CfP: Early Phenomenology and Phenomenological Realism

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Please send contributions (articles or book reviews) til 31 of May 2024. The journal accepts contributions in French, German, English.

AUC Interpretationes: Call for Papers
Early Phenomenology and Phenomenological Realism

Early Phenomenology (also referred to as the “Munich and Göttingen Circles” of phenomenology) arises in the early 20th century as a response to, and later on develops in critical distance from, the phenomenological method as it was first programmatically introduced through the publication of Husserl’s “Logical Investigations”. Authors such as Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein, Gerda Walther, Moritz Geiger, Jean Hering, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Alexander Pfänder are interested in – besides the transcendental and psychological-descriptive elucidation of consciousness – metaphysical, logical, socio-philosophical problems, in relation to which the new phenomenological approach is developed and shaped.

This issue is broadly interested in the historical and systematic discussion of the people, works, and themes of Early Phenomenology. This includes notably the authors already mentioned, all of whom have published important contributions in the “Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung” that are in some cases very under-researched. Beyond that, the work of other early phenomenologists such as Wilhelm Schapp, Herbert Leyendecker, Kurt Stavenhagen, Else Voigtländer and Paul Linke may be discussed. Contributions that deal with the historiography of phenomenology – for example, Herbert Spiegelberg’s notion of a “Phenomenological Movement” or early phenomenology’s relationship to contemporaneous movements – such as Neo-Kantianism, Object Theory, or Psychologism, are also welcome.

A further possible topic regards the idea of realist phenomenology as such. Contributions here may deal with the topic of idealism/realism, or with how this distinction is articulated in metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological approaches to central phenomenological concepts such as intentionality, knowledge (Erkenntnis), and objectivity. While a schism between Husserl and his “early followers” is traditionally understood via distinguishing idealism and realism, it is not self-evident that Husserl or the early phenomenologists endorsed idealist or realist positions in any straightforward sense. In this regard, we also welcome contributions that discuss basic assumptions of a realist phenomenology, for example in relation to phenomenology of being, essence, states of affairs, values, or psychological instances.

Finally, the editors welcome contributions that deal with more recent forms of realist phenomenology, especially insofar as they are understood to be inherited from, or resonate with, early phenomenological figures. The promise of phenomenology to lead “back to the things themselves” may therefore be discussed and reassessed as broadly as possible.

Please send your contributions (articles or book reviews) until the 31st of May 2024 to Daniel Neumann ([email protected]). The journal accepts contributions in French, German and English. Please take into consideration the formal guidelines:

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