CfP – “The Phenomenology of Joint Action”: Philosophical Psychology journal

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Approaching deadline for abstracts for “The Phenomenology of Joint Action. Structure, Mechanisms, and Functions”, Special Issue of Philosophical Psychology journal.

Call for papers
Special Issue of Philosophical Psychology:
“The Phenomenology of Joint Action. Structure, Mechanisms, and Functions”
Guest editors: Franz Knappik & Nivedita Gangopadhyay (University of Bergen)
Deadline for abstracts: 31 January 2020

Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists have extensively studied the “sense of agency” and other aspects of the phenomenology of individual action. Joint action has been the topic of much work in these disciplines, too, but that work has focused on issues about the structure, ontogenesis and neurophysiology of joint action. The phenomenology of joint action has only recently become a topic of contemporary debate in philosophy and other cognitive sciences.

It is the aim of this special issue to promote this emerging interest in the phenomenology of joint action, and to provide an interdisciplinary forum for discussing questions about the structure, mechanisms and functions of our experience of joint action. We invite contributions from all relevant fields, including analytic philosophy, phenomenology, theoretical and experimental psychology and neuroscience. Empirical researchers who reflect upon their work from a theoretical/philosophical perspective, and theoretical psychologists and neuroscientists casting a perspective on the empirical literature, are particularly encouraged to submit.

Questions to be addressed in the special issue include the following:
> Does the phenomenology of joint action include the same elements as the phenomenology of individual action, or are there differences?
> Are the phenomenal features of joint action distinctly intersubjective, and if so, what makes this the case?
> What cognitive and neural mechanisms underlie the phenomenology of joint action, and what factors modulate that phenomenology?
> Does the experience of joint action display effects of intentional binding?
> What are the functions of our experience of joint action with regard to factors like ontogenesis of joint action capacities; the coordination, monitoring and control of joint action; first-personal knowledge about joint action; and our practices of holding agents responsible for their actions?
> What can we learn about the phenomenology of joint action and its functions by exploring cases of conflict and breakdown (e.g. misunderstandings, relevant psychopathological conditions), large-scale and complex cases of joint actions, cases with a particularly strong and complex phenomenology (e.g. dance, theatre, music, cult actions, group therapy, and social-political activism), and human-machine interaction?

Important dates:
> January 31, 2020: deadline for abstracts (ca. 500 words), to be sent to the guest editors at [email protected] and [email protected], with “Abstract Special Issue PhilPsych” as subject.
> February 15, 2020: notification about whether the planned paper is suitable for submission.
> July 31, 2020: deadline for submission of papers (max. 10.000 words) for double blind peer review at

For more information, including a bibliography and a more detailed description of the topics and questions to be addressed in submissions, please consult the extended version of this Call for Papers.