm more or less linked to the body, but is the embodied life world, and Jung's descriptions of it - of its autonomy, spatiality and bodiliness, for instance – achieve ontological clarity when it is articulated as Dasein." (Brooke, 1988:ii).

The results demonstrated an altered sense of space and time and a specific imbalance in engaging with the future and the past. The study revealed gender differences in the use of space and sense of self. Both men and women's movement lacked structure, a lack compensated for through my movements. Participants expressed their sense of self differently by gender. The men engaged more with one another as a group and women focussed more on the individual bodily self. Symbolic and metaphoric communications indicated a relationship between an altered sense of space and time, and the movement dynamics present acted synchronistically with the symbols and metaphors.

I am a dance movement psychotherapist (DMP) with a special interest in psychosis and have recently completed my doctoral thesis at Durham University which explored the therapeutic mechanisms at play in the acute psychotic episode. For the past 15 years, I have delivered DMP groups within the acute inpatient mental health setting. My work is informed by a Jungian and phenomenological framework which highlights an embodied approach to psychopathology. I also work as a DMP within an outpatient psychological therapies team with a trauma focus.

Lewis Coyne.
University of Exeter

'What is Phenomenological Bioethics? A Critical Appraisal of its Aims and Methods'

In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, amongst others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the 'philosophical anthropology' presupposed by the latter. In this talk I will offer a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus' efforts, focusing on both his conception of the aims of phenomenological bioethics and the broadly Heideggerian methods he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his Heideggerian approach to reaching this end. I will conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas in future research.

I am an associate lecturer and honorary research fellow in philosophy at the University of Exeter, working at the intersection of existential phenomenology, practical ethics, and philosophical anthropology. My overarching interests are in the phenomena of life and death, and the ethics of technologically appropriating (human and non-human) nature. My publications on these topics include being co-editor of *Moral Enhancement: Critical Perspectives* (Cambridge University Press, 2018), and author of *Hans Jonas: Life, Technology and the Horizons of Responsibility* (Bloomsbury, 2020).

Caroline Greenwood Dower.
University of Durham

'Experiences of Anxiety: Exploring the phenomenon for therapeutic benefit'

Anxiety is the most common mental disorder in primary care and higher education counselling settings. Observations from clinical psychotherapy suggest a shift in reporting towards "I have anxiety", an object-related sensation, rather than "I feel anxious", a subject-related sensation. In anxious states individuals are typically highly vigilant, attentive to and at times preoccupied with the external world. The physical symptoms of anxiety – breathlessness, increased heart rate – draw attention back to the inner experience of the body, but as with anxious thoughts, they are often reported as 'intrusive'.

In response to the increase in help-seeking students a programme of workshops entitled 'Calm to the Core' was developed within a higher education counselling setting, as an applied phenomenological therapeutic alternative to individual counselling sessions. Group facilitated workshops help participants to explore and share the lived experience of anxiety, through a series of movement and breath-based enquiries. Our interest is whether these workshops increase body awareness and specifically awareness of how the individual experiences and organises their contact with the world. A helpful way to understand the benefit of this approach is by utilizing Merleau-Ponty's account of embodiment, particularly how an enhanced sense of embodied agency can help mitigate the effects of previously 'intrusive', passively-experienced, anxious symptoms.

This paper addresses the practical application of phenomenology to common mental disorders for therapeutic benefit. Some modalities of psychotherapy have a rich tradition of employing phenomenological methods within a talking therapy. Here, movement is central to the approach, combined with an emphasis on the group verbal sharing of first-person lived experiences. Diagnoses of anxiety, particularly in young adults, are increasingly becoming part of how such people regard their identity. An increased understanding of anxiety is thus urgent. To this end this paper will present pilot research findings from the workshops and set-out areas for future research.

This paper is co-authored with Benedict Smith.

Caroline Dower is a psychotherapist and Head of the Counselling Service at Durham University. Caroline has a long-standing interest in the integration of body-based methods into talking therapies and is beginning a study of the experience and conceptualisation of student anxiety in the ecology of the university setting.

Hans-Georg Eilenberger.
Tilburg University

'A Beauvoirian Take on Empirical Phenomenology'

In her great treatises *The Second Sex* (*Le Deuxième Sexe*) and *The Coming of Age* (*La Vieillesse*), Simone de Beauvoir makes systematic use of empirical data. She draws on memoirs, literary texts and clinical case histories, which help her to expose the ambiguity of lived experience. While this openness to the empirical follows from the phenomenological attitude, there are also major differences between Beauvoir's work and classical Husserlian analyses. Most striking is Beauvoir's insistence on the entanglement of lived experience and socio-cultural

norms. She interprets her data in light of existing power relations, which puts her work in close proximity to qualitative social research.

In this paper, I want to explore said proximity. How precisely does Beauvoir weave together description and conception in her studies of gender and old age? What are her lessons for future attempts at an empirically informed phenomenology? Addressing these questions first requires a reckoning with the methodological shortcomings of Beauvoir's approach: her distance from the original context of the data, her reliance on hearsay, her equivocation of literary representation and lived experience—all of which appear problematic in light of qualitative research standards. In a second step, I will zoom in on the merits of Beauvoir's approach. I will discuss several of her core ideas that, I argue, can greatly enrich qualitative research: the unity of lived experience, analogy as a criterion of validity, and existential freedom as a basic research premise. To illustrate these theoretical points, I will draw on my own ethnographic fieldwork.

I am a PhD candidate at the Tilburg School of Humanities and Digital Science working on the research project "Age and Existence: An Empirical-Philosophical Investigation of Late Life", which is funded by the Dutch Research Council (NWO). Before training as a philosopher (BA from KU Leuven, MA from Radboud University Nijmegen) I completed a law degree at the University of Vienna. The aim of my research project is to conceptualize ageing in a way that does justice to the lived experience of older people. To this end, I am drawing on the philosophies of Simone de Beauvoir and Maurice Merleau-Ponty while also conducting ethnographic fieldwork at different sites in the Dutch province of North Brabant.

Rachel Elliott.
Brandon University

'The Futurity of the "We": A Merleau-Pontian Account of Group Temporality and Improvised Music'

Is sharing time what underpins the experience of belonging to a higher-order unity or group? In this paper, I consider the extent to which music produces collective belonging using Alfred Schütz's idea of a tuning-in relationship among participants in a musical event. I claim that Schütz's Husserlian account of that relationship relies too much on the idea of active synthesis, whereas the notion can be better articulated using Merleau-Ponty's conception of time as transition synthesis, derived from his idea of the habit body. This Merleau-Pontian version of the tuning-in relationship, however, foregrounds questions about musical genre, particularly in the distinction between improvised and non-improvised musics, in constituting the tuning-in relationship characteristic of what Schütz calls a 'we' experience. By examining this transition-synthesis in more depth, we see that it is through the projecting of compatible futures, perceived gesturally in one another, that any sort of 'tuning-in' relationship can occur. This raises the question about the ability of musics whose futures are distinctly unspecified, such as improvised musics, to produce the shared experience of time that underlies this variety of 'we' experience.

Rachel Elliott is currently an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at Brandon University in Brandon, Manitoba, Canada. Her research focus is the phenomenology of groups at the level of embodiment with a special interest in temporality. Her current research centers on music, particularly improvised music, as an entry point for understanding the nature of co-perception. Her future research will address questions of temporality in relation to neurodiversity, seeking to map out the limits and possibilities of group consolidation when taking neurodiversity into account.

Pablo Fernandez Velasco.
Institut Jean Nicod

'Evenki wandering and situationist wandering'

This paper provides a comparative phenomenological analysis of the navigational practices of Evenki reindeer herders in arctic Siberia and of the artistic dérives (drifting excercises) of the Situationist movement. This paper will build on an existing analysis of the phenomenology of disorientation (Fernandez 2020, which focused on the negative aspects of the phenomenon) and on ethnographic research among the Evenki natives of central Siberia. Evenki reindeer herders and hunters have unique navigation methods that result in a very special relationship to their environment. A central aspect of this relationship is the feeling of being 'manakan' ('making your own way' in Evenki language), a feeling of autonomy and independence. A study of Evenki navigational style and its relationship to manakan will serve to elucidate the workings behind the emergence of the positive aspects of spatial disorientation.

Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 provides an overview of the phenomenology of spatial disorientation. In section 3, we will introduce the case of Evenki reindeer herders and hunters and discuss their navigational methods, using both our own ethnographic work and previously existing research. Section 4 will analyse the central features of the experience of manakan in Evenki culture and how it relates to the positive aspects of spatial disorientation. Section 5 will provide a conclusion and potential avenues for future research.

I am a doctoral researcher working at Institut Jean Nicod, an interdisciplinary research centre at the interface of philosophy and cognitive science. The focus of my work is on how space structures our experience of the world and of ourselves. The topic of my doctoral thesis is the phenomenology of spatial disorientation. Studying disorientation is studying how, through our bodies, culture and technology, we humans are connected to our environment, and what happens when this connection is weakened or severed.

Michael Fitzgerald.
Bruyère Research Institute

'Phenomenological interpretations of patient engagement in research'

This paper draws on Husserl's notions of epoché and phenomenological reduction to interpret patient engagement in research. The epoché suspends or bracket naturalistic assumptions about the existence of the world, so as to allow phenomenological inquiry to focus on meaning or significance. Phenomenological reduction to the life-world, in turn, functions to restore the significance of the concrete world of basic life, i.e., to allow the phenomenologist access to the structures of meaning that are the basis for all inquiry (Luft 2004). In particular, it suspends the assumptions of the positive sciences. Patient engagement in research is an approach that includes patients and caregivers as partners on the research team. Arguably, this approach has become the standard for a wide variety, if not all, types of health research, driven in part by funding agency imperatives. Studies of this approach have argued that the significance of and motivation for engaging patients can be understood in terms of three sets of values: "moral or normative (e.g., empowerment and rights), instrumental or substantive (e.g., improving research quality), and process (e.g., having to do with research conduct)" (Kendall et al. 2018). However, further investigation is needed into the impact of patient engagement in research, and in particular how it affects health researchers' own understanding of their research activities, exploration of which has so far been limited (Staley 2015; 2017). This paper

proposes a phenomenological approach, in which patient engagement is seen as a transformation of research. We suggest that patient engagement in research can function as an epoché or even a type of reduction, by challenging researchers' assumptions about the process of research. As with the life-world reduction, this can be seen as a way of resituating health research in the life-world, so as to expand and deepen its meaning and significance.

This paper is co-authored with Esther Shoemaker, Lisa Boucher and Claire Kendall.

Michael Fitzgerald, Research Associate, Bruyère Research Institute, Ottawa, Canada, is a social phenomenologist with expertise in the phenomenology of international development. He works on projects on patient engagement, intersectionality and social accountability.

Lorenzo Girardi.
Mary Immaculate College, Limerick

'Experience and Solidarity'

This paper investigates the possibility of a non-essentialist articulation of solidarity based on the experience of the breakdown of the processes that normally constitute social identity. It uses the work of Laclau and Mouffe on the one hand, and of Jan Patočka on the other.

These authors come from different traditions. Laclau/Mouffe start from discourse-analysis. Patočka has an existential-phenomenological perspective. Despite these differences and Laclau/Mouffe's explicit dismissal of phenomenology, there is an overlap in their ontologies that can bring them into dialogue with each other. Both see the contingency of human existence as ontological, meaning that it cannot fully be overcome, and both try to work with this to articulate a form of solidarity that can be put to political use.

Laclau/Mouffe conceive of solidarity as an articulation of chains of identities. The contingent nature of this has been criticized: It can be used for different purposes, good or bad. It lacks a normative aspect. Patočka's 'solidarity of the shaken' is not based on the articulation of a shared identity, but on a shared experience of what he refers to as problematicity. It thus contains an essential phenomenological moment as its foundation. Interestingly, Laclau/Mouffe indicate such an experience, but overlook its potential as a motivation and guide for the articulation of solidarity. This experience thus seems to provide what is lacking in the account of Laclau/Mouffe. Yet, this is a precarious experience and the ensuing solidarity is equally difficult to maintain. Patočka's account arguably lacks the constructive potential found in the work of Laclau/Mouffe that could give enduring shape to this solidarity.

This paper seeks to use these approaches to complement each other and address their respective weaknesses. The question is whether these two positions can coherently be reconciled without undermining the experience on which solidarity is to be based.

Lorenzo Girardi received his PhD jointly from the University of Limerick (Mary Immaculate College) and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. His dissertation was on the ideas of Europe and crisis in general and in the phenomenological tradition in particular, focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl and Jan Patočka. Currently he is researching the possibility of developing a phenomenological foundation for agonistic political theory.

Mary Fridley.
East Side Institute, New York City

'Creating a New Performance of Dementia'

As viewed through a biomedical lens – which remains the dominant way in which dementia is seen – Alzheimer's and related dementias (ADRD) is seen primarily as a condition of loss of capabilities within an individual: of speech, of cognitive abilities, of physical capacities and, eventually, of life while research and treatment is directed toward cure of the individual. Dementia activists across the globe are now raising the question: Is the shame, stigma, and isolation that people with ADRD and their families experience in large part a result of this very narrow lenses through which dementia is understood?
In this paper we will present on the *Joy of Dementia (You've Got to Be Kiddin!)* project, a playful, philosophical and conversational collective exploration of the dementia experience as an effort to introduce a different lens – a development lens – as a counter narrative that challenges the current "tragedy narrative" surrounding ADRD. Seen through a development lens, humans are no longer are viewed, not as discrete and isolated individuals but as relational beings, connected to one another in ways that allows us to grow with, rather than fear, uncertainty. In this view, a dementia diagnosis presents transformational opportunities not just for the individual diagnosed, but to everyone in the "dementia ensemble" – including people of all ages who fear growing older and losing cognitive abilities. The workshops, always experiential, often involve mixed groupings of family members, care givers, professionals and those diagnosed, introduces improvisational play and philosophical conversation as activities that support the discovery of new ways of relating, being together, listening and responding. Participants are supported to challenge deeply held assumptions about what we and others "know" about the dementia experience, and it is within this collaborative ensemble building activity that the joy that comes with creating a new performances of dementia is discovered.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Susan Massad. It is also the second of two papers in a preconstituted panel with Frances Bottenberg: "Dementia and the Phenomenology of Play". See preconstituted panels overview.

Mary Fridley is pro-bono Director of Special Projects at the East Side Institute in NYC and an accomplished teacher and workshop leader. She practiced social therapy for 12 years and continues to use the social therapeutic approach as an Institute faculty member. Mary co-leads two popular workshop series, "The Joy of Dementia (You Gotta Be Kidding)" and "Laughing Matters" and was featured in a February 2019 Washington Post article, "Changing 'the tragedy narrative': Why a growing camp is promoting a more joyful approach to Alzheimer." Mary is also a playwright and theater director and works as a non-profit fundraising consultant.

