Monthly Phenomenology: Angela Mendelovici (Western Ontario)

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A series of online workshops organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research: Next talk Friday, 20 May 2022.

MONTHLY PHENOMENOLOGY
An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology

Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed will stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights in recent debates in analytic philosophy.

Schedule: The talks will take place once a month on a Friday from September to June. Time: 10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.

Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to [email protected]erlin.de with the heading “Registration Monthly Phenomenology”. A zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.

Next talk:
Angela Mendelovici (Western Ontario)
Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
Friday, 20 May 2022
10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET

Abstract: Perceptual experiences seem to in some sense have singular contents. For example, a perceptual experience of a brown dog seems to represent some particular dog as being brown. There are important phenomenological, intuitive, and semantic considerations for thinking that perceptual experiences represent singular contents, but there are also important phenomenological, epistemic, and metaphysical considerations for thinking that they do not. This paper proposes a two-tier picture of the content of singular perceptual experiences that is based on phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality combined with self-ascriptivism about derived representation, a combination of views that allows mental states to have two types of contents: phenomenal contents and derived contents. On the proposed picture, singular perceptual experiences represent singular phenomenal contents, which do not involve worldly objects, as well as singular derived contents, which do involve worldly objects. This picture accommodates and reconciles the considerations for and against thinking that perceptual experiences have singular contents.

NB: This talk by Angela Mendelovici replaces that by Clare Mac Cumhaill (Durham University).

Upcoming talks:
Kyle Banick (Chapman University/California State University Long Beach)
Husserl, Experiential Conceptualism, and Stone Duality
3 June 2022

Convenors:
Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)
Marta Jorba (University Pompeu Fabra)
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research