Monthly Phenomenology, New Season (2022–2023)

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The convenors announce a new season starting with Philipp Berghofer: ‘Why We Need a Phenomenological Turn in Epistemology’ (28 October).

An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology

Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed will stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights in recent debates in analytic philosophy.

Schedule: The talks will take place once a month on a Friday from October to May. Time: 10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.

Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to [email protected] with the heading “Registration Monthly Phenomenology”. A zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.

Philipp Berghofer (University of Graz)
Why We Need a Phenomenological Turn in Epistemology
28 October 2022

Abstract: Contemporary analytic epistemology is dominated by externalist approaches. In this picture, evidence is not constituted by our experiences but by facts and the epistemic status of our beliefs is not determined by what is internally accessible to us but by external factors such as reliability. This implies that there is nothing intrinsically special about experience. The process of experiencing may lead to justified beliefs, but only if this process qualifies as reliably producing true beliefs. My objective is to introduce, motivate, and defend a phenomenological experience-first epistemology. This system rests on the cornerstones that (1) all epistemic justification and every piece of knowledge can be traced back to epistemically foundational experiences and that (2) justification-conferring experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their distinctive presentive phenomenology. I submit that there are various types of justification-conferring experiences, including (types of) perceptual experiences, intellectual experiences, evaluative experiences, and introspective experiences, such that every type of justification-conferring experience exhibits a distinctive justification-conferring phenomenology. I will specify some of the virtues of this phenomenological epistemology and ponder what it implies for the relationship between epistemology and science.

Programme continues:

Walter Hopp (Boston University)
Knowledge and the Foundations of Intentionality
18 November 2022

Katja Crone (TU Dortmund University)
Personal Identity, Narrativity, and the Self-understanding of Persons
9 December 2022

Ditte Munch-Jurisic (University of Virginia/University of Copenhagen)
Vagueness in Emotion Perception: Disorientation as the Norm?
20 January 2023

Alba Montes Sánchez (University College Cork)
Towards a Phenomenology of Migrant Nostalgia
10 February 2023

Davide Bordini (University of Fribourg)
31 March 2023

Jonathan Mitchell (Cardiff University)
The Intentional Horizons of Visual Experience
21 April 2023

Marie Guillot (University of Essex)
26 May 2023

Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)
Marta Jorba (Pompeu Fabra University)
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Philipps University Marburg)

Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research