Argumenta – CfP – The Phenomenological Turn in Analytic Philosophy of Mind

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Call for papers for Argumenta: Journal of Analytic Philosophy, editors: Michele Di Francesco, Marco Facchin, Giulia Piredda, & Giacomo Zanotti.

Journal of Analytic Philosophy


The Phenomenological Turn in Analytic Philosophy of Mind

Guest editors: Michele Di Francesco (IUSS Pavia), Marco Facchin (IUSS Pavia), Giulia Piredda (IUSS Pavia), Giacomo Zanotti (IUSS Pavia)

Invited Contributors:
> Jérôme Dokic (Institut Jean Nicod)
> Anna Giustina (University of Liège)
> Angela Mendelovici (University of Western Ontario)
> Elisabetta Sacchi (San Raffaele Vita-Salute University, Milan)
> Alfredo Tomasetta (IUSS Pavia)
> Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin)

Important dates
> Deadline for submission: November 30, 2022
> Notification of acceptance: February 28, 2023

Description: Two assumptions have long prevailed in the analytic tradition. First, intentionality has to be conceived as some sort of naturalistic relation holding between a subject’s mental states and the objects these states represent. Second, phenomenology pertains only to sensory states. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have broken free of this tradition. While these new proposals are fairly heterogeneous, they revolve around two major theses. First, the claim that the intentionality of mental states is best understood in terms of a subject’s phenomenal experience, and that indeed all forms of intentionality are rooted in phenomenology (cf. Kriegel 2014; Mendelovici 2018). Secondly, the claim that phenomenology extends beyond the sensory domain and covers a subject’s thought and propositional attitudes (cf. Pitt 2004; Horgan 2011). This diversion is rapidly gaining momentum, so much so that we are witnessing a phenomenological turn taking place in analytic philosophy of mind, challenging more traditional approaches.

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