Next Talk of “Monthly Phenomenology”: Jean Moritz Müller (University of Bonn)

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On behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research, Jean Moritz Müller presents ‘Knowing Value and Acknowledging Value’: 12 November 2021.

Announcement of the next talk of the series:
An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology

Description: This series of talks gathers together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind. It establishes a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed will stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights in recent debates in analytic philosophy.

Schedule: The talks will take place once a month on a Friday from September to June. Time: 10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes, including a 45 minutes Q&A.

Participation: Talks are held on zoom. To participate, please send an email to [email protected] with the heading “Registration Monthly Phenomenology”. A zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk.

Next talk
Jean Moritz Müller (University of Bonn)
Knowing Value and Acknowledging Value
Friday, 12 November 2021
10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT, 4:15pm CET

Abstract: On a popular view, emotions apprehend value properties exemplified in our surroundings (e.g. Roberts 2013; Tappolet 2016; Mitchell 2020). This view (which I call the Epistemic View) conceives of their primary significance in epistemic terms: the point of emotions is to make us aware of value. In this talk, I argue against the Epistemic View and motivate a different account on which the significance of emotion is practical rather than epistemic. In the first, negative part, I show that the Epistemic View radically misconceives the intentionality of emotion. Emotions are directed at something in response to values we have already apprehended. This is incompatible with emotions themselves affording awareness of value (cf. von Hildebrand 1916; Mulligan 2010; Müller 2017). In the main, positive part of my talk, I argue that, given their responsive character, emotions are more adequately conceived as ways of acknowledging value. Accordingly, we should think them as practically rather than epistemically significant: as forms of acknowledgment emotions confer validity upon values, making them ‘count’, instead of making them known.

Upcoming talks

Anna Bortolan (Swansea University)
Epistemic Emotions and Self-Trust: A Phenomenological Proposal
17 December 2021

Witold Płotka (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw)
Blaustein on Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality: Sources, Context and Main Arguments
14 January 2022

Sanneke de Haan (Tilburg University)
The Uses of Phenomenology and Enactivism for Psychiatry
25 February 2022

Hayden Kee (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Interhorizonality? Perception, Language, Thought
11 March 2022

Elisa Magrì (Boston College)
29 April 2022

Clare Mac Cumhaill (Durham University)
Anscombe and Murdoch on the Phenomenology of Scale and Distance
20 May 2022

Kyle Banick (Chapman University/California State University Long Beach)
Husserl, Experiential Conceptualism, and Stone Duality
3 June 2022

Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva)
Marta Jorba (University Pompeu Fabra)
Alessandro Salice (University College Cork)
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Organized on behalf of the Network for Phenomenological Research