Jan Halák.
Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic

'Phenomenological physiotherapy: extending Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of bodily intentionality'

This paper clarifies the significance of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account of the body for physiotherapeutic practice. Physiotherapists are trained to approach the functioning of the body from an objectivist perspective, but their therapeutic interaction with patients is not limited to an application of natural-scientific explanations. Analogically, they often perceive mechanistic models of bodily functioning as insufficient, yet they generally lack an appropriate

theoretical framework to formalize and systematically describe their experience. We argue that physiotherapists' practice well corresponds to Merleau-Ponty's theorization of the body as the bearer of an original bodily intentionality and makes it possible to elaborate it further. On the one hand, the practice of physiotherapy corroborates Merleau-Ponty's critical arguments against objectivist interpretations of the body. For example, norms of optimal corporeal functioning are highly individual and variable, and thus do not depend on generic physiological structures in a direct way; correspondingly, objectively measurable physical deviations rarely correspond to specific subjective difficulties; and similarly, a patient's reflexive insight into his or her motor deficiencies does not necessarily produce significant motor improvements. Physiotherapeutic procedures can therefore be understood neither as an expert mechanical manipulation with a patient's machine-like body nor as a process of instructing the patient's consciousness to manipulate it in that way. On the other hand, physiotherapeutic practice can draw on Merleau-Ponty's positive suggestion to understand motor disorders as modifications of bodily intentionality. Conceived in this way, physiotherapy approaches motor disorders as bodily mis-understandings or failures to optimally deal with motor requirements of a situation. Correspondingly, the therapeutical process itself becomes an inter-corporeal dialogue or bodily empathy. In the course of this process, a richer motor intentionality of the therapist takes up the patient's limited, less adaptable, and more laborious intentionality, and guides it to discovering better ways of grasping a situation as meaningful through particular postures and movements.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Petr Kříž.

Jan Halák, Ph.D., works as assistant professor at the Department of Philosophy, Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic. His scientific interests are in phenomenology, enactivism, and philosophy of embodiment. He has published several papers on Merleau-Ponty, with a special focus on Merleau-Ponty's Collège de France period, his interpretation of the concept of body schema, and the corporeal infrastructure of higher cognitive processes. Jan Halák also published several translations of Merleau-Ponty's works into Czech language (e.g. *Resumés de cours*). Dr. Halák is now working on a monograph on Merleau-Ponty's ontology based on the concept of flesh.

Veronica Heney.
Wellcome Centre for Cultures and Environments of Health, University of Exeter

'A phenomenological consideration of the meaning and function of repetition in self-harm'

Repetition is a common aspect of psychological and sociological definitions of self-harm or non-suicidal self-injury. While recent qualitative research has explored thoughtfully the key importance of authenticity, secrecy, relationality and embodiment to experiences and understandings of self-harm, the function of repetition remains under-theorised. Psychological literature has explored repetition either through research into hospital readmissions, focused on clinical understandings of risk and treatment, or through framing self-harm as a maladaptive coping mechanism which might be straightforwardly replaced. Thus a more thorough, nuanced attentiveness to the function and experience of repetition might be beneficial.
Phenomenology, as an approach, explicitly concerns itself with processes of embodied meaning constitution. In particular, the Husserlian notions of association, affectivity, temporality, and dynamic objective sense, together with more contemporary insights from critical phenomenologists, invite inquiry into the many complex layers of experiential constitution, as it is situated and embedded in political contexts. By exploring how initial

experiences develop into senses of familiarity, through the lived body, this phenomenological perspective allows us to ask how the practice of self-harm becomes something to which one returns.

In this paper, we approach the question of repetition in relation to self-harm phenomenologically. Thus we explore how meaning-constitution might complicate simplistic binaries of appropriate or maladaptive 'coping mechanisms' and the possibility of their substitution. Moreover, we consider how the recognisable lived sense, which develops through repetition, might sustain the simultaneous instability and familiarity of understandings and practices of self-harm. Finally, we discuss the significance of embodied accrual for the personal, unstable, unending negotiation between practice, self, and society contained within experiences of self-harm. We think speculatively through qualitative data and personal reflections, engaging with lived experience(s) without claiming universality. Rather, we attempt to open a space in which to explore and attend to the meaningfulness of repetition in experiences of self-harm.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Jessica Stanier.

Veronica Heney is currently a PhD candidate at the Wellcome Centre for Cultures and Environments of Health at the University of Exeter. Her research explores cultural representations of self-harm as experienced and interpreted by people who have self-harmed, taking an interdisciplinary and engaged approach which brings Social Science methodologies in conversation with the textual and narrative concerns of Literary Studies.

Joseph Houlders.
University of Birmingham

'Revelation and Pathologisation of Ambiguity in OCD'

Merleau-Ponty wrote that every instance of conscious experience is ambiguous (PhP, 172), i.e. cogently interpretable in several different ways. Whilst I am sympathetic to his suggestion, I think it requires a caveat: it is only when we reflect upon our experience, e.g. interrogate it with the purpose of finding a definitive conclusion, that we become aware of its ambiguity. Unreflective experience is superficially unambiguous; conscious interrogation reveals its ambiguity. Relatedly, linguistic practices imply the ideal of total certainty (see Cerbone, 2018). As such, the ambiguity that is discovered via reflection can be a surprise - in some cases, a very difficult one.

These thoughts apply to the phenomenology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder ('OCD'), especially where the obsessions concern one's 'true' or 'real' feelings about a range of subject matter. I suggest that principal symptoms of the disorder, 'rumination' and 'body monitoring', reveal the extent to which the provenance and meaning of our thoughts, feelings and bodily sensations are ambiguous. They do so by forcing over-attendance to one's experience. I then go further by stating that what is revealed is likely to be 'pathologised', i.e. brought into the disorder. I develop this view with reference to the expectation that experience is, or can be rendered, unambiguous. This expectation leads people with OCD to interpret the ambiguity negatively, i.e. as a cause for concern. This interpretation feeds back into the illness, in that it is anxiogenic and encourages further rumination and body scanning; in this way the ambiguity that is revealed is pathologised through how it is interpreted. I close by discussing how the revelation and pathologisation of ambiguity limits interactions with one's surroundings.

I am studying for a PhD in philosophy with the Institute for Mental Health at the University of Birmingham. I am supervised by Professor Matthew Broome and Professor Lisa Bortolotti, and funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. My thesis explores expectations of certainty in the context of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder; I understand my work to contribute to the field of phenomenological psychopathology. Prior to my PhD, I studied for an MA in Cognitive Studies at the University of Sheffield, supervised by Dr. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc. I was awarded a Distinction and a Petrie Watson Exhibition Award.

Gemmo Iocco.
University of Parma

'A Bioethical Reading of Scheler Personalism'

> A widely discussed issue within the contemporary bioethical debate concerns the description of the biological and biographical marks on which the distinction between human-being and person is rested on. An o closer look this distinction characterizes two different ways to consider the idea of person, precisely a) a 'naturalistic-reductionistic' approach according to which there would be a phenomenological distinction between biological and biographical life and b) a 'personalisticapproach' aimed at calling into question the legitimacy of such a distinction. In this debate Scheler's phenomenological personalism offers some interesting causes for reflection since it allows to overcome the bounds of both approaches. Thus, starting from the criticism of those accounts that understand personal identity in a strictly temporal meaning, Scheler emphasizes the 'normative' nature of selfhood considered 'the innermost essence of personhood'. Specifically, personal identity is not constituted through identifying acts that pertain to contents of experience and the relations of meaning among them but rather through the 'individual mode' of experiencing all such contents. According to Scheler, indeed between biological functions and biographical marks there is a deep intertwinement to the extent that the normative essence of a person depends on the individuation of certain phenomenological functions – mental health, cognitive development, own-body control, autonomy.
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> The goal of my paper is to show how Scheler's phenomenological personalism may suggest interesting answers to a set of issues concerning personal identity. In doing so, firstly I sketch out the different accounts of person addressed within the contemporary bioethical debate. Then I discuss Scheler thesis according to which the essence of a person consists in 'becoming different through that person's experience' and finally I conclude outlining how these assessments may help to overcome a naturalistic-reductionistic view according to which a person would merely be a set of biological functions.

I am Assistant Professor in History of Philosophy at the Department of Humanities, Social Sciences and Cultural Industries, University of Parma since 2014 where I teach History of Culture and Values and History of Contemporary Philosophy. I meanly deal with a) German phenomenology (Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger) b) value-theories from a phenomenological point of view and c) theory of emotion. I published two books in Italian on phenomenological issues and approximately twenty article/contributions in Italian, English and French.

Tarun Kattumana.
KU Leuven

'The Crisis of Vaccine Hesitancy'

The revolutionary effectiveness of vaccination programs has drastically reduced the spread and prevalence of infectious diseases resulting in herd immunity. Consequently, the threat of these diseases and the protection that vaccines provide lose importance in the public imagination (Lewis, 2004; Larson et. al, 2011). This results in a growing disparity between the bio-medical concern to maintain herd immunity through continued vaccination and hesitant parents who take this immunity for granted. Anti-vax groups use this disparity to reorient parental concerns towards the perceived risks of vaccinating. Bio-medical experts defend vaccine safety through population level analysis that argues that vaccines are safe and that adverse side effects are extremely rare. However, parents do not evaluate the safety of vaccines at the population level, but in relation to their child (Hobson-West, 2007; Goldenberg, 2016). Consequently, hesitant parents are worried rather than reassured by expert claims regarding the rarity of adverse side-effects as any risk means that their child could be affected.

This paper examines the gap between bio-medical experts and hesitant parents through Husserl's analysis in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Husserl, 1970). This analysis discusses how the monumental success of the sciences contributes to a growing disparity between a scientific conception of the world and lived experience.

The paper has three sections. The first focuses the gap between the increased formalization of the Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) paradigm and the philosophical criticism that these practices leads to the inadvertent overlooking of the individual patient's experiences (Tonelli, 1998; Goldenberg, 2006). The second section argues that EBM's emphasis on statistical epidemiological evidence leads to the expert reliance on population level analysis that does not adequately speak to the personal concerns of hesitant parents. This paper concludes with a constructive argument to bridge the gap between experts and hesitant parents.

Tarun Kattumana is a PhD student at the Institute for Philosophy and the Bio-medical Sciences at KU Leuven. His doctoral thesis focuses on vaccine hesitancy in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and extends a critical phenomenological approach to related issues such as scientific expertise, bio-medical evidence, contemporary science denial and the implications that follow from a democratization of "critique".

Claire Kendall.
Bruyère Research Institute

'Phenomenological interpretations of patient engagement in research'

This paper draws on Husserl's notions of epoché and phenomenological reduction to interpret patient engagement in research. The epoché suspends or bracket naturalistic assumptions about the existence of the world, so as to allow phenomenological inquiry to focus on meaning or significance. Phenomenological reduction to the life-world, in turn, functions to restore the significance of the concrete world of basic life, i.e., to allow the phenomenologist access to the structures of meaning that are the basis for all inquiry (Luft 2004). In particular, it suspends the assumptions of the positive sciences. Patient engagement in research is an approach that includes patients and caregivers as partners on the research team. Arguably, this approach

has become the standard for a wide variety, if not all, types of health research, driven in part by funding agency imperatives. Studies of this approach have argued that the significance of and motivation for engaging patients can be understood in terms of three sets of values: "moral or normative (e.g., empowerment and rights), instrumental or substantive (e.g., improving research quality), and process (e.g., having to do with research conduct)" (Kendall et al. 2018). However, further investigation is needed into the impact of patient engagement in research, and in particular how it affects health researchers' own understanding of their research activities, exploration of which has so far been limited (Staley 2015; 2017). This paper proposes a phenomenological approach, in which patient engagement is seen as a transformation of research. We suggest that patient engagement in research can function as an epoché or even a type of reduction, by challenging researchers' assumptions about the process of research. As with the life-world reduction, this can be seen as a way of resituating health research in the life-world, so as to expand and deepen its meaning and significance.

This paper is co-authored with Esther Shoemaker, Lisa Boucher and Michael Fitzgerald. Michael Fitzgerald will present the paper.

Claire Kendall, a primary care physician and Clinical Scientist, Bruyère Research Institute and Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, where she is also Assistant Dean, Social Accountability, has expertise in health services research, cohort and administrative data linkages, systematic reviews, participatory approaches, qualitative research and practice-based interventions, with strong links to policy makers in primary care of marginalized populations.

Kata Dóra Kiss.
University of Pécs, Hungary

'The Importance of Intersubjectivity in the Process of Psychotherapy'

Intersubjectivity had become one of the key concepts for the relational school of psychoanalysis. Although for most psy-sciences the importance of relations in the constitution of the self is out of the debate, there is much less consensus on how decisive this relation is. Furthermore, the question of intersubjectivity in psychology drives us to one of the ultimate question of the psychology of the present: human beings are more biologically determined, than socially or vice versa?

Nowadays, natural scientific discourse is the mainstream scientific frame for western psy-sciences, although, there has never been one coherent and fully consensual one in psychology. This frame prefers biological explanations over the socio-cultural account. The fundamental unit of examination in this approach is the individuality and its implicit assumption is that the psychic structure is a closed system where mental processes are taking place. Western clinical practices mainly rely on this paradigm, as it could produce a testable and comprehensive empirical framework. This framework, however, implicitly formulate a generalized and normative ideal. In cognitive sciences or universal diagnostic systems, there is an implicit notion on how our cognition or psyche has to function. It raises the risk of normalization, in which therapy is a tool for the modification of the patient's self to approach a "neurotypical" ideal. However, the notion of normality is a protean category that is culturally determined and very changeable in time and space.

The presentation would like to argues that those therapeutic forms that are based on the intersubjectivitist approach could easier avoid the menace of normalization. These concepts are prioritized the complex cultural, social and family matrix in which human experiences are formed. It implies that our self, traits, and attitudes are unfolding through our connections

and bonds from early childhood. The relational school of psychoanalysis does not accept the myth of the isolated mind, but it emphasizes our embeddedness in the web of social relations. Budapest School, British object-relations theory, intersubjective psychoanalysis or relational psychoanalysis are assuming that psychotherapy is first and foremost an interpersonal event between two people. In the field of therapy, the analysand's psychic structure could never be independent of its objects, in this case, from the therapist. This intersubjective relation is the central element of the healing process. It assumes that psychological events are never just a function of inner structures and forces but are always derivate of interaction with others. Consequently, therapeutic space is also an open-ended plane of transactions.

Transference and counter-transference, occur in the therapy, create a dialectical field where past emotions and traumas are re-enacted and embodied in the two-person context. Memories from the past, specific associations cannot spring automatically but because of the presence of the other person. This phenomenological approach would be helpful for professionals to understand in-depth the importance of embodied emotions that could only raise by the physical contact. The two main topics of the presentation are the connection between the phenomenological intersubjectivity and the relational approaches of psychoanalysis and the importance of intersubjectivist approaches in psychological healing.

I am a second-year student of the Theoretical Psychoanalysis Ph.D. program at the University of Pécs, Hungary. My doctoral research focuses on the importance of intersubjective relations in the field of psychological therapy. By this, I would like to point out that a more humanistic approach, that intersubjectivity could offer, could help professionals to avoid the process of normalization and the reproduction of social imbalances through psychological treatment. Before my Ph.D., I completed my Masters in Philosophy and Critical Gender Studies at the Central European University in Budapest. These fields help me to see this question not only from an insider, psychological approach but from a more critical and social scientific perspective.

Julian Kiverstein.
Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, Amsterdam, Netherlands; Amsterdam University Medical Center, Amsterdam, Netherlands

'The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why disability does not entail pathological embodiment'

In the last 50 years, discussions of how to understand disability have been dominated by the medical and social models. According to the medical model, disability can be understood in terms of functional limitations of a disabled person's body caused by a pathological condition, to be treated and cured through rehabilitation or normalization. In contrast, the social model claims that disability is not an individual physical condition, but is rather the outcome of oppressive conditions imposed by society on physically impaired people. Paradoxically, both models overlook the disabled person's experience of the lived body, thus reducing the body of the disabled person to a physiological body.

