Monthly Phenomenology: Marta Jorba – ‘Possibilities for Action in Thought’

BSP News Item Thumbnail

Marta Jorba (University Pompeu Fabra) at the Monthly Phenomenology series of talks, Network for Phenomenological Research, Online, Friday 9 April.

An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology

Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights to recent debates in analytic philosophy.

Schedule: The talks take place once a month on a Friday for 8 months (with a break in March). Time: 10:15am EST/EDT, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.

Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to [email protected] with the heading “Registration Monthly Phenomenology”. You will be registered to our mailing list and a zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.

Marta Jorba (University Pompeu Fabra)
Possibilities for Action in Thought
Friday, 9 April 2021
10:15am EDT, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET

Abstract: According to Husserl’s phenomenology, the intentional horizon is a general structure of experience. However, its characterisation beyond perceptual experience is a quite unexplored aspect of the mind. In this talk I argue that there is a viable notion of cognitive horizon that presents features that are analogous to features of the perceptual horizon. Then I propose to characterise a specific structure of the cognitive horizon—that which presents possibilities for mental action—as a cognitive affordance, a key notion in ecological psychology. Finally I explore a prominent kind of cognitive affordances, i.e., those that are linguistically embedded, arguing that the phenomenon of silently talking to ourselves can be characterised both as a mental action and as a verbal affordance. This conceptualisation provides a new framework with significant implications for the metaphysics and epistemology of inner speech, as well as for the main philosophical and psychological theories of inner speech.

Upcoming talks

Anna Giustina (University of Liège)
Acquaintance and Inner Awareness
7 May 2021

Joel Smith (University of Manchester)
Perceptual Demonstratives in the Logical Investigations
25 June 2021

Matt Bower (Texas State University)
The Problem of Objectual Phenomenology
9 July 2021

Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research