Monthly Phenomenology: Chad Kidd ‘Sensory and Cognitive Presence to Mind’

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Announcement of the next talk of the series on Friday, 26 February 2021. Organized for the Network for Phenomenological Research.

Monthly Phenomenology:
An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology

Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights to recent debates in analytic philosophy.

Schedule: The talks take place once a month on a Friday for 8 months (with a break in March). Time: 10:15am EST/EDT, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.

Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to [email protected] with the heading “Registration Monthly Phenomenology”. You will be registered to our mailing list and a zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.

Next talk:
Chad Kidd (City University of New York)
Sensory and Cognitive Presence to Mind
Friday, 26 February 2021
10:15am EST, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET

Abstract: What is it for a thought to be conscious? In this talk, I will articulate and defend the view, presented separately by Tim Crane and Marta Jorba, that thoughts and sensory experiences are both conscious in the same fundamental way: they are both phenomenally conscious occurrences in the stream of consciousness in which the contents of thoughts and sensory experiences are made manifest to the subject. It is compatible with this view that, even though they are conscious in the same way, thoughts and sensory experiences nonetheless have distinctive phenomenal characters. I will argue that the phenomenal characters of thoughts and sensory experiences are distinctive, not because they have completely different contents, but because they employ different modes of presentation of their contents. To make this case, I will develop a concept of the “mode of presentation” of a content that is inspired by the Husserlian/phenomenological notions of “constitution” and active and passive synthesis.

Upcoming talks

Marta Jorba (University Pompeu Fabra)
Possibilities for Action in Thought
9 April 2021

Anna Giustina (University of Liège)
Acquaintance and Inner Awareness
7 May 2021

Joel Smith (University of Manchester)
Perceptual Demonstratives in the Logical Investigations
25 June 2021

Matt Bower (Texas State University)
The Problem of Objectual Phenomenology
9 July 2021

Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research