Based on a co-authored paper (by Juan Toro, Julian Kiverstein, and Erik Rietveld ['The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why Disability Does Not Entail Pathological Embodiment']) I introduce the Ecological-Enactive (EE) model of disability. The EE-model combines ideas from phenomenology, enactive cognitive science and ecological psychology with the aim of doing justice simultaneously to the lived experience of being disabled, and the physiological dimensions of disability. More specifically, we put the EE model to work to disentangle the concepts of disability and pathology. From an ecological-enactive perspective, we locate the difference between pathological and normal forms of embodiment in the person's capacity to adapt to changes in the environment by establishing and following new

norms. From a phenomenological perspective, we distinguish normal and pathological embodiment of disabled people in terms of the structure of the experience of I-can and I cannot. The I-cannot experienced by the non-pathologically disabled person can be understood as a local I-cannot, with a background of I-can: I-can do it in a different way, I-can ask for help, etc. This contrasts with the experience of I-cannot of the pathologically embodied person, which deeply pervades their being-in-the-world. To ensure that the discussion remains in contact with lived experience, we draw upon phenomenological interviews we have carried out with people with Cerebral Palsy.

This paper is co-authored with Juan Toro and Erik Rietveld. Juan Toro will present the paper.

Julian Kiverstein is Assistant Professor of Neurophilosophy at the University of Amsterdam. He is currently writing a monograph for Palgrave Macmillan entitled The Significance of Phenomenology. He edited a comprehensive handbook for Routledge Taylor Francis on the philosophy of the social mind. He is associate editor of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences and was until recently Book Review Editor for the Journal of Consciousness Studies. Before his appointment at Amsterdam in 2011, Kiverstein was teaching fellow at Edinburgh University, where he played a lead role in developing and designing the Mind, Language and Embodied Cognition Masters Programme, of which he also became director.

D. R. Koukal.
University of Detroit Mercy

'Teaching Phenomenology as a Heuristic Tool in Architectural Design'

> In this paper the author will report on an ongoing experiment: teaching graduate-level students of architecture how to use phenomenology as a technique of discovery to assist them in their design process. This experiment originated in directed readings that attempted to theoretically engage phenomenologically-informed "schools" of architecture, and over fifteen years has evolved into a small seminar-workshop that is focused on having students produce their own rigorous phenomenological analyses in the service of their various thesis projects. The paper will convey the challenges of grounding non-philosophers in the demanding literature of phenomenology and its place in modern thought, and then move on to outline the basic features of the course: exposure to the "orthodox" methodologies of phenomenology; highlighting examples of phenomenological analyses of place and space by philosophers and practicing architects; and an exploration of different ways of doing phenomenology collaboratively. However, most of the paper will be focused on the "practical" dimension of the course, where every member has a say in refining an adopted collaborative methodology to phenomenologically explore a different architectural "theme" every week, all of which are chosen by the class as a whole. These explorations have taken a variety of forms over the years, including peer-reviewed free writing, directed "free" writing, sketches, illustrations, word clouds, meaning-schematics, collaborative narration, and computer-generated eidetic imagery. In the end, the author will report on the course's successes and failures, but will ultimately conclude that the biggest challenge to any "engaged" phenomenology is motivating others to "see" or intuit what phenomenology can reveal to them, and that the best way of doing this is giving them the tools to "do" phenomenology for themselves.

D.R. Koukal's research has centered on the phenomenological method and the problem of expression. They have published articles on Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre. They are interested in

the actual practice of phenomenology, and have undertaken several investigations of the experience of media, lived space and the body.

Petr Kříž.
Charles University, Prague, and Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic

'Phenomenological physiotherapy: extending Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of bodily intentionality'

This paper clarifies the significance of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account of the body for physiotherapeutic practice. Physiotherapists are trained to approach the functioning of the body from an objectivist perspective, but their therapeutic interaction with patients is not limited to an application of natural-scientific explanations. Analogically, they often perceive mechanistic models of bodily functioning as insufficient, yet they generally lack an appropriate theoretical framework to formalize and systematically describe their experience. We argue that physiotherapists' practice well corresponds to Merleau-Ponty's theorization of the body as the bearer of an original bodily intentionality and makes it possible to elaborate it further. On the one hand, the practice of physiotherapy corroborates Merleau-Ponty's critical arguments against objectivist interpretations of the body. For example, norms of optimal corporeal functioning are highly individual and variable, and thus do not depend on generic physiological structures in a direct way; correspondingly, objectively measurable physical deviations rarely correspond to specific subjective difficulties; and similarly, a patient's reflexive insight into his or her motor deficiencies does not necessarily produce significant motor improvements. Physiotherapeutic procedures can therefore be understood neither as an expert mechanical manipulation with a patient's machine-like body nor as a process of instructing the patient's consciousness to manipulate it in that way. On the other hand, physiotherapeutic practice can draw on Merleau-Ponty's positive suggestion to understand motor disorders as modifications of bodily intentionality. Conceived in this way, physiotherapy approaches motor disorders as bodily mis-understandings or failures to optimally deal with motor requirements of a situation. Correspondingly, the therapeutical process itself becomes an inter-corporeal dialogue or bodily empathy. In the course of this process, a richer motor intentionality of the therapist takes up the patient's limited, less adaptable, and more laborious intentionality, and guides it to discovering better ways of grasping a situation as meaningful through particular postures and movements.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Jan Halák.

Petr Kříž is a physiotherapist, doctoral student of philosophy at Charles University, Prague, and research associate at Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic. His thesis aims to develop a new theoretical framework for physiotherapy on the basis of a phenomenological interpretation of bodily intentionality. His scientific interests are in motor intentionality and its pathologies, differentiation of body schema, bodily empathy, and the expressivity of the body. Apart from several papers written in Czech, Petr Kříž has recently published an English paper on "Merleau-Ponty's Discovery of the Pre-objective Body and Its Consequences for Body-Oriented Disciplines" (*Sport, Ethics and Philosophy*, 2019).

Joel Krueger.
University of Exeter

'Taking Watsuji online: aidagara and expression in the techno-social niche'

Despite increased interest in comparative philosophy within the past few decades — including particular interest in the Kyoto School of Japanese philosophy — Tetsurō Watsuji has not received the attention he deserves. Watsuji was a broad-ranging and original thinker who developed important insights into culture, ethics, religion, embodiment, and the self. He was also a skilled phenomenologist. His rich analysis of embodiment, space, and intersubjectivity not only predates insights developed by phenomenologists such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty but also deepens and extends their analysis in productive ways.

This talk has two objectives: first, to briefly introduce Watsuji's phenomenology of aidagara ("betweenness"), including its novel analysis of embodiment, space, and intersubjectivity; second, to use aidagara to think through the dynamics of subjectivity and expression within the Internet-enabled "techno-social niches" found in everyday life. I argue that Watsuji develops a prescient analysis of embodiment and expression — centered around core notions of "subjective spatiality" and "spatial extendedness" — anticipating modern technologically-mediated forms of expression, connection, and engagement. More precisely, I show that instead of adopting a traditional phenomenological focus on face-to-face interaction, Watsuji instead argues that communication technologies — which now include Internet-enabled technologies and spaces — are expressive vehicles enabling new forms of emotional expression and co-regulated experiences that would be otherwise inaccessible without these technologies. For Watsuji, these expressive vehicles and spaces aren't mere add-ons to the self and its capacities. Rather, they are progressively incorporated into the self, understood as "betweenness". Accordingly, they should be seen as constitutive parts of our "subjective spatiality" — that is, part of the embodied self and the rich pathways of "spatial extendedness" that establish enduring interconnections with others. I consider some of Watsuji's arguments and indicate how this view might productively impact several debates, including debates over our perceptual access to other minds.

This paper is part of a preconstituted panel with Lucy Osler: "Engaging with Online Spaces". See preconstituted panels overview.

Joel Krueger is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Exeter. He works primarily in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of cognitive science — with a particular focus on issues in 4E (embodied, embedded, enacted, extended) cognition, including emotions, social cognition, and psychopathology. He also works in comparative philosophy and philosophy of music.

Ondra Kvapil.
École Normale Supérieure de Paris / Charles University in Prague

'Thought-provoking Death'

My paper will focus on Sartre's meditations on death. Sartre formulates them as a critique of Heidegger – and the majority of commentators adopt his approach. I will however claim it more fruitful to read Sartre's conclusions in the light of Husserl's analyses of death. These were indeed unknown to Sartre, nonetheless the two share key presuppositions: Because our death cannot be grasped in reflection on our subjectivity, it cannot belong to the ontological structure of subjectivity itself; death is then classified as a mundane event, as well as a limit-

problem of phenomenological description. I will demonstrate how Sartre radicalizes this notion. Death is not a limit-problem only for transcendental reflection, but already in pre-theoretical and pre-phenomenological attitude. Not only can we never live to see it coming, we cannot even anticipate it, as the instant of death is principally indeterminate. The only meaning we can attribute to our death is that of the end of our –meaningful, or meaningless – existence. Our death is thus categorically different from all that is intended in the world. There is also a tacit consequence to the exclusion of death from subjectivity: mortality is reduced to bodily vulnerability. Death is the final strike, which may come in various disguises – perhaps that of a virus. Coming from the world, where we nevertheless cannot intend it, death remains essentially exterior to us. In sum, I will unravel the missing link between Husserl's unpublished reflections on death and Levinas' grasp of death as radically Other. Moreover, it will emerge that death, which as a mundane fact becomes a subject to a variety of disciplines, at the same time exceeds all empirical facts and thus engages philosophy. Far from being limited to academia, death engages thinking of each and every one of us – no matter where we come from.

I am a postgraduate researcher at École Normale Supérieure de Paris and Charles University in Prague, currently working on my dissertation The Philosophical Significance of Death. Previously, I have also studied at Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. I have taught several courses in phenomenological philosophy, mainly on Heidegger, at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Charles University. My research concerns phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics, as well as 19th-century continental philosophy, with particular research interests that include death and mortality, relation between being and nothingness, and the problem of time.

Corinne Lajoie.
Pennsylvania State University

'Space, Access, Belonging: Insights from Phenomenology and Disability Studies'

The following essay draws on and interprets Maurice Merleau-Ponty's account of lived space in Phenomenology of Perception from a disability studies perspective to investigate the relation among access, space and belonging. While the buzz around access has taken over by storm a variety of scholarly fields and public debates, the notion of access — at least in its common acceptation as a linchpin for inclusivity — remains conspicuously absent from the phenomenological literature. And yet, phenomenology's longstanding interest in lived space and the embodied ways in which we make sense of and encounter a shared world offers a unique vantage into these questions. Strictly speaking, there would be no 'spaces' for us to 'access' and in which to feel as if we 'belonged' if we did not have a body already involved in the world. The common-sense approach to access in institutional practice and policy, however, does little to reflect this originary entwinement. Instead, access is most-often collapsed with the legal provision of mandated accommodations. When taken in the most general sense, access is popularly imaged as are incommensurate with exclusion. In other words, access begets inclusion.
The fluence with which we speak of these notions, however, should give us pause. Disability scholar Tanya Titchkosky, for example, warns of the perils of embracing access and inclusion as "unquestioned values" (Titchkosky 2017, ix) without asking ourselves what access means, how and when it materializes (or fails to materialize), who is already 'included', and why some of us need to fight for access in the first place. Exploring the phenomenological meaning of access fundamentally involves "the exploration of the meaning of our lives together — who is

together with whom, how, where, when, and why?" (ibid, 6). On this view, access lies at the intersection of bodies, space, and the "everyday practices of inclusion and exclusion" (ibid, xi) that determine the intersubjective shape of belonging. My project in this paper angles Titchkosky's invitation to denaturalize the taken-for-granted meaning of access and interrogate its role and lived meaning in ableist social worlds. I offer, in the main, two interrelated claims: first, I argue that a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology of space and belonging can contribute to our understanding of broader issues of access, justie, and inclusion in the American post-ADA context. And second, I suggest that bureaucratic (or legalistic) approaches to access need 'cripping' by a disability studies framework to reflect limitations of disabled ways of being-in-the-world.

Corinne Lajoie is a PhD student in Philosophy and Women's Gender and Sexuality Studies at Penn State University. Her main areas of research are phenomenology, philosophy of disability, feminist philosophy and health ethics. Her work has been published in *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* and *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy*. In 2020, she will be co-editing a special issue of *Puncta: A Journal of Critical Phenomenology* titled "Critically Sick: New Phenomenologies of Illness, Madness, and Disability".

Adriano Lotito.
Milano-Bicocca University

'Tran Duc Thao between Phenomenology and Marxism'

This contribution focuses on the Tran Duc Thao's work, *Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism*, that is fundamental to post-war French thought, having influenced thinkers as Lyotard and Derrida amongst others and representing the first systematic attempt to synthesize Marxism and phenomenology. Firstly I examine the Tran's reconstruction of Husserlian phenomenology. Originally there is an objective idealism theorizing the independence of the object; then there is its reversal in a subjective idealism highlighting the constituting consciousness; finally there is the switch from static to genetic phenomenology with the thematization of the life-world as historical-empirical ground (I). Secondly I explore the contradiction indicated by Tran between the Husserl's idealistic frame, implicating the reproduction of an abstract dualism, and the results of the concrete analysis, bound to the original claim of going back to the things themselves. This tension is particularly detectable in *The Origin of Geometry* (II). Thirdly I discuss the Tran's solution to this riddle, namely the radicalisation of the materialistic stance discovered in the Husserl's late writings towards a Marxist horizon. The genesis of the *a priori* forms of the antepredicative experience is derived from the evolution of species and from the development of human work. The dialectic of behaviour as practical interaction between organism and nature determines the emergence of meanings structuring the experience. The notion of intentionality is interpreted as result of an immanent negation, the *aufhebung* of any immediate determinations through the work of an emerging bodily-social intersubjectivity that in this way reaches the self-consciousness. The real movement, insofar as is sketched out and repressed at once, is sublated as intentional content. Transcendental subjectivity becomes an immanent subjectivisation of the object through praxis. This could lead to an alternative antireductionist ontologization of phenomenology despite a teleologism that risks to cage the dialectic in a too narrow path (III).

Adriano Lotito graduated in Philosophy (B.A) at the University of Bologna with a thesis entitled *Phenomenology and Marxism in Tran Duc Thao* (Supervisor Prof. Manlio Iofrida) and in Philosophy of the Contemporary World (M.A) at the Vita-Salute San Raffaele University with a thesis entitled *Criteria*

of Normativity in the Axel Honneth's Critical Theory (Supervisor Prof. Roberto Mordacci). He is currently attending the Advanced Course in Critical Theory of Society at the Milano-Bicocca University. He is focusing, with the view to a future Ph.D., on the rethinking of the immanent critique specifically in connection with the work transformations.

Bence Peter Marosan.
Budapest Business School, Pazmany Peter Catholic University

'Engaged Eco-phenomenology. An Eco-socialist stance based upon a phenomenological account of narrative identity'

> In my presentation, I will attempt to show how a phenomenologically consequent interpretation of narrative identity would lead to eco-ethical and eco-political consequences. In particular, I will try to show the outlines of an eco-socialist theory, which implies an egalitarian approach of all living beings, and which is motivated by a phenomenological understanding of narrative identity.
>
> My presentation consists of two main parts. In the first part, I would like to treat the relationship between freedom, responsibility and – narratively conceived – personal identity, from a phenomenological point of view. The main authors of this part will be Husserl, Heidegger, Ricoeur, Lévinas and László Tengelyi. For Husserl, the narrative aspect of personal identity was already an important topic. For Heidegger, our own decisions constitute our identity. But in my opinion, there is a decisive factor, which was marginal for Heidegger, in regard of our identity and freedom: the Other. The Other's problem became central for Lévinas, and also for Ricoeur. László Tengelyi modified Ricoeur's account of narrative identity on a decisive point: he draws the attention to the role of "events of fate"; events that change the course of our lives fundamentally.
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> In the second part I would like to show the ethical and political implications of the first part. The way in which we treat in fact the Other shows the best, who we are in real. But the Other must not just be a human being; she or he can be a living being whatsoever. Here I would like to emphasize the eco-phenomenological motifs in Husserl (to this see also: Erazim Kohák); and I will try to show how such motifs lead to an egalitarian, eco-socialist view of everything which lives.

