The Network for Phenomenological Research are very pleased to announce the new season of Monthly Phenomenology (2021-2022). Begins 24 September.
An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology
Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed will stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights in recent debates in analytic philosophy.
Schedule: The talks will take place once a month on a Friday from September to June. Time: 10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.
Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to [email protected] with the heading “Registration Monthly Phenomenology”. A zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.
Elijah Chudnoff (University of Miami)
Friday, 24 September 2021
10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET
Abstract: There is a felt difference between following an argument to its conclusion and keeping up with an argument in your judgments while failing to see how its conclusion follows from its premises. In the first case there’s what I’m calling an inferential seeming, in the second case there isn’t. Inferential seemings exhibit a cluster of functional and normative characteristics whose integration in one mental state is puzzling. Several recent accounts of inferring suggest inferential seemings play a significant role in the process, but none provides a fully satisfactory understanding of inferential seemings themselves. In this paper I critically examine theoretical options on offer in the existing literature, then develop an alternative view. I’ll also discuss implications for recent debates about general principles governing inference, such as Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification and Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
Anna Ichino (State University of Milan)
Conspiracy Theories, Superstition, and Imagination
29 October 2021
Jean Moritz Müller (University of Bonn)
Knowing Value and Acknowledging Value
12 November 2021
Anna Bortolan (Swansea University)
Epistemic Emotions and Self-Trust: A Phenomenological Proposal
17 December 2021
Witold Płotka (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw)
Blaustein on Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality: Sources, Context and Main Arguments
14 January 2022
Sanneke de Haan (Tilburg University)
The Uses of Phenomenology and Enactivism for Psychiatry
25 February 2022
Hayden Kee (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Interhorizonality? Perception, Language, Thought
11 March 2022
Elisa Magrì (Boston College)
29 April 2022
Clare Mac Cumhaill (Durham University)
Anscombe and Murdoch on the Phenomenology of Scale and Distance
20 May 2022
Kyle Banick (Chapman University/California State University Long Beach)
Husserl, Experiential Conceptualism, and Stone Duality
3 June 2022
Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)
Marta Jorba (University Pompeu Fabra)
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Goethe University Frankfurt)
Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research