Bence Peter Marosan's PhD Studies were on Philosophy and Phenomenology, and conducted at the institutes of Eötvös Loránd University (Hungary), University College Dublin (Ireland), Bergische Universität Wuppertal (Germany), Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, École Normale Supérieure, (France). His affiliations are now with the Budapest Business School, Pázmány Péter Catholic University. His more important publications include two monographies on Husserl (in Hungarian), and he has edited two volumes on Marx and on László Tengelyi (in Hungarian). His research interests are Phenomenology (Husserl in particular), Hermeneutics, Philosophy of Mind, Political Philosophy, Eco-ethics, Eco-politics.

Susan Massad.
The East Side Institute, New York City

'Creating a New Performance of Dementia'

> As viewed through a biomedical lens – which remains the dominant way in which dementia is seen – Alzheimer's and related dementias (ADRD) is seen primarily as a condition of loss of

capabilities within an individual: of speech, of cognitive abilities, of physical capacities and, eventually, of life while research and treatment is directed toward cure of the individual. Dementia activists across the globe are now raising the question: Is the shame, stigma, and isolation that people with ADRD and their families experience in large part a result of this very narrow lenses through which dementia is understood?

In this paper we will present on the Joy of Dementia (You've Got to Be Kiddin!) project, a playful, philosophical and conversational collective exploration of the dementia experience as an effort to introduce a different lens – a development lens – as a counter narrative that challenges the current "tragedy narrative" surrounding ADRD. Seen through a development lens, humans are no longer are viewed, not as discrete and isolated individuals but as relational beings, connected to one another in ways that allows us to grow with, rather than fear, uncertainty. In this view, a dementia diagnosis presents transformational opportunities not just for the individual diagnosed, but to everyone in the "dementia ensemble" – including people of all ages who fear growing older and losing cognitive abilities. The workshops, always experiential, often involve mixed groupings of family members, care givers, professionals and those diagnosed, introduces improvisational play and philosophical conversation as activities that support the discovery of new ways of relating, being together, listening and responding. Participants are supported to challenge deeply held assumptions about what we and others "know" about the dementia experience, and it is within this collaborative ensemble building activity that the joy that comes with creating a new performances of dementia is discovered.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Mary Fridley. It is also the second of two papers in a preconstituted panel with Frances Bottenberg.

Susan Massad is a retired clinician and medical educator. A primary care physician she has researched and taught in the arena of doctor-patient communication and the social-cultural-biological dimensions of health and wellness. She is a faculty member at the The East Side Institute where she is the co-creator of the Joy of Dementia© workshops that she coleads all over the US with colleague, Mary Fridley.

Sam McAuliffe.
Monash University

'The Improvisational Encounter: What is Common to Music and Hermeneutic-Phenomenology'

Hermeneutic-phenomenology as a method of inquiry is increasingly finding its way into music studies, and the performing arts more generally. Indeed, with respect to music studies there is no shortage of projects where hermeneutic-phenomenology is employed as a means to better understand music, both from the perspective of creating music and experiencing it as a spectator. There is a clear distinction, then, between the practice of music and the application of hermeneutic-phenomenological inquiry; one is used to understand the other. Rarely acknowledged however, are those characteristics that are common to both music and hermeneutic-phenomenology. In this paper I would like to explore one of those shared characteristics: improvisation.

By exploring the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition from a Gadamerian perspective and the practice of music, broadly conceived, I argue that what is common to each is the 'improvisational encounter'. Which is to say, the improvisation that is essential to the practice of music is equally essential to hermeneutic-phenomenological inquiry. By highlighting the hermeneutic-phenomenological nature of improvisation in music and the improvisational nature of hermeneutic-phenomenology we might better notice the relevance of each field to

the other. Consequently, not only can applied hermeneutic-phenomenology better speak to the practice of music, but so too can studying music provide insight into hermeneutic-phenomenology as such. Thus, perhaps by acknowledging the commonalities between art and philosophy we can notice ways in which these disciplines might speak to and complement one another.

Sam McAuliffe is a PhD candidate at Monash University, working at the intersection of improvised music and philosophical hermeneutics. In addition to his academic work Sam has worked as a musical director for experimental theatre productions, has curated sound installations for major Australian art festivals, and he plays guitar in a variety of ensembles.

Filipa Melo Lopes.
University of Edinburgh, Philosophy Department

'"Half Victim, Half Accomplice": Cat Person and Narcissism'

At the end of 2017, Kristen Roupenian's short story, Cat Person, went viral. Published at the height of the #MeToo movement, it depicted a 'toxic date' and a disturbing sexual encounter between Margot, a college student, and Robert, an older man she meets at work. The story was widely viewed as a relatable denunciation of women's powerlessness and routine victimization. In this paper, I push against this common reading. I suggest that it fails to capture the disturbing and 'skin-crawling' quality of the story because it fails to engage with its rich phenomenological description. I propose an alternative feminist interpretation of Cat Person through the lens of Simone de Beauvoir's notion of narcissism. For Beauvoir, narcissism is a particular form of alienation that consists in making oneself both the subject and the ultimate project of one's life. Framing Margot as a modern-day narcissist casts her as engaging, not in subtly coerced, undesired sex, but rather in sex that is desired in a tragically alienated way. I argue that Beauvoir's notion of narcissism is an important tool for feminists today –well beyond the interpretation of Cat Person. It presses us to see systematic subordination not just as something done to women, but also as something women do to themselves. This in turn highlights the neglected role of self-transformation as a key aspect of feminist political resistance.

Filipa Melo Lopes is a Lecturer in Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. She completed her Ph.D. in Philosophy, in 2019, at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Her research interests include Social Theory, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Disability and Philosophy of Sexuality.

Ellen Moysan.
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA

'Phenomenological Description of the Notion of Inner Song: Doing Phenomenology to Understand Music Practice'

A musical performer plays or composes what is "heard in the mind." I call this musical phenomenon: "inner song," and I use a Husserlian framework to describe it as an object of phantasy. In the present paper, I will demonstrate how an accurate description of the inner song requires a rigorous praxis of phenomenology giving voice to actual performers coming from various backgrounds.

The "inner song" is a musical phenomenon of phantasy in the sense that it is independent from the perception of a physical sound and constituted in consciousness by the imagination reshaping sensory-data (essentially sounds) in a totally new fashion. It can take two forms: a "pure phantasy object" (improvisation and composition), and a "hearing through seeing" (interpretation from a score); the difference between the two is the mode of involvement of perception.

My method is to engage with phenomenology as a "praxis." I go back to the experience of the inner song: (1) questioning my experience as a cellist, and (2) engaging in a dialogue with musicians from various traditions interviewing them about their practice. This approach provides a plurality of points of views and constitutes an "eidetic variation" that helps me to highlight the essential structures of the "inner song". From this foundation I develop a description grounded in a Husserlian framework.

Engaging with the inner song offers a unique perspective on the challenges of interdisciplinary phenomenology: first, it brings back to phenomenology as a "praxis" starting with the reduction and shaped by the object itself; second, it highlights the necessity to listen to a plurality of practitioners who have a first-hand experience of the object, here the musicians themselves; finally, it demonstrates how it is the object itself which brings together the phenomenologist and the practicing musician in a collaborative description of the lived-experience.

Ellen Moysan started her education in Philosophy at Paris-Sorbonne IV (France), before studying with the French and German Master Erasmus Mundus Europhilosophy at the Karl University (Czech Republic), Hosei University (Japan), and Wuppertal University (Germany). She is now a doctoral candidate at Duquesne University (USA). Over the last ten years, Ellen Moysan has researched the notion of "inner song," interviewing more than fifty musicians from different horizons on that topic, and creating a digital archive where the collection of interviews is available in French, Italian, and English. Currently, she is working on her interviews and finishing her dissertation.

Jamie Murphy.
University College Cork, Ireland

'The Angry is Always Right'

According to a widespread assumption in contemporary literature on the philosophy of emotions, it is possible for a subject to elicit anger for no reason (Nussbaum 2016, Huebner 2018, Cherry 2018, Callard 2018). This talk aims to reject this claim by arguing for the opposite idea: it is impossible for an agent to get angry for no reason.

The talk is organized in three parts.

Part 1 gives a brief outline of how anger is viewed in contemporary literature, and presents the assumption that anger can occur for no reason.

Part 2 rejects this claim: anger must come about from a reason. First, I distinguish between a reason and a cause for an emotion by showing that a reason can be either justified or unjustified, whereas a cause either exists or not. A cause will always become a justified reason for the angry subject. The reason has the potential to be unjustified when it is presented to the angry subject's peers. I build on this by introducing warranted anger and vindicated anger. Warranted anger is anger which has a justified reason. Vindicated anger is anger which, if presented to the angry subject's peers, would be seen as warranted anger.

In part 3 I posit and explain the idea of "Vapid Anger". Vapid Anger is anger the subject of which knows they shouldn't feel, but feel it anyway. It is controlled by an agent's mood and overall disposition to anger, thereby determining the likelihood they will get angry at

something "vapid". I introduce this concept as it is a response to potential attacks against my argument; it shows that one can still have a reason for being angry but are aware that, if their reason was presented to a group of their peers, would be seen as unjustified.

I attained my BA with a major in philosophy in 2016. I graduated with my MA in philosophy in 2018. My MA dissertation was focused on moral responsibility, specifically on compatibilist thought. Both of these degrees were attained in University College Cork (UCC). After 2 years away from academia I returned to begin my PhD in September 2019. My thesis is focused solely on anger as an emotion, in an attempt to give a full account of all types of anger.

Lucy Osler.
University of Exeter

'Blending spaces: techno-social niches and emotion regulation in the age of the Internet'

> Philosophical work exploring how people use scaffolding and niche-making as a way of shaping, driving and supporting affect is now well-established. This work often describes how we set up spaces such as our homes and offices in order to regulate our affective lives. However, little consideration has been given to the way the Internet influences our affective life. In this presentation, I explore how the Internet scaffolds affect and how it does so in distinctive ways. I argue that the Internet not only regulates and scaffolds our affective lives but is used to create 'techno-social niches' that blend both offline and online space. These blended spaces have unique properties that introduce new dimensions of complexity to our regulative practices and pose interesting questions for our phenomenological understanding of lived space and interpersonal space.
> On the positive side, the hyper-portability of the Internet paired with the huge number of possibilities it offers us, makes the Internet a highly flexible, reliable, and stable resource for emotion regulation, allowing it to contribute to and nestle within many of our affective techno-social niches. Moreover, the Internet, as a hyper-social forum, gives us near-constant access to forms of interpersonal emotion regulation, as well as supporting online we-spaces that engender a continual sense of connection with others, even when we are not physically present with other people. However, these features also have potentially disruptive impacts, too. For instance, the multitude of possibilities that the Internet offers and its continual presence in our lives may lead to the disruption of our niches. Additionally, the role that background agencies have in shaping what the Internet offers and promotes to us, as well as the potential risk of over-reliance and over-regulation when we use such deeply entrenched forms of emotion regulation, is considered.

> *This paper is part of a preconstituted panel with Joel Krueger: "Engaging with Online Spaces". See preconstituted panels overview.*

Lucy Osler is a philosophy PhD candidate at the University of Exeter. She specialises in the phenomenology of sociality, with a particular interest in interpersonal encounters online, empathy, group atmospheres, and shared experience. Lucy has recently published an article on 'Feeling togetherness online: a phenomenological sketch of online communal experiences' and co-authored an article with Joel Krueger on 'Engineering affect: emotion regulation, the internet, and the techno-social niche'.

Maria-Nefeli Panetsos.
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

'Dancing Phenomenology: A New Source of Non-Verbal Knowledge'

> When talking about Phenomenology we usually think about only about the traditional studies of the subject's perception of its surrounding phenomena. However, when turning the point of view towards the body, except the first steps done by Merleau-Ponty, Philosophy remains under some limitations of the orthological perception of reality. I found interesting the fact that in the history of Philosophy there is a clear absence towards the art of Dance, as the main corporeal - and for Hegel 'primitive' and 'uncivilized' - form of art which has no place in the fine art hierarchy.
> Looking for the reasons why this may have happened, I see that there always have been the fear of the body as a source of knowledge, as it has been always seen as unreliable filter of the human perception. However dance helps to see how the process of sensing and understanding one's subjectivity and may enrich and change the perspective of one's identity. I would like to merge the concept of the dancer with the phenomenological existential subject, as an example of conscious and aware subject that actively experiences its existence, transcendental self and its physicality into the intersubjective space where it lives. Through dance, borders and 'merleaupontian' fleshes can be managed in a conscious way, essentially focusing on one's subjectivity and its relationship with time, space, other objects and subjects. As Prof. Shusterman already proposes in his Somaesthetics, the philosophical research can be amplified in the embodied experience of other corporeal activities that usually are not taken into consideration as explanatory for the human existence. An involved, inclusive phenomenological process, will definitely find further ways to sense and understand the aspects of the subject's condition, as the self and identity are always related and influenced by the corporeal dimension of the human.

My name is Maria-Nefeli Panetsos, born in Madrid (Spain), student of the Italian School of Madrid, and recent graduate student of the faculty of Philosophy, Pedagogy and Psychology of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, where I specialised in Philosophy and my main fields of interest have been Phenomenology, Existentialism and Aesthetics. Since 2016 I started personal research focusing on the Identity of Dance and its Aesthetics, and later I continue finding connections with Philosophy of the Body and other applied phenomenological and existentialist perspective of Philosophy. I'm currently interested in continuing my research in Art History studies and Aesthetics in a postgraduate level.

Fabio Tommy Pellizzer.
Independent

'The Sounds of the Manifold. Towards a Phenomenology of Noise'

> Phenomenologically speaking, things are always constituted through unity-of-manifold structures. To what extent can phenomenology account for a phenomenon that escapes what appears to be the very 'grammar' of phenomenological analysis? In fact, while a thing is always experienced as a focal point that brings the manifold into unity, noise is more like a halo effect, i.e. a scattered multiplicity that surrounds the thing. Such a multiplicity does not overlap but on the contrary contrasts with the experience of things as meaningful. In this light, noises do not come from the thing as meaningful, for their source lies elsewhere – somehow in the thing, but not in its sense.

In part one, building upon Heidegger's analysis of tools and signs, I define the phenomenon of noise as a disruption within the relational texture of experience. For example, the noise of the jackhammer presents itself as a multiplicity that cannot be inscribed within the unity-of-manifold structure that constitutes the jackhammer as a tool. The noise 'intersects' –in the form of a disturbance – our experience of the jackhammer as a tool. On this basis, noise can be defined as the very background of things, as always 'surrounded' by (and 'embedded' in) sensations that cannot be reduced to unity-of-manifold structures (e.g. relations of usefulness).

In part two, I discuss noise as a 'relative' phenomenon, i.e. as something that can be meaningful but also highly invasive. Firstly, I consider how noises can be reintegrated in new forms of unity of manifold, as in the case of acoustic signals like hooters or alarms (which I describe by contrast to Heidegger's discussion of car's turn signals). Secondly, I consider particular experiences of noise drawing from both fiction and everydayness, such as background noises in Star Trek's star ships, noise pollution, noises that come from within ourselves (e.g. heartbeat).

This paper is part of a preconstituted panel with Giuseppe Torre and Basil Vassilicos: "Phenomenologies of Noise - Three studies". See preconstituted panels overview.

In 2019 I received a PhD from Ca' Foscari University of Venice, with a thesis entitled "The Unity of the Manifold. Heidegger's Interpretation of the Synthesis between Husserl and Kant". My research interests include phenomenology (Heidegger, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty), Kant's philosophy and current debates on materiality and agency. My recent investigations aims at developing, in dialogue with archaeology and anthropology, a phenomenological approach to tools, signs and artefacts.

Danielle Petherbridge.
University College Dublin

'An Embodied-Cognitive Approach to Dementia'

Dementia is a complex disease that is most often framed in terms of diminished cognitive capacity or neurodegeneration, together with assumptions about the loss of personhood, memory and communication skills. As a consequence, forms of dementia assessment and care are often based on a cognitive account of personhood and framed in terms of cognitive and linguistic capacities. One of the central arguments of this paper is that such accounts of personhood are one-sided and neglect the important embodied dimensions of persons both as subjects in the world and in their interactions with others. More significantly, drawing specifically on phenomenology, the research constructs an embodied-cognitive account of dementia that offers new insights not only into the lived experience of persons with dementia but also alternative forms of care. The paper begins by examining the appropriateness of an account of empathy in encounter with persons with dementia before investigating the importance of dynamic engagement that can give rise to embodied and relational capabilities and forms of communication. This has significant ramifications for forms of interaction and care, as well as existing policies, medical attitudes and diagnosis of dementia. Our aim in this paper is to: (a) offer an embodied-cognitive approach to dementia drawing on a phenomenology; (b) provide an account of the lived experience of persons with dementia that in turn informs policy and care; (c) explore alternative forms of expressivity and personhood informed by a phenomenological approach. This research offers an important phenomenological alternative to current research on dementia with implications for the understanding of dementia, as well as diagnosis and methods of care.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Natalia Burakowska.

Dr. Petherbridge is Assistant Professor in the School of Philosophy at University College Dublin and Deputy-Director of the UCD Centre for Ethics in Public Life. Previously Dr. Petherbridge was an IRC Marie-Curie fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University, New York. Her primary research interests include the relation between perception, attention and affect; theories of intersubjectivity in phenomenology and social philosophy as well as embodied-cognitive approaches to illness. She is PI of a research project on embodied-cognitive accounts of dementia being undertaken in partnership with the Alzheimer Society of Ireland.

Vít Pokorný.
Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic

'Embodiment of rhythm and rhythms of embodiment: exploring rhythmic multiplicity'

This presentation attempts to explore the relation between rhythm and embodiment. It understands embodiment as extended intertwining of various dynamic processes, and rhythm as the key element of its dynamics. Rhythm is not just sheer periodicity or evenly spaced repetition (Langer), it goes far beyond the auditory experience and it can't be reduced only to kinetic phenomena. Thus, rhythm should be conceived rather as structural (Tosaki) which means that rhythm is not just phenomenal, but phenomenological, that it not only appears and accordingly can be described but pertains to the very structure of appearing.

In this context, the two correlated questions will be explored: How is rhythm embodied? and How is embodiment rhythmic? In order to comprehend rhythmicity of embodiment, rhythmic phenomena on its various levels need to be described. First, there are rhythmic phenomena of our individual bodies, their heartbeat, respiration, and metabolism. On the background of these first order rhythms, there are countless subliminal rhythmic patterns: physiological, neural, or cellular as each unit of organic composition has its own cycles of activity. In this respect, rhythm is characteristic inherent to living organisms in general (Mancuso, Shabala).

Since our embodiment is never simply individual but intersubjective, we are also engaged in shared rhythmic patterns of interpersonal and social life. These span from the fundamental rhythm of individuation (distinguishing between me and others) to various social rhythms that define dynamic structure of culture. Embodiment is also extended, our bodies are open dynamic systems dwelling within technological, as well as ecological environments. Such environments are also characterised by its frequencies, pulses and patterns of activity and our dynamic processual bodies are inherent parts of it.

It is not easy to live within such complex rhythmic multiplicity. It is on the one hand impossible to live in complete arrhythmia, a chaotic environment whose cycles and patterns are constantly disrupted. On the other hand, machinic cycles and frequencies or our clocks and computers can be dissonant with our organic lives. It might be crucial for our well-being to achieve rhythmic equilibrium.

Vít Pokorný is affiliated as a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic in Prague and as a lecturer of philosophy and anthropology at the Faculty of Arts, Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem. His research interests range methodologically between phenomenology and post-phenomenology, enactivism, deleuzo-guattarian schizo-analysis and rhizomatics, literary aesthetics, system theory, biodynamic ecology, processual philosophy, media philosophy, autoethograpy, cognitive and philosophical anthropology. His research topics include: tactility, rhythm, embodiment, biodynamics, mediascapes, technosphere, psychedelics, poetry, C. McCarthy,

post-human condition, artistic research and others. In his works, he attempts to formulate a complex transdisciplinary methodology that goes beyond traditional disciplinary divides.

Irina Poleshchuk.
European Humanities University (Vilnius)

'Ethical dimension of chronic pain: temporal dephases, guilt, and despair'

> In *The Absent Body* Drew Leder (1990) writes that phenomenological lived body is both the existential and experiental body and it forms the very core of subjectivity concentrating specifically on the presence. Leder also notices that being a foundation of almost all experiences, the living body continuously tends to recede from direct experience. Our embodied sensibility is the most solid and unescapable form of being present, it is also essentially characterized as 'the absent body.' The 'absent body' operates in health instances and widely present in biomedical discourse, however, it has been criticized in phenomenology (Good, 1995; Morris, 1991). The phenomenon of chronic pain renders visible a gap between 'absent body' and sensibility of embodied experience which opens an interaffective dimension (Fuchs, 2013).
>
> The paper discusses data-driven verbal and visual narratives of mothers experiencing chronic pain. Chronic pain experience has set various questions of normativity of responsibility and validity of moral acts in intersubjective relation. Trauma engrained in chronic pain reformulates meanings of intimacy, care, and modalities of female embodiment. The converse of chronic pain sharpens even more the dualism of body-present-in-illness/body-absent-in-health which is uttered by contemporary phenomenology of medicine (Goldenger, 2010). The paper seeks to articulate ethical temporality of female embodiment in chronic pain (especially ethical temporality of mother-child relation) and to sample multiple voices of narratives which contribute to understanding of complexity and diversity of female subjectivity in pain (Mattingly, 1998). Elaborating transitivity of responsibility launched by specific structure of temporality of chronic pain I wish to draw attention to a complexity of ethical becoming (Levinas, 2006), particularly to such modalities as guilt, shame, and despair (often read as morbid experiences in the 'absent body' paradigm).
>
> The research data are the narratives of women which are collected from interviews and sessions of art therapies.

I have been particularly interested in the philosophical heritage of Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Henry. Being adherent to philosophy of Levinas my post-doctoral research (University of Helsinki) has focused on the ethics of temporality and the temporality of justice, pain, shame, gilt, suffering and the phenomenology of embodiment. During last years I concentrated on phenomenology of chronic pain, affectivity of pain, and its ethical outcomes for parental (especially mother-child) relation. I have participated in a project "Life without future and pharmacotherapy: the use of antidepressant as a social event," analysing psychiatric medical sources, specifying the conditions of use of antidepressants, and inferring their ethical impacts.

Belinda Marshall.
University of St. Andrews

'Being-in-the-Virtual-World'

Questions surrounding the nature of being and existence have been tackled by philosophers for centuries, however, in this paper I analyse how concepts explored by these philosophers translate into virtual environments, as explored within virtual reality technologies. To begin, I will discuss the concept of "realism" - in an attempt to argue for the case that virtual reality - although still technology - can actually be considered a form of reality in itself. In accepting that virtual reality is a form of reality - or at least, a convincing enough extension of reality, we can accept that many existential possibilities and freedoms can be explored within virtual realms. (See: Myeung-Sook (2001)) This then opens up the potential for discussion surrounding what kinds of experiences we could expect to have within virtual environments, how they compare to phenomenological discussion of experience within "real" environments - and how these still hold both philosophical, and real world significance. Phenomenological analysis of accounts of "being" in terms of technology are vastly unexplored, beyond the postphenomenological movement as written by the likes of Ihde and Verbeek - however, even within postphenomenology, this discussion rarely ventures into virtual reality technologies. This research is important due to the level of potential real world impact - which is something else I will further clarify; particularly, with the increased use of virtual reality technologies to treat people with severe disabilities, I believe that it is crucial to explore how virtual environments can best be used and designed, to enable the user to maximise their lived experiences within virtual reality, if it is not possible for them in the primary version of reality. This does not limit the impact of such research, however, as virtual reality is becoming an increasingly popular form of entertainment technology, it is critical that we aim to gain a well-rounded understanding of its potential impact. This level of research also expands beyond the phenomenological questions, but also gains strength from other areas of philosophy such as extended cognition; Clark and Chalmers' original paper The Extended Mind (1998) has often been translated to suit modern day technology (such as the smartphone) - however, more recent research on extended cognition (and 4E cognition as a whole) has wide applicability to many forms of technology, yet is rarely explored within the context of computer-mediated reality. The cognitive links between technology and self, combined with the sensory and experiential links between virtual reality and self, can provide an excellent framework for further philosophical discussion on the phenomenology of virtuality.

I have a PhD in progress at the University of St Andrews as part of the SASP program, under supervision by Prof. Michael Wheeler and Dr. Kevin Scharp, project titled: 'Virtual Reality and the Extended Mind'. Previously completed my MA thesis titled 'The Question Concerning Virtual Reality' for which I was awarded a Distinction. I have also presented my paper 'Authenticity, Virtual Reality and AI' at Cambridge University for the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, as well as in Nottingham for the British Personalist Forum; and my paper 'Feminism and the Extended Mind' at Cardiff University for the Feminism and Technology conference. I also have an upcoming chapter publication in an edited volume on Transhumanism, titled 'Evolving the Natural-born Cyborg: Using Virtuality to Navigate the Posthuman'.

Nicole Miglio.
San Raffaele University

'Painful experience and constitution of the intersubjective self: a critical-phenomenological analysis'

Pain is ordinary and integral to our experiential topography; a 'background texture' of pain characterises our whole lives. I flinch away from a hot pan as it brushes against my arm at the stove. I absent-mindedly rub my shoulder, relieving the dull ache from sitting at my desk too long. If we consider these routine and mundane ways in which pain features in everyday experience, it becomes clear that - far from presenting only through unusual and excruciating events - pain is familiar and, in many ways, vital for navigating the world. Pain draws our attention to our bodies as they pertain to our surroundings. And while everyday pain is often a far cry from the overwhelming agony of extreme injury, it is nonetheless recognisable as pain across these various contexts.

Pain relief and treatment is a huge global pharmaceutical industry, based on a medical conception of pain as a set of quantifiable and calculable conditions in a physiological body. This notion of pain fails to account for social and political contexts which constitute subjects in pain, as they are alternately marginalised, disbelieved, prioritised, or cared for; the status of their painful experience garners significance in this relational intersubjective context.

By taking a critical-phenomenological approach, this paper seeks to critique and further reductionistic conceptions of pain by better accounting for the complex contextual and intersubjective variation of painful experiences. We articulate how painful experience involves several phenomenological levels – from the hyletic to the intersubjective – differentially affected by the subject's social, political, and cultural situation. We suggest that this critical-phenomenological account might be integrated into lifeworld-based approaches to care and treatment of pain, through social and political engagement, as well as raising some critical points of investigation for phenomenology in itself.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Jessica Stanier.

Nicole Miglio is a PhD Student at San Raffaele University (Milan). She's carrying her doctoral research in several institutions, in the U.S. (George Washington University and The University of San Francisco), in the UK (University of Exeter), and in Israel (University of Haifa). Her background is in theoretical philosophy and aesthetics, but she is working especially in the field of Feminist phenomenology. She is currently writing her PhD dissertation, which is exploring the many philosophical facets of the gestating subjectivity, considering both the classical accounts (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt, Beauvoir) and the contemporary ways to think the experiential complexity of the gestational relationship. She is co-supervised by Prof. Chiara Cappelletto (Aesthetics), prof. Francesca de Vecchi (Phenomenology and Social ontology), and Prof. Marjolein Oele (Contemporary European Philosophy).

Erik Rietveld.
Amsterdam University Medical Center, Amsterdam, Netherlands; Department of Philosophy, University of Twente, Enschede, Netherlands; Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Faculty of Science, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

'The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why disability does not entail pathological embodiment'

In the last 50 years, discussions of how to understand disability have been dominated by the medical and social models. According to the medical model, disability can be understood in

terms of functional limitations of a disabled person's body caused by a pathological condition, to be treated and cured through rehabilitation or normalization. In contrast, the social model claims that disability is not an individual physical condition, but is rather the outcome of oppressive conditions imposed by society on physically impaired people. Paradoxically, both models overlook the disabled person's experience of the lived body, thus reducing the body of the disabled person to a physiological body.

Based on a co-authored paper (by Juan Toro, Julian Kiverstein, and Erik Rietveld ['The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why Disability Does Not Entail Pathological Embodiment']) I introduce the Ecological-Enactive (EE) model of disability. The EE-model combines ideas from phenomenology, enactive cognitive science and ecological psychology with the aim of doing justice simultaneously to the lived experience of being disabled, and the physiological dimensions of disability. More specifically, we put the EE model to work to disentangle the concepts of disability and pathology. From an ecological-enactive perspective, we locate the difference between pathological and normal forms of embodiment in the person's capacity to adapt to changes in the environment by establishing and following new norms. From a phenomenological perspective, we distinguish normal and pathological embodiment of disabled people in terms of the structure of the experience of I-can and I cannot. The I-cannot experienced by the non-pathologically disabled person can be understood as a local I-cannot, with a background of I-can: I-can do it in a different way, I-can ask for help, etc. This contrasts with the experience of I-cannot of the pathologically embodied person, which deeply pervades their being-in-the-world. To ensure that the discussion remains in contact with lived experience, we draw upon phenomenological interviews we have carried out with people with Cerebral Palsy.

This paper is co-authored with Juan Toro and Julian Kiverstein. Juan Toro will present the paper.

Prof. dr. Erik Rietveld is Socrates Professor, Senior Researcher at the University of Amsterdam (AMC/Department of Philosophy/ILLC/Brain & Cognition) and a Founding Partner of RAAAF [Rietveld Architecture-Art-Affordances]. In 2013 his research project on skilled action titled "The Landscape of Affordances: Situating the Embodied Mind" was awarded with a NWO VIDI-grant for the development of his research group on skilled intentionality & situated expertise. Recently he received an ERC Starting Grant for a new philosophical project titled "Skilled Intentionality for 'Higher' Embodied Cognition: Joining Forces with a Field of Affordances in Flux". His work as a Socrates Professor at the University of Twente focuses on humane technology: the philosophy of making and societal embedding of technology in the humanist tradition.

Rosa Ritunnano.
University of Birmingham

'Self, World and Meaning: Understanding Existential Changes in Early Psychosis'

What does a person encounter when they are confronted with anomalous self and world experience during the onset of psychosis? How should we interpret such experiential anomalies?
In this contribution, I explore possibilities for engaging with psychological theories of meaning-making such as the meaning maintenance model (MMM; Heine et al., 2006). One fundamental assumption is that humans are inexhaustible meaning-makers, constantly trying to match their perceptions of the world with expected relations of meaning. This meaning-making activity responds to two existential concerns: 1) the need for coherence, or meaning as

comprehensibility–that is the value-neutral experience that something makes sense, and 2) the need for purpose, or meaning as significance-–-that is the value-laden experience that something is meaningful. According to the MMM, when the world contradicts our committed understandings we experience a meaning violation: the world feels unfamiliar, absurd (Camus) or uncanny (Heidegger). This is in turn motivates meaning maintenance behaviours aimed at re-establishing a sense of familiarity.

Experiential changes in the sense of presence, reality and familiarity have been long recognised as relevant psychopathological features of prodromal psychosis (e.g, Ratcliffe, Sass). Building on this work, I propose an integrative understanding of anomalous self-world experiences as meaning violations. Such an understanding allows us to consider the existential implications of psychopathological experiences not only in the phenomenal realm but also in relation to the person's life narrative. I argue that meaning-making is a prerequisite for experiencing the world as familiar and for valuing our lives as significant. In situations where the self and the world are incomprehensible, it might prove difficult to uphold a sense of meaning in life. I argue that in some cases, the formation of delusional narratives can restore a feeling of familiarity and provide a sense that our lives matter and are worth living.

Rosa Ritunnano is a PhD researcher at the Institute for Mental Health (University of Birmingham), jointly funded through the Priestley PhD programme in collaboration with the University of Melbourne. Rosa is interested in the cross-disciplinary applications of phenomenological approaches in the context of mental health research and practice. Her doctoral project focuses on the psychopathology of early psychosis and seeks to integrate current phenomenological theories with the existential dimension of experience (e.g. personhood, meaning-making, meaning in life). Alongside her academic commitments, Rosa is a Consultant Psychiatrist in Early Intervention and a Principal Investigator in ongoing clinical trials.

Erika Ruonakoski.
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä

'Violated and Suppressed Intentionality'

The presentation provides a phenomenological analysis of the ways in which intentionality and bodily boundaries are intertwined and become challenged through acts of violence. Interpersonal violence, whether physical or psychological, always involves a violation of the boundaries of the body-subject. From the starting point of the Husserlian and Beauvoirian characterisations of the lived body as "a zero-point of orientation to the world" or "a radiation of subjectivity", the violation of body-subject's boundaries reveals itself not only as a violation of one's "personal space" but also as an interference in one's orientation to the world. Workplace bullying or controlling acts of a spouse, for instance, carry this element of violence with them, as they both force themselves into the sphere of ownness of the subject and are practiced in order to coerce the subject's orientation into routes chosen by others. In cases of physical violence, such as sexual assault or life-threatening acts of violence, the same twofold structure of intrusion is present, but in a more traumatising manner, as the lived, sensuous body comes to appear as a site dominated by the other. I suggest that the dissociative features of the victim's experience in such extreme circumstances can be interpreted as an attempt to continue existence as a willing and intending agent, as a radiation subjectivity, albeit outside the physical boundaries of the body.

Dr. Erika Ruonakoski is Experienced Researcher and Docent in Philosophy at the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Finland. Her current research project Despair and

Time deals with despair as a crisis of future-orientation. Ruonakoski has specialised in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's and Simone de Beauvoir's philosophy, and her earlier research topics include empathy with animals, phenomenology of reading, analysis of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy, and gender-sensitive pedagogy. She is the author of *Eläimen tuttuus ja vieraus* (*Familiarity and foreignness of animals*, 2011), and co-author of *Human and Animal in Ancient Greece: Empathy and Encounter in Classical Literature* (2017). She has translated works by Beauvoir and early feminist philosophers into Finnish. She is also the president of a Helsinki-based philosophical association, Center for Practical Phenomenology, which works to inspire practice-oriented and socially informed questioning in philosophy, and encourages alternative, audience-friendly forms of academic dialogue.

Esther Shoemaker.
Simon Fraser University

'Phenomenological interpretations of patient engagement in research'

> This paper draws on Husserl's notions of epoché and phenomenological reduction to interpret patient engagement in research. The epoché suspends or bracket naturalistic assumptions about the existence of the world, so as to allow phenomenological inquiry to focus on meaning or significance. Phenomenological reduction to the life-world, in turn, functions to restore the significance of the concrete world of basic life, i.e., to allow the phenomenologist access to the structures of meaning that are the basis for all inquiry (Luft 2004). In particular, it suspends the assumptions of the positive sciences. Patient engagement in research is an approach that includes patients and caregivers as partners on the research team. Arguably, this approach has become the standard for a wide variety, if not all, types of health research, driven in part by funding agency imperatives. Studies of this approach have argued that the significance of and motivation for engaging patients can be understood in terms of three sets of values: "moral or normative (e.g., empowerment and rights), instrumental or substantive (e.g., improving research quality), and process (e.g., having to do with research conduct)" (Kendall et al. 2018). However, further investigation is needed into the impact of patient engagement in research, and in particular how it affects health researchers' own understanding of their research activities, exploration of which has so far been limited (Staley 2015; 2017). This paper proposes a phenomenological approach, in which patient engagement is seen as a transformation of research. We suggest that patient engagement in research can function as an epoché or even a type of reduction, by challenging researchers' assumptions about the process of research. As with the life-world reduction, this can be seen as a way of resituating health research in the life-world, so as to expand and deepen its meaning and significance.
>
> *This paper is co-authored with Claire Kendall, Lisa Boucher and Michael Fitzgerald. Michael Fitzgerald will be presenting the paper.*

Esther Shoemaker, Postdoctoral Fellow, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada, and Affiliated Scientist, Bruyère Research Institute, is a medical sociologist and early career researcher with sex- and gender-based mixed methods expertise in health services delivery for marginalized populations.

Joe Smeeton.
University of Sheffield

'In search of meanings within child protection social work in the UK'

> Social work theory often tears itself between sociological and psychological ways to understand the human condition and, as I will argue, is always therefore left missing important ways to think about what is happening for people. This paper will draw upon phenomenology to make the case that social work should focus first of all on the lived experience of the people who use its services and to prioritise the meanings they make of their experiences prior to applying external theoretical 'professional' meanings.
>
> Theorists such as Merleau-Ponty offer a theoretical framework that sees the human condition as embodied in the social world and therefore consisting of plural accounts of experience that don't easily lend themselves to oversimplified ontical descriptions of the social or psychological realms that claim to explain the commonalities of 'humanity'. Social work is therefore able to work within a more ethical mode of practice and Levinas adds a richness to current ethical frameworks to support a questioning about social work practice.

Joe Smeeton has practiced, taught and researched social work within the UK for the last 30 years. He has focused much of this work within child protection social work and with looked after children. He is particularly interested in the knowledge bases that inform social worker's decision-making and especially how the risk paradigm has impacted upon organisational and individual decisions. More recently Joe is exploring the use of phenomenology as a way of understanding and theorising about social work. Joe has taught at the Universities of Sheffield, Salford, East Anglia and Nottingham Trent. He has developed qualifying and post-qualifying programmes and has also acted as external examiner at a number of other programmes.

Benedict Smith.
University of Durham

'Experiences of Anxiety: Exploring the phenomenon for therapeutic benefit'

> Anxiety is the most common mental disorder in primary care and higher education counselling settings. Observations from clinical psychotherapy suggest a shift in reporting towards "I have anxiety", an object-related sensation, rather than "I feel anxious", a subject-related sensation. In anxious states individuals are typically highly vigilant, attentive to and at times preoccupied with the external world. The physical symptoms of anxiety – breathlessness, increased heart rate – draw attention back to the inner experience of the body, but as with anxious thoughts, they are often reported as 'intrusive'.
>
> In response to the increase in help-seeking students a programme of workshops entitled 'Calm to the Core' was developed within a higher education counselling setting, as an applied phenomenological therapeutic alternative to individual counselling sessions. Group facilitated workshops help participants to explore and share the lived experience of anxiety, through a series of movement and breath-based enquiries. Our interest is whether these workshops increase body awareness and specifically awareness of how the individual experiences and organises their contact with the world. A helpful way to understand the benefit of this approach is by utilizing Merleau-Ponty's account of embodiment, particularly how an enhanced sense of embodied agency can help mitigate the effects of previously 'intrusive', passively-experienced, anxious symptoms.

This paper addresses the practical application of phenomenology to common mental disorders for therapeutic benefit. Some modalities of psychotherapy have a rich tradition of employing phenomenological methods within a talking therapy. Here, movement is central to the approach, combined with an emphasis on the group verbal sharing of first-person lived experiences. Diagnoses of anxiety, particularly in young adults, are increasingly becoming part of how such people regard their identity. An increased understanding of anxiety is thus urgent. To this end this paper will present pilot research findings from the workshops and set-out areas for future research.

This paper is co-authored with Caroline Greenwood Dower, who will be presenting the paper.

Dr Benedict Smith is Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Durham University. His research interests include phenomenology, philosophy of psychiatry, Wittgenstein and Hume. Dr Smith's research has focused on narratives of depression and the value of lived-experience in an interpersonal setting. His current research uses related phenomenological insights to address experiences of anxiety.

Sadaf Soloukey.
Erasmus Medical Center, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

'Phenomenological Embodiment in Patients with Spinal Cord Injury Receiving Neural Implants'

Spinal Cord Injury (SCI) is a field of research currently experiencing unprecedented results in functional recovery of patients due to neurotechnological developments. As such, the number of patients with SCI receiving neural implants is expected to increase steadily. However, current literature seems to lack a parallel development focused on users' experience in terms of implanted tool incorporation or embodiment of neurotechnological devices in general. As such, we ignore how interwoven neurotechnological efforts are with human experience, and how vital accurate considerations in this process are for treatment success.

In a previous publication, I developed a theoretical framework forembodiment in neuro-engineering and defined three concepts that facilitate 'transparency': functionality, sensorimotor feedback and affective tolerance. Based on these concepts, I discuss practical guidelines for clinicians which can contribute to the actual success of embodiment: 1) The 'Patient Preference Diagnosis', which warms up the patient for the existential reorientation and 2) The 'Patient Transparency Diagnosis' during and after implantation, which provides the patient with possibilities to fine-tune the level of incorporation. However, this attempt to capture the complexity of tool incorporation into a single theoretical framework might be inherently limited and calls for a move back from the bench to the actual bedside.

In this paper, we present the results of a series of in-depth interviews with five SCI patients receiving temporary neural implants as part of a clinical trial. Based on our previously published embodied phenomenological framework, we questioned our patients on domains including 1) body image, 2) expectations of the neural implant, 3) their judgement on the possibility of incorporation of the device and 4) their 'ideal' implant. Interviews were performed both pre- and post-implantation, subjected to thematic analysis and compared against the backdrop of the previously mentioned theoretical framework based on embodied phenomenology as developed by group.

Sadaf Soloukey is a MD/PhD-Candidate in the departments of Neuroscience and Neurosurgery at the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Sadaf holds two MSc-degrees (Neuroscience and Health Economics) and one MA-degree (Philosophy, cum Laude). Sadaf's research interests lie in neuro-technology and include neuromodulation for Spinal Cord Injury. Additionally, Sadaf works on

identifying the phenomenological implications of neuro-technological interventions in the clinical domain.Sadaf's applied philosophical work has so far received multiple awards, including the prestigious prof. Brouwer Prize awarded by the Dutch Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) to the best philosophical thesis of that academic year.

Lucienne Spencer.
University of Bristol

'The phenomenological impact of hermeneutical injustice'

> Fricker coined the term 'hermeneutical injustice' to highlight gaps in the interpretive framework where experiences of marginalised groups ought to be. Fricker illustrates hermeneutical injustice primarily through the victims of sexual harassment prior to the 1960s: without the term 'sexual harassment' at their disposal, the victim was not only incapable of discussing sexual harassment but also lacked the hermeneutical resources to fully make sense of the experience themselves. Fricker identifies a primary harm in hermeneutical injustice, through which the victim is undermined as a 'knower', and a secondary harm, through which the victim encounters practical disadvantages such as being unable to report sexual harassment. The purpose of this talk is to draw out a further, phenomenological harm that is overlooked in the literature.
>
> For Merleau-Ponty, speech expression is a manner of employing one's body to engage with the world. Prior to expression, there lingers nothing in the mind but a 'vague fever'. Only upon expression does this 'vague fever' transform into meaningful communication. As a gesture, speech expression does not signify meaning; rather words are saturated with meaning through their expression. Merleau-Ponty emphasises the role of speech expression as fundamental to the activity of projecting oneself toward the world.
>
> Hermeneutical resources are created and sustained by those who belong to privileged groups, and as such are designed to express their privileged experiences. Armed with speech expression, the hermeneutically advantaged move through the world with a pre-reflective openness. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, I will argue that hermeneutical injustice causes a disruption of the patterns of embodiment in marginalised subjects, who are unable to engage with the world in the same way as their privileged counterparts. As speech expression is a fundamental aspect of embodiment, I will show that hermeneutical injustice constitutes a breakdown of the body-world synthesis for marginalised subjects.

I'm a third-year SWW-DTP funded PhD student at the University of Bristol under the supervision of Havi Carel (and co-supervised by Lisa El Refaie of Cardiff University). My research spans the areas of phenomenology, epistemic injustice and the philosophy of illness. Through my thesis, I hope to develop an account of the experience of psychiatric illness through Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of speech expression. Given my interest in widening participation, I have been involved in the 'Insights into Philosophy' scheme targeted at state schools across Bristol and am the Postgraduate Representative for the Society for Women in Philosophy UK.

Jessica Stanier.
Wellcome Centre for Cultures and Environments of Health, University of Exeter

'A phenomenological consideration of the meaning and function of repetition in self-harm'

Repetition is a common aspect of psychological and sociological definitions of self-harm or non-suicidal self-injury. While recent qualitative research has explored thoughtfully the key importance of authenticity, secrecy, relationality and embodiment to experiences and understandings of self-harm, the function of repetition remains under-theorised. Psychological literature has explored repetition either through research into hospital readmissions, focused on clinical understandings of risk and treatment, or through framing self-harm as a maladaptive coping mechanism which might be straightforwardly replaced. Thus a more thorough, nuanced attentiveness to the function and experience of repetition might be beneficial.

Phenomenology, as an approach, explicitly concerns itself with processes of embodied meaning constitution. In particular, the Husserlian notions of association, affectivity, temporality, and dynamic objective sense, together with more contemporary insights from critical phenomenologists, invite inquiry into the many complex layers of experiential constitution, as it is situated and embedded in political contexts. By exploring how initial experiences develop into senses of familiarity, through the lived body, this phenomenological perspective allows us to ask how the practice of self-harm becomes something to which one returns.

In this paper, we approach the question of repetition in relation to self-harm phenomenologically. Thus we explore how meaning-constitution might complicate simplistic binaries of appropriate or maladaptive 'coping mechanisms' and the possibility of their substitution. Moreover, we consider how the recognisable lived sense, which develops through repetition, might sustain the simultaneous instability and familiarity of understandings and practices of self-harm. Finally, we discuss the significance of embodied accrual for the personal, unstable, unending negotiation between practice, self, and society contained within experiences of self-harm. We think speculatively through qualitative data and personal reflections, engaging with lived experience(s) without claiming universality. Rather, we attempt to open a space in which to explore and attend to the meaningfulness of repetition in experiences of self-harm.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Veronica Heney.

'Painful experience and constitution of the intersubjective self: a critical-phenomenological analysis'

Pain is ordinary and integral to our experiential topography; a 'background texture' of pain characterises our whole lives. I flinch away from a hot pan as it brushes against my arm at the stove. I absent-mindedly rub my shoulder, relieving the dull ache from sitting at my desk too long. If we consider these routine and mundane ways in which pain features in everyday experience, it becomes clear that - far from presenting only through unusual and excruciating events - pain is familiar and, in many ways, vital for navigating the world. Pain draws our attention to our bodies as they pertain to our surroundings. And while everyday pain is often a far cry from the overwhelming agony of extreme injury, it is nonetheless recognisable as pain across these various contexts.

Pain relief and treatment is a huge global pharmaceutical industry, based on a medical conception of pain as a set of quantifiable and calculable conditions in a physiological body. This notion of pain fails to account for social and political contexts which constitute subjects

in pain, as they are alternately marginalised, disbelieved, prioritised, or cared for; the status of their painful experience garners significance in this relational intersubjective context.

By taking a critical-phenomenological approach, this paper seeks to critique and further reductionistic conceptions of pain by better accounting for the complex contextual and intersubjective variation of painful experiences. We articulate how painful experience involves several phenomenological levels – from the hyletic to the intersubjective – differentially affected by the subject's social, political, and cultural situation. We suggest that this critical-phenomenological account might be integrated into lifeworld-based approaches to care and treatment of pain, through social and political engagement, as well as raising some critical points of investigation for phenomenology in itself.

This paper is co-authored and co-presented with Nicole Miglio.

Jessie Stanier is a PhD student at the Wellcome Centre for Cultures and Environments of Health at the University of Exeter. She takes an engaged approach to her transdisciplinary research on phenomenology, ageing, and older age, collaborating with publics affected by the lived realities of ageing and caring. In her PhD thesis, she aims to shed new light on normative determinants of ageing and how they affect lived experiences and possibilities for older people. She is co-supervised by Dr Robin Durie, Dr Felicity Thomas, and Prof Luna Dolezal. She completed her MA in Philosophy at KU Leuven, Belgium, in 2018.

Margaret Steele.
University College Cork

'Weight-Based Shame as an Affective Determinant of Health'

> Dolezal and Lyons (2017) have argued that shame may be an 'affective determinant of health.' They include weight as a potential site of such shame, and they recommend further research including, "Explore shame associated with different health problems and in different settings." (2017, 262) In this paper, I take up that invitation, describing how shame might be a determinant of health for fat/obese people, due to its effects on their constitution of their own bodies as sites of "I can."
> Weight-based shame can make people reluctant to engage in physical activity.This reluctance is partly explained by a desire to avoid the acute shame associated with, for example, a derisive comment about one's body. This fear of how others might respond to one's body could itself have a negative effect on health by directly reducing one's movement.
> However, I argue that there is also a deeper problem: Weight-based shame, I suggest, affects how people constitute themselves not just as objects but as subjects. When we move less as a result of weight-based shame, we lose strength, endurance and agility. I argue this diminished capacity is directly given in experience. The body itself feels stiffer, more easily fatigued. The body's correlates, spaces and terrains, feel inaccesible, even hostile. The body comes to feel like a burden instead of a site of agency. Thus weight-based shame not only reduces a person's movement; it can also reduce both their perceived and their actual ability to move.
> Iris Marion Young said women in a sexist society are physically handicapped. I make a similar claim about fat/obese people in a fatphobic society. It seems cruelly ironic that fat/obese people are shamed for moving too little in a society that handicaps them in their efforts to move.

Dr Margaret Steele is a lecturer in philosophy at University College Cork. Her research interests include philosophy and phenomenology of health, particularly in relation to fatness, fitness and food. Her work in this area draws not only on scholarly resources but also on her direct experience of living as a fat person.

Hamid Taieb.
University of Hamburg

'Walther on the Reality of Communities'

This paper focuses on a crucial question of social ontology addressed by Gerda Walther, namely that of knowing whether a community has its own reality over and above its individual members, e.g. human beings, and its "products", e.g. language, religion, infrastructures, works of arts, etc. As this paper would like to show, Walther has a nuanced answer, whose specificity is to combine elements coming from the phenomenological and the Marxist traditions.

Her view, close to that of "Hegel and socialists" (1923: 123), is that communities are sui generis entities, with their own reality. These social structures, nonetheless, are grounded in specific mental acts of the individuals that constitute them. Based on fine-grained phenomenological analysis, Walther identifies the exact kind of mental acts that are required: these are "we-experiences" (1923: 70-–80). In addition, she holds that communities – at least human communities – are grounded in the bodies of their members, and this, as she adds, reveals a correct intuition of "historical materialism" (1923: 125). As for the "products" of communities, a notion that Walther borrows from Husserl, they are "manifestations" or "signs" of the "life of the community". Although the community can be said to be founded in them, its reality cannot be reduced to these manifestations, as Marx and some (Austro-)Marxists philosophers already defended, Walther says (1923: 28–29 and 139).

Walther's account of communities builds a harmonious view, which acknowledges the thesis, defended in the (Hegelian-)Marxist tradition, that social structures have their own reality, while enriching it, from a phenomenological point of view, with a detailed explanation of the way this reality is grounded in individual psychic lives. As such, Walther's theory is the earliest encounter between phenomenology and Marxism, prior to Tran Duc Thao or Sartre, and, thus, occupies a major position in the history of engaged phenomenology.

Hamid Taieb is an Alexander-von-Humboldt postdoctoral research fellow working at the University of Hamburg. He wrote his PhD at the University of Lausanne and the École pratique des hautes études, Paris, and held positions at the Universities of Geneva and Salzburg. His areas of research are Austro-German philosophy, including early phenomenology, and the Aristotelian tradition. He has published a monograph on the sources of Brentano's theory of intentionality (Springer, 2018) and written several articles on the Austro-German and Aristotelian traditions.

Juan Toro.
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen

'The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why disability does not entail pathological embodiment'

In the last 50 years, discussions of how to understand disability have been dominated by the medical and social models. According to the medical model, disability can be understood in terms of functional limitations of a disabled person's body caused by a pathological condition,

to be treated and cured through rehabilitation or normalization. In contrast, the social model claims that disability is not an individual physical condition, but is rather the outcome of oppressive conditions imposed by society on physically impaired people. Paradoxically, both models overlook the disabled person's experience of the lived body, thus reducing the body of the disabled person to a physiological body.

Based on a co-authored paper (by Juan Toro, Julian Kiverstein, and Erik Rietveld ['The Ecological-Enactive Model of Disability: Why Disability Does Not Entail Pathological Embodiment']) I introduce the Ecological-Enactive (EE) model of disability. The EE-model combines ideas from phenomenology, enactive cognitive science and ecological psychology with the aim of doing justice simultaneously to the lived experience of being disabled, and the physiological dimensions of disability. More specifically, we put the EE model to work to disentangle the concepts of disability and pathology. From an ecological-enactive perspective, we locate the difference between pathological and normal forms of embodiment in the person's capacity to adapt to changes in the environment by establishing and following new norms. From a phenomenological perspective, we distinguish normal and pathological embodiment of disabled people in terms of the structure of the experience of I-can and I cannot. The I-cannot experienced by the non-pathologically disabled person can be understood as a local I-cannot, with a background of I-can: I-can do it in a different way, I-can ask for help, etc. This contrasts with the experience of I-cannot of the pathologically embodied person, which deeply pervades their being-in-the-world. To ensure that the discussion remains in contact with lived experience, we draw upon phenomenological interviews we have carried out with people with Cerebral Palsy.

This paper is co-authored with Julian Kiverstein and Erik Rietveld. Juan Toro will present the paper.

I'm a PhD student at the Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, and a researcher at the Enactlab – an interdisciplinary team of researchers, artists, journalists and practitioners working on solutions for complex problems faced by minorities in society. In my research, I combine an empirical approach to physical disabilities – focusing on cerebral palsy – with insights from phenomenology, 4E cognition and ecological psychology.

Giuseppe Torre.
University of Limerick, Ireland

'Noise, Phenomena and the Digital Psychosis'

With respect to digital technologies, noise is something that is at once both fought and sought. We may wish to minimise noise in communications but require it for encrypting the very content communicated. We may wish to minimise noise when recording sound but also want to use it to improve the fidelity of the recording process.

The catch is that noise is both an abstract idea and a concrete thing that does not sit comfortably in relation to systems that are deterministic/probabilistic, such as digital technologies. This is a fact that computer scientists know well but that is systematically overlooked in order to safeguard and improve the functioning of digital technologies, such as digital instruments. Indeed beyond the plethora of different kinds of noises, the comparison between analogue and digital technologies highlights the existence of just two types of noise: one that is naturally occurring (noise) and one that is humanly constructed (pseudo-noise).

Digital technologies operate by moving from noise to pseudo noise, in order to then 1) crystallise reality into mathematical constructs and 2) create realities from mathematical

constructs. This makes the digital realm a type of technology different from any other, namely, one in which noise is fiercely fought and used for the digitisation process but then relentlessly sought, and always denied, within the digital realm.

This observation points to at least two further implications: one is that noise may point to essential differences between analogue and digital technologies; the second is that the presence or absence of noise may lead to either crippled or diverse phenomenologies. To this extent, digital technology, rather than revealing by challenging (Heidegger), has more to do with enabling a psychotic stance towards reality - one in which reality has been made to conform to our mathematically constructed idea of it … and one which might be too much even for a phenomenologist to overcome. These arguments will be developed from the perspective of a digital art practitioner.

This paper is part of a preconstituted panel with Fabio Tommy Pellizzer and Basil Vassilicos: "Phenomenologies of Noise - Three studies". See preconstituted panel overviews.

I am a lecturer in Digital Arts at the University of Limerick (Ireland). My research interest lies at the crossroads between digital art practices, open source technology/culture and philosophy. These interests respond to a questioning of the relationships between art and technology and that has so far led me to question under what forms and forces truly creative efforts may, or may not, arise.

Basil Vassilicos.
Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick, Ireland

'Noise as positive phenomenon: assessing the constraints of a "no-noise" principle in phenomenology'

Noise, under a myriad of forms, seems to be a basic fact of the universe with which a number of sciences have to wrestle. It thus seems like a phenomenon or group of phenomena from which philosophy cannot escape and for which it ought to muster some sort of account. In this paper, we propose to assess the philosophical resources available for such an account, with particular scrutiny on the capabilities of a phenomenological approach to noise. Our hypothesis is that phenomenological philosophy may be hamstrung when it comes to noise. On the one hand, this has to do with its more or less externalist leanings to reject hylomorphism and any corresponding notion of raw sense data; on the other, this concerns its Gestalt-like commitment to the view that the content of mental episodes has its origins in, but cannot be reduced to, non-independent inputs. While both such commitments garner much support today from philosophers of different stripes, the question is whether they dispose phenomenological philosophy to operate on the basis of a 'no-noise' principle, whereby noise either falls outside its purview or is only understood as something that is disturbing or lacking in relation to experience.

A predilection towards such a no-noise principle in phenomenological philosophy will be established through an analysis of Ingarden's phenomenological aesthetics. Taking Ingarden as the focus presents a couple advantages. First, the workings of a no-noise principle can be clearly demonstrated in terms of the latter's analyses of both cognitive-perceptual and aesthetic experience, and can be probed in terms of whether he can account for noise as positive phenomenon, that is, as constitutive of an aesthetic or cognitive property. What's more, insofar as Ingarden's approach coheres with a number of strands of phenomenological research pursued after Husserl, our analysis raises a question about whether other phenomenological perspectives have embraced or avoided a no-noise principle, as for instance can be seen when it comes to contemporary interest in the concept of 'aboutness' or intentional content.

This paper is part of a preconstituted panel with Fabio Tommy Pellizzer and Giuseppe Torre: "Phenomenologies of Noise - Three studies". See preconstituted panel overviews.

Basil studied at Penn State in the U.S.A. and completed his PhD at the University of Leuven, after which he taught and researched there for a number of years. From 2016, he has been Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick, in Limerick, Ireland. Recent research topics include the philosophy of self-conscious emotions, collective freedom, and the relationship between language and gestures.

Sabina Wantoch.
University of Sheffield

'Navigating "mad" experience: An application of Multiple Realities to anomalous experience'

> This presentation is about 'mad experience': the experience of living with voices, visions (also called hallucinations/ delusions), and focuses on tensions between the social movement of Mad-Pride as a marginalised community and the dominant 'consensus world'. I introduce the framework of Multiple Realities in classical phenomenology as a tool that can be helpful in navigating these tensions and something that the 'consensus world' can use in order to be more accessible for these experiences, rather than 'colonising' these ways of being and knowing.
> I introduce the dominant narrative about madness – the biomedical model of psychiatry – and explain how this can have existential implications for its subjects through its implicit commitments to claims about their assumed place in the social world as knowers. I argue that this can implicate 'epistemic out-casting' for the person: out-casting them from the possible realms of knowledge. This 'realm' is a guarded space, sustained through intersubjectivity of the 'consensus world' which is influenced by this dominant narrative of psychiatry. I then introduce the contemporary, peer support based Mad-Pride and Hearing Voices movements as radically different ways of framing these experiences, that do not have the exclusionary commitments of the dominant model of psychiatry – the model that largely permeates the 'consensus world'; i.e. mainstream society. After exposing these tensions, I introduce and apply James's (1912) and Schutz's (1945) Multiple Realities as a way to frame mad experience, and also these peer-support based radical movements. I argue that if the dominant narrative about madness, which exists through psychiatry and implicit cultural narratives, could apply the Multiple Realities in its framing of these experiences, then the consensus world could be more accessible for experiencers of madness: the intersubjective gatekeeping of the consensus world could relax its grip by acknowledging other [mad] forms of knowing.

My research is about anomalous experiences (experiences of voices/ visions, otherwise called hallucinations) and how the way that they are framed may affect the very experiences themselves. I use some theoretical groundwork in phenomenology to cache out what might be going on in these experiences, focusing on the role of the interpersonal world; especially trauma. I then look at different ways that society frames these experiences – the dominant narratives of psychiatry as well as alternative approaches – and use this groundwork to analyse how these frameworks might impact anomalous experiencers as well as their very anomalous experiences. I am looking at the wider feedback loops that exist between the experience of voices/visions, trauma, and the interpersonal world: how it frames these experiences, narratives about these experiences and the interpersonal power dynamics that exist in different sorts of interventions.

PRECONSTITUTED PANELS OVERVIEW

"Engaging phenomenology in the neurosciences" *– preconstituted panel*

Before becoming a subject of study in philosophy classes, phenomenology is the method that underpins all of science. Husserl conceived phenomenology as an a priori science of essences, but it has developed through other important authors during the beginning and first half of XX century (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012; Moran, 2000; Zahavi, 2003). Engaging phenomenology in the contemporary scenario means embracing the legacy of the classics and also exploring its potential for different fields of knowledge, such as politics, public space, health. Phenomenology is a methodical effort to describe the basic structures inherent to conscious experience, such as embodiment, spatiality, temporality, intentionality, intersubjectivity, and to analyse their possible deviations and derailments (Fuchs, 2002). In recent years phenomenological approaches contributed to psychiatry and psychopathology by providing novel theoretical frameworks (Sass, Parnas, & Zahavi, 2011) and defining the subjective essence of experience more clearly.

The aim of this panel is to explore how the phenomenological method can contribute to neurosciences through three different areas of research: to bridge the gap between the brain and lived experience allowing to understand mental disorders as not merely reducible to brain dysfunctions and brain disorders as consequence of abnormal mental experience; to offer a multidisciplinary account of autism, linking the role of the body and intercorporeality with recent findings in philosophy of neuroscience under the predictive brain hypothesis; and to improve care in people with epilepsy by implementing the neurophenomenological paradigm through systematic interviews, which allow people with epilepsy to recognise subjective seizure "warning signs".

The aim of the panel is to present findings already recognised by the scientific and academic community, and to go a step further by showing the necessity of a paradigm shift capable of improving the understanding and treatment of neurological conditions and neurodiversity.

Prisca Bauer. 'Engaged phenomenology: neurology beyond the brain'
Valeria Bizzari. 'A multidisciplinary analysis of autism: predictive engagement and the living body'
Francesca Brencio. 'Shifting the paradigm. Neurosciences and the phenomenological challenge'

For affiliations, abstracts, and profiles see speaker abstracts.

"Dementia and the Phenomenology of Play" *– preconstituted panel*

This panel seeks to dismantle key assumptions fueling the "tragedy discourse" that until recently has held absolute dominance in defining the narrative of living with dementia and caring for someone living with dementia. Closely linked with the de-personalizing and pathologizing biomedical model, the tragedy discourse reduces living with dementia to an intolerably undignified and increasingly pathetic state of human existence. Gradually, counter-narratives are being put forward that aim to re-humanize those who live with the condition. The first talk on this panel theoretically introduces and justifies such counter-narratives through engagement with the phenomenological work of Edith Stein and Eugen Fink, focusing on Stein's account of empathy and Fink's ontology of play. The second talk describes and explains an ongoing applied project, *The Joy of Dementia (You've Got to Be Kiddin!)*, which the co-presenters run jointly and which stands as a compelling example of engaged phenomenology in the service of an urgent social cause.

Frances Bottenberg. 'Toward a non-privative framing of dementia experience: Lessons on play and empathy from Eugen Fink'
Mary Fridley and Susan Massad. 'Creating a New Performance of Dementia'

For affiliations, abstracts, and profiles see speaker abstracts.

"Engaging with Online Spaces" *– preconstituted panel*

Despite its interest in sociality, phenomenology has, with few exceptions (Kekki 2020; Osler 2020; forthcoming) said very little about interpersonal encounters and shared experiences in online space. Phenomenology of sociality typically focuses on embodied face-to-face encounters. Online interactions seem to take place in a virtual disembodied arena and therefore appear to lack the concrete qualities that phenomenology has taken most interest in. However, there is now increasing recognition that we should not treat our online and offline lives as dichotomous realms, pitting the "real" against the "virtual". When we enter online spaces, we do not exit our offline worlds entirely; the latter shapes and constrains how we access and engage with the former. Our online and offline lives are, therefore, in many ways deeply intermingled: we often interact with people we know both offline and online, and pursue interests that cut across both the "real" and virtual world (e.g. politics, art, culture). Moreover, when we log onto our laptop or pick up our phone to go online, we do not leave our bodies behind. We still inhabit a body that we use to manipulate the technologies granting access to online spaces — and via these technologies and embodied interactions, we integrate these online spaces into the physical spaces of our homes and habits, and we use them to share emotions and experiences with others.

This panel explores some of the ways that we engage with online spaces. The two talks comprising this panel consider questions like: When we talk about online spaces are we simply being metaphorical? Or do our online experiences have spatial dimensions? If so, how should we understand these dimensions and the ways they shape our experience of sharing online spaces with others? How do we use online spaces to regulate, express, and share emotions with others? How might the Japanese philosopher Tetsurō Watsuji's phenomenology of aidagara ("betweenness") help us better understand the character of online spaces?

Joel Krueger. 'Taking Watsuji online: aidagara and expression in the techno-social niche'
Lucy Osler. 'Blending spaces: techno-social niches and emotion regulation in the age of the Internet'

For affiliations, abstracts, and profiles see speaker abstracts.

"Phenomenologies of Noise - Three studies" *– preconstituted panel*

The aim of this panel is to contribute to a burgeoning discussion of phenomena of noise (rumore, σαματς, Gërausch, bruit, lawaai). There are a number of questions here that merit attention. In the first place, noise is a phenomenon ineluctable within scientific and technological research and theory; that is, one cannot understand if not embrace a naturalist perspective without having some familiarity with a concept of noise. At the same time, noise under some guise or other (as raw sense data or bodily affects, the (back)ground or horizon for intentional objects, disturbances and irregularities within one's perceptual field) figures as an underlying premise of a number of contemporary views on the nature of human experience. This points to a first question about the relationship and crossover between noise

as a scientific and as a human phenomenon - is each commensurate with the other or not, and what implications may be drawn from this? A second question has to do whether phenomena of noise may be considered as limited to perceptual states or to one type of perceptual state (aural), or as co-extensive with a variety of forms of human experience. Is there also type of noise involved in the ways in which one may have self-awareness, for instance, in temporal awareness, in agentive awareness or bodily awareness, or in meaning-intention awareness? May there be a case for noise having a role in emotions and feelings, or in how one relates to others; is there also noise in ethical or practical deliberation, or noise in acts of communication or sharing (gesture, empathy)? A third question has to do with the descriptions a philosophical or phenomenological perspective could attribute to phenomena of noise, and the resources disposed of in order to do so. Is noise simply a case of 'unmeaning' or of a lack of either form or content? Is it to be understood as the hither side of the explananda of philosophy, the mere leftover of whatever philosophy sets out to account for; meaning, being, totality, etc.? May noise be understood as a positive phenomenon in its own right, one which has distinctive features and indeed even content, difficult though they might be to pin down? In other words, is contemporary philosophy or phenomenology in a position to give a robust account of phenomena of noise, or is noise relegated to the status of a derivative phenomenon, something which by necessity must fall outside of philosophical explanation or phenomenological inquiry – and is this because of a fault within philosophy and phenomenology, or because of some arcane nature of noise itself?

In this panel, we thus adopt the perspective that the concept and phenomena of noise instantiate a number of important questions for contemporary philosophical research. The papers in this panel will address such questions by exploring three areas in which attention to phenomena of noise may extend and contribute to phenomenological philosophy. A first paper will explore the experience of noise in relation (and in contrast) to the phenomenological concept of constitution and sense through unity-of-manifold structures. Within this framework, also via concrete examples, the paper pinpoints essential features of the 'strange meaningfulness' of noise, as a halo effect that surrounds and intersects our experience of things and ourselves. A second paper will examine noise through both the digital and the analogue lens. The argument proposed is that the distinction between a calculable/pattern-able noise and incalculable/un-pattern-able one not only points to peculiarities of the digital but may also lead towards a phenomenology of the digital governed by a psychosis. A third paper will attempt to sketch out an account of noise by inquiring how it might fit into a phenomenological aesthetics, with particular attention to the question whether noise may become an aesthetic or perceptual property in its own right (e.g., the crackle on a vintage LP).

Fabio Tommy Pellizzer. 'The Sounds of the Manifold. Towards a Phenomenology of Noise'
Giuseppe Torre. 'Noise, Phenomena and the Digital Psychosis'
Basil Vassilicos. 'Noise as positive phenomenon: assessing the constraints of a "no-noise" principle in phenomenology'

TRANSPARENCY

The BSP aims to be transparent in how we organise, promote and host all our events including our annual conference. This means everything from the call for papers and speaker selection, through to seeking feedback. You can find information on all these things below, including speaker demographics.

Feedback

One of the key aspects of our annual conference is listening to participants, and acting upon their feedback. Each year we send out a survey to attendees after the event to better understand what went well, what not so well, and how we can improve things going forwards. These anonymised results are combined with results from previous years so we can understand where we are and are not making progress. We then share a summary and full slidepack of the results. So, look out for a feedback email after AC2020, and to find out what people thought of last year's conference, please check out the AC2019 feedback page:

https://www.britishphenomenology.org.uk/bsp-annual-conferences-attendees-tell-us-what-they-think/

Call for Papers

The AC2020 call for papers was released 1 February 2020 and closed on 31 March 2020. It was promoted on our website, on academic lists (Philos-L and PhilEvents), and over our social channels (Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn). Here is the original call for papers guidance (that appeared alongside the overall theme – see page 5):

Abstracts:

We welcome papers across a broad range of areas. These include, but are not limited to:

> Health and Social Care (medicine, medical humanities, physiotherapy, maternity, disability)
> Mental Health and Psychological Theories (psychology, psychotherapy, psychiatry, childhood development, trauma studies)
> Public Policy and Society (education, policing, law, economics, politics and international relations, science and technology [STEM])
> History and Theory of Phenomenology (perception, the body, sexuality, emotion, ethics and morality, key thinkers in the history of phenomenology, feminism, gender, race, existentialism, philosophy of religion, phenomenological theology, philosophy of technology)
> Art (fine art, photography, video games, poetry, literature, film, architecture, music)

We are looking for contributions from these categories and others, across multiple perspectives, from practitioners and philosophers (including both the European / Continental and Anglo-American / Analytic traditions). Also, submissions from postgraduate researchers, who will be considered in a separate student panel.

**Abstract submission demographics:**

Abstract acceptance demographics:

(1) Gender balance, abstract submission and acceptance

(2) Balance of students and non-students, abstract submission and acceptance

Selection process

The selection process is advertised on the conference webpages during the CfP period. The selection panel is made up of experts in academic and practitioner phenomenology who are members of the BSP executive committee and the host university. The panel proceeds with multiple blind reviews, in other words, abstracts are reviewed without the name, profile or any details of the person submitting the proposal being available to the reviewers. Accordingly, submissions are judged on the strength of the submission alone. Each member of the panel assesses each paper individually, giving it a score for how the abstract engages with phenomenology and how it speaks to the theme of the conference. The papers with the highest overall score are selected for acceptance against how many slots we are able to provide at the conference. This means each year we unfortunately receive more high quality abstracts than for which we are able to provide space. Due to the nature of the process and the quantity of abstracts, while we notify everyone on the outcome of their submission, we are unable to supply individual feedback on those which are unsuccessful at being selected.

UNIVERSITY OF EXETER

The Centre's vision is to create and sustain cultures and environments that enable health and well-being across the life course.

The Centre combines expertise from the humanities, social sciences, and medical sciences to address complex health challenges: the mental health of young people; the social needs of ageing populations; the emergence of new infections and antibiotic resistance; and the damaging effects of poverty, weakened support networks, and social isolation.

Recognising the need to engage more fully with communities, policy-makers, and practitioners in order to co-create the conditions for health and well-being, the Centre's research aims to determine how health and well-being are shaped by cultural contexts, environmental conditions, and social relations in the past and present and to extend the evidence base for cross-sectoral policies and interventions that help to create and sustain `healthy publics'.

The Wellcome Centre for Cultures and Environments of Health is physically based on the Streatham campus of the University of Exeter, can be found online at www.wcceh.org and can be followed on all social media as @wcceh.

Based at the University of Exeter in the UK, Egenis is committed to providing research of the highest International standard into the nature, historical precedents, and philosophical, social and scientific implications of developments in contemporary biosciences. We are interested in all of the life sciences' socio-political, ethical, as well as epistemic repercussions. We have active research strands on: cognitive sciences and the study of embodiment; biomedical and clinical research; environmental and agricultural science; and data science and artificial intelligence. We have pioneered new approaches to the understanding of genomics, stem cell science, symbiosis, model organisms, data-intensive research, systems and synthetic biology, heredity, translational research, and microbiology.

We have a strongly interdisciplinary culture, encompassing a range of perspectives from the social and natural sciences, history and philosophy. The Egenis membership is engaged in developing and running a highly innovative, interdisciplinary research projects in cooperation with a range of external partners. This   research is characterised by its variety of output modes, impact vectors, and policy applications.

We routinely host workshops, event and visitors in these research areas, are home to the journal *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences*, are active in the boards of many international academic societies and organise a biennial European summer school. This lively research culture finds its roots in Egenis' foundation in 2003 as the *ESRC Centre for Genomics In Society* under the directorship of John Dupré. After 10 years of producing internationally excellent social science research on the social impact of developments in genomic science, the focus and scope evolved as reflected by our current title.

BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY

The British Society for Phenomenology is a not-for-profit organisation set up with the intention of promoting research and awareness in the field of Phenomenology and other cognate arms of philosophical thought. Currently, the society accomplishes these aims through its journal, events, and podcast.

BSP Membership

The Society welcomes new members from whatever fields of endeavour that interest them in phenomenology and related continental and analytic thought. Our members include philosophers, psychologists, psychotherapists, social workers, artists, and teachers, among others.

Membership includes a year's print subscription (four issues) of the *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, with access to 50+ years of articles via the online journal through the Taylor and Francis website.

If you have any questions before joining, please don't hesitate to contact the Membership Secretary at membership@britishphenomenology.org.uk.

Journal Subscription

Your membership will include a subscription to the JBSP starting today. The journal subscription is for one year (four issues). The first edition you will receive in print will be the next issue to be published. You will also receive full electronic access to the journal. Once the publisher process your new subscription, they will contact you by the email you specify below with instructions of how to claim your membership.

Fees

BSP membership rates per year are £40 for a standard membership and £20 for a student, unwaged or emeritus membership.

To join the society, please fill out the application form on our website:
https://www.britishphenomenology.org.uk/membership/.

Thank you for supporting the British Society for Phenomenology with your membership. If you have any questions at all, please contact: membership@britishphenomenology.org.uk.

JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY

The JBSP is one of the longest standing phenomenological publications in the world. The journal publishes papers on phenomenology and existential philosophy as well as contributions from other fields of philosophy engaging with topics in the tradition of Phenomenology. Papers from researchers in the humanities and the human sciences interested in the philosophy of their subject will be welcome too. Space is also given to research in progress, to interdisciplinary discussion, and to book reviews.

In each annual volume we aim to publish one Special Issue covering themes of contemporary significance. Proposals for such issues should be submitted to the editorial collective. The person(s) proposing will usually serve as Guest Editor.

JBSP at Taylor & Francis Online: advanced access to articles as they are published, 50+ years of essays.

The JBSP is led by an editor-in-chief, managed by an editorial collective, and supported by an editorial advisory committee. To find out more about the journal, including its aims, how to access it, or how to contribute, see our JBSP webpage. To contact the editors: journal@britishphenomenology.org.uk.

BSP PODCAST

The BSP Podcast is a regular audio streaming service free to all. Its aim is to both promote the British Society for Phenomenology and its activities, as well as preserve, archive, and share the work of phenomenologists associated with the society. The content is generated primarily from recordings of papers given at our events.

Go to:
www.britishphenomenology.org.uk/podcast/

All episodes are hosted on Podbean, indexed on the BSP Podcast page, and can also be found on iTunes and all good podcasting apps by searching 'BSP Podcast'.

BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY ONLINE

Our online homepage is the place to go to find out what is happening at the BSP and in the world of phenomenology.

We post news items about our journal articles, podcast, events, as well as CfPs, events, and book releases from other organisations.

Go to:
www.britishphenomenology.org.uk/

We would love to publicise BSP members' essays, books, conferences, and activities via our website, and over our social channels. Just give us a shout: contact@britishphenomenology.org.uk.

BSP SOCIAL MEDIA

www.facebook.com/britishphen/   https://twitter.com/BritishPhen   www.linkedin.com/company/thebsp

BSP EXECUTIVE

The BSP is represented by an Executive Committee (ExCo), a voluntary body within and composed from the society's membership. Executive committee representatives may serve by fulfilling a specific role (or roles) for the society, or in a purely advisory capacity. The ExCo is committed to ensuring the success and growth of the society.

Executive with roles
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British Society for Phenomenology